STANLEY GLEN STEWART, DEBORAH SUE STEWART, and SARA ELIZABETH STEWART, SUZI ANN STEWART and CHRISTOPHER CLARK STEWART, All Minors by their Father and Next Friend STANLEY GLEN STEWART, Plaintiffs-Appellants, vs. IOWA MACHINERY & SUPPLY CO., INC., DAVE RODGER, DAN HUNGERFORD; Defendants, JAMES BALLARD, FRANK WRIGHT, JASON STOOKESBERRY, BRAD RUSSMAN, MICHAEL MULLIHAN and SHEILA PIERSON, Defendants-Appellees.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-841 / 08-0411
Filed June 17, 2009
STANLEY GLEN STEWART, DEBORAH SUE STEWART,
and SARA ELIZABETH STEWART, SUZI ANN
STEWART and CHRISTOPHER CLARK STEWART,
All Minors by their Father and Next Friend
STANLEY GLEN STEWART,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
IOWA MACHINERY & SUPPLY CO., INC.,
DAVE RODGER, DAN HUNGERFORD;
Defendants,
JAMES BALLARD, FRANK WRIGHT,
JASON STOOKESBERRY, BRAD RUSSMAN,
MICHAEL MULLIHAN and SHEILA PIERSON,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Artis I. Reis, Judge.
Plaintiffs appeal the district court‟s grant of summary judgment to six
defendants on plaintiffs‟ claims of civil conspiracy. AFFIRMED.
Kyle T. Reilly of Thomas J. Reilly Law Firm, P.C., Des Moines, for
appellants.
Angel A. West and Debra L. Hulett of Nyemaster, Goode, West, Hansell &
O‟Brien, P.C., Des Moines, for appellees.
Heard by Vogel, P.J., and Mahan and Miller, JJ.
2
MILLER, J.
Background Facts & Proceedings
Stanley Stewart was employed by John Deere Des Moines Works. On
May 28, 2003, Stewart claimed that while exiting a forklift he stepped on some
hydraulic oil on the floor that had leaked from the forklift. He claimed that he
slipped in the oil, injuring his knee. The forklift had recently been worked on by
Iowa Machinery & Supply Co., Inc. Employees of John Deere investigated and
came to the conclusion the forklift was not leaking oil at the time of the incident.
John Deere believed that Stewart had made a false claim of a workrelated injury. A disciplinary hearing was held at which Stewart was represented
by a union member. The company found that Stewart had made a false claim of
a work-related accident and ordered him suspended for thirty days without pay.1
The Union filed a grievance on Stewart‟s behalf under the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement between the Union and the company. In an arbitration
decision, the Union and the company agreed the period of Stewart‟s suspension
would be reduced from four weeks to two weeks and he would be paid his wages
for the other two weeks.
On May 24, 2005, Stewart, his wife, and children filed suit against Iowa
Machinery alleging it was negligent in the maintenance, care, and operation of
the forklift. The plaintiffs also raised claims against individual employees of John
Deere—Dave Rodger, James Ballard, Frank Wright, Dan Hungerford, Jason
Stookesberry, Brad Russman, Michael Mullihan, and Sheila Pierson.
1
They
Stewart was a member of the International Union United Automobile, Aerospace and
Agricultural Implement Workers of America. The Union and John Deere had entered
into a collective bargaining agreement.
3
alleged the first seven of the individual employees had engaged in gross
negligence by repeatedly ignoring Stewart‟s complaints about the forklift. The
plaintiffs also claimed the individual defendants had “individually and jointly
conspired to deny the petitioned incident and Plaintiff‟s injury in a willful and
wanton and fraudulent manner so as to maliciously interfere with any and all
contractual rights that existed between Plaintiff and John Deere Des Moines
Works.”
The individual defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. On the
claim of gross negligence, the district court granted summary judgment to
Rodger, Ballard, Wright, Stookesberry, Mullihan, and Pierson.2 Thus, on the
claim of gross negligence the case proceeded against Russman and Hungerford
only. On the claim of civil conspiracy, the court granted summary judgment to
Rodger and Hungerford. The court denied the request for summary judgment on
the claim of civil conspiracy against Ballard, Wright, Stookesberry, Russman,
Mullihan, and Pierson.
