STEPHEN MARTIN SCOTT, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. DUTTON-LAINSON COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-882 / 08-0365
Filed February 19, 2009
STEPHEN MARTIN SCOTT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
DUTTON-LAINSON COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Eliza J. Ovrom,
Judge.
Appeal from the district court judgment in a products liability case.
REVERSED.
Michael Jones of Patterson Law Firm, L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellant.
J. Campbell Helton of Whitfield and Eddy, P.L.C., Des Moines, for
appellee.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Potterfield, J., and Huitink, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2007).
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SACKETT, C.J.
Plaintiff-appellant, Stephen Scott, appeals from the district court judgment
entered in his suit against defendant-appellee, Dutton-Lainson Company, the
manufacturer of a swivel jack for a boat trailer. He claims the court erred in
excluding (1) evidence that Dutton-Lainson modified the pin of the swivel jack
following Scott’s injury and (2) testimony concerning a statement by an officer of
Dutton-Lainson that it modified the swivel jack as a result of Scott’s injury. He
also claims a substantial right was affected by the court’s exclusion of the
evidence Dutton-Lainson modified the pin. We reverse.
I.
Background and Proceedings.
Plaintiff, the manager of a boat dealership, was injured when the swivel
jack on a boat trailer collapsed when he attempted to move the boat and trailer
and the tongue of the trailer landed on his foot. He sued the trailer manufacturer
and the trailer jack manufacturer, alleging the jack failed due to defects in its
design and manufacture and the negligence of the defendants. He also alleged
the defendants failed to warn him adequately of the danger.
Before trial, the defendants filed a motion in limine pursuant to Iowa Rule
of Evidence 5.104 and Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.431 for a ruling on
preliminary questions of admissibility of certain evidence including subsequent
remedial measures. Plaintiff dismissed the trailer manufacturer, but proceeded
to trial against Dutton-Lainson. At the beginning of trial, the court sustained the
motion. The court submitted the case to the jury on theories of design defects
and failure to warn properly. The jury returned a verdict finding Dutton-Lainson
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was not at fault. The court entered judgment for the defendant and dismissed
the plaintiff’s claim.
II.
Scope and Standards of Review.
Our review is for correction of errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4; Tucker v.
Caterpillar, Inc., 564 N.W.2d 410, 412 (Iowa 1997). Trial courts are granted
broad discretion concerning the admissibility of evidence, and reversal is
warranted only if the court clearly abused its discretion, to the complaining party’s
prejudice. Horak v. Argosy Gaming Co., 648 N.W.2d 137, 149 (Iowa 2002); see
also Iowa R. Evid. 5.103(a).
Therefore, our review of the court’s decisions
concerning admissibility of evidence is for an abuse of discretion. Jensen v.
Sattler, 696 N.W.2d 582, 585 (Iowa 2005).
III.
Analysis.
A. Subsequent Remedial Measures. The plaintiff contends the court
erred in excluding evidence the defendant modified the pin in its swivel jack after
his injury. Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.407 governs the admissibility of evidence of
subsequent remedial measures:
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken
previously, would have made the event less likely to occur,
evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove
negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event. This
rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent
measures when offered in connection with a claim based on strict
liability in tort or breach of warranty or for another purpose, such as
proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures,
if controverted, or impeachment.
The rule is “not a general rule of exclusion,” but rather “a rule precluding the
evidentiary use of remedial measures to prove negligence.” McIntosh v. Best
Western Steeplegate Inn, 546 N.W.2d 595, 597 (Iowa 1996).
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Rule 5.407 was adopted before Iowa adopted the Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Product Liability sections one and two for product defect cases.
See
Wright v. Brooke Group, Ltd., 652 N.W.2d 159, 169 (Iowa 2002). The language
of the rule excludes evidence of remedial measures if offered “to prove
negligence,” but does not require exclusion if offered “in connection with a claim
based on strict liability in tort.” Iowa R. Evid. 5.407. In Wright, the supreme
court, after a lengthy discussion of strict liability and negligence in product liability
cases and changes in the analytical framework since earlier Iowa cases stated,
with reference to design defect claims, “we prefer to label a claim based on a
defective product design as a design defect claim without reference to strict
liability or negligence.”
