STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. WILLIAM LAWRENCE FILIPPO, JR., Defendant-Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-866 / 07-1784
Filed January 22, 2009
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
WILLIAM LAWRENCE FILIPPO, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Floyd County, John S. Mackey,
Judge.
Filippo appeals following his convictions of assault on a peace officer,
eluding, and operating while intoxicated, second offense. AFFIRMED.
Judith O’Donohoe, Charles City, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Thomas S. Tauber, Assistant Attorney
General, Jesse Marzen, County Attorney, and David Kuehner, Assistant County
Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Mahan and Miller, JJ.
2
VOGEL, P.J.
William Filippo appeals from his convictions of assault on a peace officer
while using or displaying a dangerous weapon in violation of Iowa Code section
708.3A (2007), eluding in violation of Iowa Code section 321.279(1), and
operating while intoxicated, second offense in violation of Iowa Code section
321J.2(2).
I. Speedy Trial
A. Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33(2)(b).
Filippo first asserts that the district court should have granted his motion to
dismiss because his right to a speedy trial under Iowa rules of criminal procedure
was violated. Pursuant to Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33(2)(b), a criminal
charge must be dismissed if a defendant is not brought to trial within ninety days
of his indictment, unless good cause for the delay is shown. We review a trial
court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss based on speedy trial grounds for abuse of
discretion.
State v. Campbell, 714 N.W.2d 622, 627 (Iowa 2006); State v.
Winters, 690 N.W.2d 903, 907 (Iowa 2005).
“However, that discretion is a
narrow one, as it relates to circumstances that provide good cause for delay of
the trial.” Campbell, 714 N.W.2d at 627.
On February 23, 2007, the State filed a criminal complaint against Filippo
and a motion to require Filippo’s counsel to withdraw, as she had previously
represented the trooper-victim.
denied.
Following a hearing, the State’s motion was
During subsequent proceedings, additional information came forth
regarding defense counsel’s conflict of interest that supported the State’s motion.
On May 22, 2007, the State filed a renewed motion seeking the withdrawal of
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Filippo’s counsel.
On May 29, following a second hearing, the district court
recognized the impropriety of defense counsel’s representation of Filippo, the
prejudice that could befall the State, and granted the State’s motion.1 Because
trial was scheduled for the following day, May 30, the trial date was rescheduled
beyond the ninety days, which would run on June 3, in order to afford Filippo time
to secure and prepare with new counsel.
On approximately June 17, 2007,
Filippo filed a request with our supreme court for an interlocutory appeal, which
was denied on August 14, 2007. On August 21, 2007, the case was tried to the
court on the minutes of evidence. The district court found Filippo guilty of assault
on a peace officer while using or displaying a dangerous weapon, eluding, and
operating while intoxicated, second offense.
In denying Filippo’s motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds, the district
court reasoned that the “consideration of the second motion to recuse and ruling
thereon during the only possible time frame allotted immediately prior to trial
constitutes good cause for delay.” We agree. This was not a last-minute attempt
by the State to gain additional time prior to trial, but was an ongoing effort to
secure unbiased proceedings. Once Filippo’s counsel was disqualified, it was
necessary to allow additional time for Filippo to acquire new counsel and prepare
for trial. See Campbell, 714 N.W.2d at 628 (“In determining whether there is
good cause for a delay, we focus only on one factor, the reason for the delay.”).
Thus Filippo’s right to a speedy trial was not violated under rule 2.33(2)(b).
1
Filippo’s trial counsel who was ordered to withdraw is now Filippo’s appellate counsel.
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B. The Constitutional Claim.
Additionally, Filippo contends that his right to a speedy trial was violated
under a constitutional analysis. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; State v. Petersen,
288 N.W.2d 332, 334 (Iowa 1980) (stating that when determining whether a
defendant’s constitutional right to a speed trial was violated, we balance four
factors: (1) length of delay; (2) reason for delay; (3) defendant’s assertion of his
right to a speedy trial; and (4) prejudice resulting from the delay); see also Iowa
Const. Article 1, § 10; State v. Hamilton, 309 N.W.2d 471, 475 (Iowa 1981)
(stating that the Article I, section 10 of the Iowa Constitution is implemented in
the Iowa rules of criminal procedure); State v. Orte, 541 N.W.2d 895, 898 (Iowa
Ct. App. 1995) (stating that Article I, section ten of the Iowa Constitution is
solidified by the Iowa rules of criminal procedure). However, we conclude that
“[n]o serious constitutional speedy trial challenge emerges from the record here”
and find this argument without merit. Petersen, 288 N.W.2d at 344; See State v.
Nelson, 600 N.W.2d 598, 600 (Iowa 1999) (“We have observed that [rule
2.33(2)(b)] is more stringent than the constitutional protection delineated in
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972).”). Thus,
there was no constitutional violation of Filippo’s right to a speedy trial and his
motion to dismiss was properly denied.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Finally, Filippo challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to his
conviction for assault on a peace officer while using or displaying a dangerous
weapon. We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence for errors at
law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4; State v. Lambert, 612 N.W.2d 810, 813 (Iowa 2000);
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State v. Chang, 587 N.W.2d 459, 461-62 (Iowa 1998). In order to prove Filippo
committed an assault on a peace officer while using or displaying a dangerous
weapon, the State was required to prove that (1) Filippo committed an assault as
defined in Iowa Code section 708.1; (2) that the person Filippo assaulted was a
peace officer and Filippo knew he was a peace officer; and (3) Filippo used or
displayed a dangerous weapon in connection with the assault.
Iowa Code
§ 708.3A(2); see Iowa Code § 702.7 (defining a dangerous weapon).
The evidence revealed the following:
At approximately 7:30 a.m. on
February 16, 2007, numerous 911 calls began reporting a vehicle being driven
erratically and at a high rate of speed. Subsequently, Filippo led Iowa State
Patrol Trooper Mark Domino, who was in a marked patrol car, on a high speed
chase. Trooper Domino pursued Filippo for approximately three miles with his
emergency flashers and siren activated.
After witnessing Filippo’s extremely erratic driving, Trooper Domino used
his patrol car to knock Filippo’s vehicle into the median; Filippo then drove his car
across both lanes of traffic and into a snowy ditch. Trooper Domino, who was in
uniform, ran to the driver’s door of Filippo’s vehicle, ordered Filippo to turn off the
engine and get out of the vehicle, and attempted to open the driver’s door to
remove Filippo from the vehicle. The door was locked and Trooper Domino
returned to the roadway where he pointed his weapon at Filippo and yelled at
Filippo multiple times to turn off the vehicle’s engine and get out of the car.
Trooper Domino stated that Filippo was looking straight at him.
Filippo began rocking his vehicle to free it from the snow and then drove
his vehicle straight at Trooper Domino. See State v. Greene, 709 N.W.2d 535,
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537 (Iowa 2006) (stating an automobile may be a dangerous weapon). Several
citizen witnesses stated that Filippo’s vehicle came out of the ditch directly at
Trooper Domino and that they believed Trooper Domino was going to get hit by
the vehicle. Trooper Domino, in fear of his life, shot and wounded Filippo.
We note that the district court found there was an “overwhelming amount
of corroborative evidence from numerous motorist eyewitnesses and physical
evidence secured from the scene.” Upon our review of the record, we agree with
the district court that the State proved all the elements of assault on a peace
officer while using or displaying a dangerous weapon. We have considered all
issues presented and conclude that sufficient evidence supports Filippo’s
conviction. Thus, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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