FRONTIER LEASING CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. DUFF CUNNINGHAM GOLF SHOP, INC., and DUFF CUNNINGHAM, Individually, Defendants-Appellees.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-840 / 08-0364
Filed January 22, 2009
FRONTIER LEASING CORPORATION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
DUFF CUNNINGHAM GOLF SHOP, INC., and
DUFF CUNNINGHAM, Individually,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Karen A. Romano,
Judge.
Frontier Leasing Corporation appeals the dismissal of C & J Vantage
Leasing Co.’s lawsuit against Duff Cunningham Golf Shop, Inc. and Duff
Cunningham. APPEAL DISMISSED.
Edward McConnell of Ginkens & McConnell, P.L.C., Clive, for appellant.
Stephen Lombardi, West Des Moines, for appellees.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Mahan and Miller, JJ.
2
MILLER, J.
C & J Vantage Leasing Co. (“Vantage Leasing”) sued Duff Cunningham
Golf Shop, Inc., (Cunningham Golf) and Duff Cunningham (Cunningham)
(collectively “the defendants”).
Vantage Leasing sought a return of leased
property together with money damages, claiming Cunningham Golf as lessee
and Cunningham as guarantor of Cunningham Golf’s obligations under the lease
had breached the lease by failing to make payments required by the lease. In
their eventual answer, served March 28, 2007, the defendants denied that
Vantage Leasing was the real party in interest and further stated as an
affirmative defense that Vantage Leasing was not the real party in interest.
In a ruling filed January 9, 2008, following a hearing on the defendants’
motion to dismiss on real party in interest grounds, the district court found that
the only named plaintiff was Vantage Leasing, Vantage Leasing had assigned
the lease in question to Frontier Leasing Corporation (Frontier) on April 8, 2005,
Vantage Leasing had had the ensuing time period to seek to amend its petition or
substitute parties but had failed to do so, and that the file contained no
application to amend the petition or substitute parties. Frontier, never a party to
the lawsuit in the district court, filed a “Motion to Reconsider” on January 14,
2008.
The defendants resisted the motion and the district court denied the
motion on February 15. Frontier served and filed a notice of appeal on February
22, 2008.
On appeal Frontier claims the district court erred in dismissing Vantage
Leasing’s petition because (1) by answering Vantage Leasing’s petition
3
defendants waived any right to claim Vantage Leasing was not the real party in
interest, (2) if the defendants’ answer did not constitute a waiver, the defendants
could only raise the real party in interest issue by way of motion for summary
judgment,1 and (3) a reasonable time had not been allowed for substitution of
Frontier as the real party in interest.2 The defendants in turn seek dismissal of
Frontier’s purported appeal, claiming in part (1) the appeal is untimely under Iowa
Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.5 as Frontier’s post-ruling motion did not extend
the time for a notice of appeal, and (2) Frontier, never a party to this case in the
district court, has no standing to pursue an appeal. We agree with this latter
contention and do not reach or address the other claims raised.
In Alons v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 698 N.W.2d 858 (Iowa 2005), our supreme court
addressed the question of whether several persons who had not been parties in
proceedings before the district court had standing to challenge the decree
entered by the district court. The court noted its previous pronouncement that
“standing to sue means a party must have sufficient stake in an otherwise
justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy.” Id. at
863-64 (quotations and citations omitted). The court further explained that “this
means that a complaining party must (1) have a specific personal or legal interest
in the litigation and (2) be injuriously affected. Having a legal interest in the
1
We note that in its appeal brief Frontier, as a nominal appellant, acknowledges that no
later than November 1, 2006, any previously unassigned lessor’s rights in the lease in
question had been assigned to it and notice of the assignment had been given to the
defendants.
2
See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.201 (“No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not
prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been
allowed after objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or
substitution of, the real party in interest . . . .”).
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litigation and being injuriously affected are separate requirements for standing.”
Id. at 864 (quotation and citations omitted). In addition, the court stated:
Standing is a doctrine courts employ to
refuse to determine the merits of a legal controversy
irrespective of its correctness, where the party
advancing it is not properly situated to prosecute the
action. When standing is put in issue, the question is
whether the person whose standing is challenged is a
proper party to request an adjudication of the issue
and not whether the controversy is otherwise
justiciable, or whether, on the merits, the plaintiff has
a legally protected interest that the defendant’s action
has invaded.
In short, the focus is on the party, not on the claim. Even if
the claim could be meritorious, the court will not hear the claim if
the party bringing it lacks standing.
Id. (citations omitted).
Although Alons involved a certiorari action, we believe that its reasoning
and application of rules concerning standing apply equally to Frontier’s attempt to
appeal in this case. We conclude that Frontier, never a party to the lawsuit in the
district court, had no specific personal or legal interest in that lawsuit between the
plaintiff Vantage Leasing and the defendants, thus lacks standing to pursue this
appeal, and the appeal should therefore be dismissed.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
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