Wright, 652 N.W.2d at 169.
The court noted “the
Products Restatement does not place a conventional label, such as negligence
or strict liability, on design defect cases.” Id.
This shift in Iowa jurisprudence turns our focus to the official comment to
the rule, which provides, in pertinent part:
The Rule excluding evidence of subsequent repairs originally
rested on the notion that such repairs were irrelevant, or had little
probative value, to the issue of the defendant’s antecedent
negligence. More recently, Courts and legislatures have frequently
retained the exclusionary rule in negligence cases as a matter of
“public policy,” reasoning that the exclusion of such evidence may
be necessary to avoid deterring individuals from making
improvements or repairs after an accident. However, when the
context is transformed from a typical negligence setting to the
modern products liability field, the “public policy” assumptions
justifying this exclusionary rule are no longer valid. This is because
it is unrealistic to suggest that the contemporary corporate mass
producer of goods, the normal products liability defendant, who
manufactures tens of thousands of units of goods, will forego
making improvements in its product, and risk enumerable additional
lawsuits and the attendant adverse effect upon its public image,
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simply because evidence of adoption of such improvements may
be admitted in an action founded on strict liability or breach of
warranty for recovery on an injury that preceded the improvement.
...
. . . Courts that have held Federal Rule of Evidence 407 or a
similar state statute inapplicable in products liability actions have
generally noted that a products liability case looks to, or
emphasizes a defect in the product, rather than any conduct or
culpable act on behalf of the manufacturer. . . .
Therefore, it is the Committee’s position that relevant
evidence should not be excluded from a products liability case by
an obsolete evidentiary rule when modern legal theories,
accompanied by economic and political pressures, will achieve the
desired policy goals.
Iowa R. Evid. 5.407 Official Comment (1983) (emphasis added).
Because this design defect case “emphasizes a defect in the product,
rather than any conduct or culpable act on behalf of the manufacturer,” we
conclude rule 5.407 should not act to exclude evidence of subsequent remedial
measures in a design defect case. We conclude the district court abused its
discretion in excluding evidence of subsequent modifications in the design of the
swivel jack.
With the adoption of sections one and two of the Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Product Liability, product’s design is defective:
when, at the time of sale or distribution, . . . the foreseeable risks of
harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by
the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the seller or
other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of
distribution, and the omission of the alternative design renders the
product not reasonably safe.
Parish v. Jumpking, Inc., 719 N.W.2d 540, 543 (Iowa 2006) (quoting the
Restatement, section two).
B. Affecting a Substantial Right. The plaintiff claims the court erred in
excluding the evidence the jack was modified because it “was relevant and highly
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probative” and excluding the evidence adversely affected him and prejudiced his
substantial right to a fair trial. See Iowa Rs. Evid. 5.402, 5.403. We agree. The
evidence of a subsequent change in design is relevant to the fact finder’s
consideration whether the prior design was defective.
C. Admission of a Party Opponent. The plaintiff contends the court
erred in excluding the testimony or deposition evidence of an officer of the
dismissed defendant, Prestige Trailers, that referred to a conversation with Mr.
Haase, an engineer and officer of Dutton-Lainson.
In the conversation, Mr.
Haase reportedly said Dutton-Lainson changed the design of the jack in
response to the accident. The plaintiff contends the evidence should have been
admitted as an admission of a party opponent. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.801(d)(2)
(providing an admission by a party opponent is not hearsay). We agree that the
testimony offered falls within the ambit of rule 5.801(d)(2).
IV.
Conclusion.
The district court abused its discretion in applying rule 5.407 to exclude
evidence of subsequent design changes.
prejudiced the plaintiff’s substantial rights.
The exclusion of such evidence
Rule 5.801(d)(2) excepts the
proffered admission by a party opponent from exclusion as hearsay. We reverse
the judgment of the district court.
REVERSED.
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