IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF DEBRA R. RO DGERS AND DENNIS A . SCHNEIDER Upon the Petition of DEBRA R. RODGERS f/k/a DEBRA R. SCHNEIDER , Petitioner - Appell ee , And Concerning DEN NIS A. SCHNEIDER , Respondent - Appell ant .
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-869 / 07-1892
Filed February 19, 2009
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF DEBRA R.
RODGERS AND DENNIS A. SCHNEIDER
Upon the Petition of
DEBRA R. RODGERS f/k/a
DEBRA R. SCHNEIDER,
Petitioner-Appellee,
And Concerning
DENNIS A. SCHNEIDER,
Respondent-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Palo Alto County, Nancy L.
Whittenburg, Judge.
Appellant challenges the denial of his request for summary judgment in an
action to modify an injunction, claiming that the district court erred in ruling that
he was required to file a petition for postconviction relief before being able to
modify the injunction. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Timothy Braunschweig of Braunschweig Law Firm, Algona, for appellant.
Richard Meyer of Fillenwarth & Fillenwarth, Estherville, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Potterfield, J. and Robinson, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2007).
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VAITHESWARAN, P.J.
Dennis Schneider appeals the denial of his motion for summary judgment
in an action to modify an injunction.
I.
Background Facts and Proceedings
This case has a lengthy and convoluted procedural history, only some of
which is relevant to the ruling that is challenged here. Dennis Schneider and
Debra Rodgers divorced in 1998. Several months after the dissolution decree
was entered, Rodgers applied for a permanent injunction against Schneider to
prevent a claimed pattern of harassment. The application was filed under the
same caption as the dissolution matter even though the dissolution decree
contained no injunctive relief. Following a hearing, the district court issued an
injunction directing Schneider to have no contact with Rodgers. The order was
dated April 1, 1999. Schneider did not appeal the order.
A state district court subsequently found Schneider in contempt for
violating the injunction and sentenced him to thirty days in jail.
Schneider
petitioned a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus. The federal district court
focused on whether Schneider exhausted state court remedies before
proceeding to federal court. The court concluded that a state court needed to
determine whether a state postconviction relief action was a cognizable means of
challenging a finding of criminal contempt. The court stated,
If the state courts determine that a postconviction relief
application will not lie from a conviction for criminal contempt, then
it will be clear that Schneider has both attempted to exhaust state
remedies and that the State’s postconviction relief process is
“ineffective” to protect his rights.
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Schneider’s federal court petition was ultimately dismissed without prejudice.
Meanwhile, Schneider filed a state court petition to modify and clarify the
April 1, 1999 injunctive order. This petition, like the injunction that it challenged,
was filed under the caption of the dissolution action and alleged several grounds
for dissolving the injunction, including changed circumstances. Years after filing
the petition, Schneider moved for summary judgment. He asserted that the 1999
order was actually a chapter 236 (1999) domestic abuse injunction which
automatically expired one year after its issuance. He also raised constitutional
grounds for dissolution of the injunction. The district court denied the motion.
Relying on the federal court’s ruling concerning exhaustion of state court
remedies, the court concluded, “If Respondent wishes to attack the [1999] order,
he will have to do so in a postconviction action.”
Schneider sought interlocutory review of the district court’s ruling. His
request was granted and the appeal was transferred to the court of appeals for
disposition.
II.
Analysis
Schneider first takes issue with the district court’s conclusion that he
would have to file a postconviction relief application to challenge the 1999 order.
Our review of the ruling is for errors of law. See Benavides v. J.C. Penney Life
Ins. Co., 539 N.W.2d 352, 354 (Iowa 1995).
As noted, the district court relied on the federal court decision in the
habeas corpus action. That habeas corpus action was a challenge to the state
court’s earlier finding of contempt. The procedural question before the federal
court was whether the contempt finding could be challenged in a state court
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postconviction relief action. If it could, Schneider was obligated to exhaust that
state court avenue before seeking redress in federal court. See Doty v. Lund, 78
F. Supp. 2d 898, 901 (N.D. Iowa 1999) (quoting Weeks v. Bowersox, 119 F.3d
1342, 1349 (8th Cir. 1997)) (“[A] state prisoner wishing to raise claims in a
federal petition for habeas corpus ordinarily must first present those claims to the
state court and must exhaust state remedies.”). The habeas corpus action was
not a direct challenge to the 1999 injunctive order.
This action, in contrast, is an action to modify the 1999 injunction. Setting
aside the question of whether Schneider could attack the 1999 order by filing a
petition to modify the injunction years after it was issued and the appeal deadline
had expired,1 we find no authority requiring challenges to injunctive orders such
as this to be made in a postconviction relief action. See Iowa Code § 822.2(1)
(2001) (stating statute applies to “[a]ny person who has been convicted of, or
sentenced for, a public offense”). Therefore, we reverse the district court’s ruling
denying Schneider’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that he was
required to challenge the injunction via a postconviction relief action.
Schneider also argues that the 1999 order was in fact a domestic abuse
order under Iowa Code chapter 236 and, under the authority of that chapter, the
injunction should have automatically expired within a year of its issuance. See
Iowa Code § 236.5(2)(e) (1999). The district court did not address this argument
on the merits. “It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must
1
Rodgers argued that Schneider’s action was an impermissible collateral attack on the
1999 order. The court did not address that argument or the question of whether the
changed circumstances alleged in the petition to modify rendered this a permissible
action rather than an impermissible collateral attack on the 1999 order.
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ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide
them on appeal.” Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002). As this
issue was not decided, we have nothing to review. See Stammeyer v. Div. of
Narcotics Enforcement, 721 N.W.2d 541, 548 (Iowa 2006) (“If the court does not
rule on an issue and neither party files a motion requesting the district court to do
so, there is nothing before us to review.”).
The same holds true for Schneider’s constitutional arguments. Schneider
appears to concede this. He states that he “sought a determination of other
constitutional issues, which the District Court did not address, and which are not
before this court on appeal.” These issues, therefore, are not preserved for
review and are waived. Iowa R. Civ. P. 6.14(1)(c) (“Failure in the brief to state, to
argue or to cite authority in support of an issue may be deemed waiver of that
issue.”).
Rodgers seeks appellate attorney fees. Assuming without deciding that
fees are authorized under the circumstances of this case, we decline the request
at this juncture.
III.
Disposition
We reverse the district court’s denial of Schneider’s motion for summary
judgment on the only ground properly before us. This effectively vacates the
decision of the district court.
As Schneider did not preserve error on his
remaining grounds for summary judgment, we remand for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
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