Plaintiffs filed a motion seeking to amend the petition to bring claims of
defamation and slander against the individual defendants.
The district court
denied the motion, finding the amendment would prejudice the defendants
because “these new claims are substantially different than a claim of conspiracy
and would require additional discovery in order for the Defendants to adequately
prepare for trial.”
The six individual defendants against whom the civil conspiracy claim
remained outstanding subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration of the
2
We note that the plaintiffs had made no claim of gross negligence against Pierson.
4
motion for summary judgment on the civil conspiracy claim. They stated that
during discovery they became aware plaintiffs were claiming the individual
defendants had intentionally interfered with Stewart‟s rights under the collective
bargaining agreement between the Union and John Deere.
The individual
defendants asserted that, because plaintiffs‟ claims were “substantially
dependent” upon or “inextricably intertwined” with consideration of the terms and
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, the claims were preempted by
the federal Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). The district court granted
summary judgment to the remaining individual defendants on the civil conspiracy
claim on the ground that plaintiffs‟ claims were preempted under the LMRA.
Plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider the grant of summary judgment on
the civil conspiracy claim. The district court denied the motion to reconsider.
The plaintiffs then dismissed all remaining claims in the case. Plaintiffs appealed
the grant of summary judgment to the six individual defendants on the plaintiffs‟
civil conspiracy claims based on the LMRA.
II.
Standard of Review
We review the district court‟s ruling on a motion for summary judgment for
the correction of errors at law. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.4. Summary judgment is
appropriate only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3);
Kistler v. City of Perry, 719 N.W.2d 804, 805 (Iowa 2006). A court should view
the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Eggiman v. SelfInsured Servs. Co., 718 N.W.2d 754, 758 (Iowa 2006).
5
III.
Federal Preemption
Section 301 of the LMRA provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a
labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting
commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor
organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
The United States Supreme Court has determined section 301 preempts
state claims “founded directly on rights created by collective-bargaining
agreements, and also claims „substantially dependent on analysis of a collectivebargaining agreement.‟” Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 394, 107 S.
Ct. 2425, 2431, 96 L. Ed. 2d 318, 328 (1987) (citation omitted). This preemption
is
necessary
to
“ensure
uniform
interpretation
of
collective-bargaining
agreements, and thus to promote the peaceable, consistent resolution of labormanagement disputes.” Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399,
404, 108 S. Ct. 1877, 1880, 100 L. Ed. 2d 410, 417 (1988).
In tort as well as contract suits, the preemption of section 301 applies
“when resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of
the terms of an agreement made between parties in a labor contract . . . .” AllisChalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220, 105 S. Ct. 1904, 1916, 85 L. Ed. 2d
206, 221 (1985). In tort actions, we must consider “whether evaluation of the tort
claim is inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor
contract.” Id. at 213, 105 S. Ct. at 1912, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 216. We must also
6
consider whether the federal labor law, as established by section 301, would be
frustrated by bringing the tort action in state court. Id. at 209, 105 S. Ct. at 1910,
85 L. Ed. 2d at 214.
Where a tort action brought in state court is not “inextricably intertwined”
with a collective bargaining agreement, the claim is considered to be
independent and is not preempted under section 301. Lingle, 486 U.S. at 407,
108 S. Ct. at 1882, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 419. If “the state-law claim can be resolved
without interpreting the agreement itself, the claim is „independent‟ of the
agreement for § 301 pre-emption purposes.” Id. at 410, 108 S. Ct. at 1883, 100
L. Ed. 2d at 421. Thus, the preemption of section 301 does not apply to every
state law claim that relates in some manner to a collective bargaining agreement,
or to all parties covered by a collective bargaining agreement. Lueck, 471 U.S.
at 211-12, 105 S. Ct. at 1911-12, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 215-16. The issue of federal
preemption must be determined in a case-by-case basis. Barske v. Rockwell Int’l
Corp., 514 N.W.2d 917, 921 (Iowa 1994).
This case involves a tort claim of civil conspiracy. “Civil conspiracy is not
in itself actionable; rather it is the acts causing injury undertaken in furtherance of
the conspiracy which give rise to the action.” Basic Chemicals, Inc. v. Benson,
251 N.W.2d 220, 233 (Iowa 1977). “A conspiracy is a combination of two or
more persons by concerted action to accomplish an unlawful purpose, or to
accomplish by unlawful means some purpose not in itself unlawful.” Id. at 232.
The tort of civil conspiracy requires proof of an agreement or understanding to
effect a wrong against another. Ezzone v. Riccardi, 525 N.W.2d 388, 398 (Iowa
7
1994); Robbins v. Heritage Acres, 578 N.W.2d 262, 265 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998).
Civil conspiracy is “an avenue for imposing vicarious liability on a party for the
wrongful conduct of another with whom the party has acted in concert.” Wright v.
Brooke Group Ltd., 652 N.W.2d 159, 172 (Iowa 2002).
Plaintiffs‟ civil conspiracy claim alleges that the individual defendants
“individually and jointly conspired to deny the petitioned incident and Plaintiff‟s
injury in a willful and wanton and fraudulent manner so as to maliciously interfere
with any and all contractual rights that existed between Plaintiff and John Deere
Des Moines Works.”
Through later discovery plaintiffs specified that the
contractual rights they were relying upon were those arising from the collective
bargaining agreement between the Union and John Deere. Thus, the acts giving
rise to the action of civil conspiracy would be interference with Stewart‟s
contractual rights under the collective bargaining agreement.
The case of Conaway v. Webster City Products Co., 431 N.W.2d 795, 798
(Iowa 1988), involved a claim of retaliatory discharge. The court found this tort
was like the tort of interference with contractual relationships. Conaway, 431
N.W.2d at 799. The court stated, “[t]he existing valid contractual relationship
here is the employment relationship, the existence of which is a factual question
that does not depend on the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement.”
Id. The court concluded the tort of retaliatory discharge was independent of the
collective bargaining agreement, and was not preempted by section 301 of the
LMRA. Id.; see also Sanford v. Meadow Gold Dairies, Inc., 534 N.W.2d 410, 414
(Iowa 1995) (noting retaliatory discharge suit was not preempted by LMRA).
8
Although Conaway discussed the tort of interference with contractual
relationships, the case actually involved the tort of retaliatory discharge, and we
conclude it has limited relevance to the issue in this case.
In Grimm v. US West Communications, Inc., 644 N.W.2d 8, 12 (Iowa
2002), the plaintiff raised a claim of tortious interference with a contract. The
court specifically pointed out the plaintiff had chosen not to rely upon contractual
rights arising from a collective bargaining agreement, but rather was asserting
contractual rights created by an employee handbook. Grimm, 644 N.W.2d at 13.
The court noted, “[w]hen a plaintiff invokes a right created by a collectivebargaining agreement, the plaintiff has chosen to plead what we have held must
be regarded as a federal claim, and removal is at the defendant‟s option.” Id. at
14 (quoting Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 399, 107 S. Ct. at 2433, 96 L. Ed. 2d at 331).
The court concluded that the claim of tortious interference with a contract, not
based upon a collective bargaining agreement, was not preempted by the LMRA.
Id. at 15-16.
In other cases, courts have held that when a plaintiff alleges tortious
interference with contractual rights arising from a collective bargaining
agreement, the claim is preempted under section 301 of the LMRA.
See
Beidleman v. Stroh Brewery Co., 182 F.3d 225, 235 (3rd Cir. 1999); Oberkramer
v. IBEW-NECA Serv. Ctr., Inc., 151 F.3d 752, 756 (8th Cir. 1998); Turner v.
American Fed. of Teachers Local 1565, 138 F.3d 878, 884 (11th Cir. 1998);
DeCoe v. General Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 212, 218 (6th Cir. 1994); Magerer v.
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John Sexton & Co., 912 F.2d 525, 528 (1st Cir. 1990); Johnson v. Anheuser
Busch, Inc., 876 F.2d 620, 624 (8th Cir. 1989).
We conclude plaintiffs‟ claim of civil conspiracy, based on their claim the
individual defendants interfered with Stanley Stewart‟s contractual rights under
the collective bargaining agreement between the Union and John Deere, is
preempted by section 301 of the LMRA.
Plaintiffs‟ claim is “substantially
dependent” upon and “inextricably intertwined” with the collective bargaining
agreement.
We affirm the decision of the district court granting summary
judgment on this issue to Ballard, Wright, Stookesberry, Russman, Mullihan, and
Pierson.
IV.
Motion to Amend
Plaintiffs assert the district court abused its discretion in denying their
motion to amend the petition to include a claim of defamation. Plaintiffs‟ original
petition was filed on May 24, 2005. Twenty-one months later, on February 21,
2007, plaintiffs filed a motion to amend the petition, claiming defendants‟ actions
constituted slander and defamation.
The motion to amend was filed after
defendants had filed a responsive pleading, and so the petition could be
amended “only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party.” See
Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.402(4).
A district court has considerable discretion in ruling on a motion for leave
to amend the petition. Rife v. D.T. Corner, Inc., 641 N.W.2d 761, 766 (Iowa
2002). “We will find an abuse of discretion when the court bases its decision on
clearly untenable grounds or to an extent clearly unreasonable.” Id. Generally,
10
“[l]eave to amend . . . shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Iowa R.
Civ. P. 1.402(4). A court does not abuse its discretion, however, by denying a
motion to amend that would substantially change the issues in the case. See
Holliday v. Rain & Hail, L.L.C., 690 N.W.2d 59, 65 (Iowa 2004). Furthermore, a
motion to amend should be denied if the opposing party is prejudiced or unfairly
surprised. Rife, 641 N.W.2d at 767.
We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying
plaintiffs‟ motion to amend the petition. The motion was not filed until eighteen
months after the individual defendants had filed their motion for summary
judgment; after the plaintiffs had once amended their petition as of right and had
later amended it again, with leave of court; and after the plaintiffs had at least
twice been granted extensions of time to complete discovery and respond to the
defendants‟ motions for summary judgment.
The claims of slander and
defamation were substantially different than the claims of gross negligence and
civil conspiracy that had previously been raised and concerning which discovery
had been conducted. Also, the defendants would have been prejudiced by the
amendment because it would have led to the need for additional discovery, and
under existing orders all or most all discovery should have been completed at the
time the motion to amend was filed.
V.
Motion to Strike
The appellees filed a motion to strike certain materials included in the
appendix. They claim “Disciplinary Action Hearing Findings” and “Disciplinary
Hearing Minutes” were improperly included in the appendix because they were
11
not part of the record presented to the district court. The appellants resist the
motion. They point out that these exhibits were included in a list they filed, as
required by a scheduling order, of proposed witnesses and exhibits to be used at
trial. The Iowa Supreme Court has ordered that the motion to strike be submitted
with the appeal.
Following the district court‟s grant of summary judgment on the civil
conspiracy claim to the six individual defendants, the plaintiffs dismissed their
remaining claims and no trial was held. The “exhibits” in question were never
submitted to the district court for its consideration in ruling on the individual
defendants‟ motion for summary judgment or reconsideration thereof.
Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.10(1), regarding the composition of
the record on appeal, provides that “[t]he original papers and exhibits filed in the
district court . . . shall constitute the record on appeal in all cases.” Materials that
were not filed in the district court should not be included in the record on appeal.
Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 696 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Iowa 2005). We conclude the motion to
strike should be granted.
We affirm the decision of the district court granting summary judgment to
Ballard, Wright, Stookesberry, Russman, Mullihan, and Pierson on plaintiffs‟
claims of civil conspiracy.
AFFIRMED.
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