STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. ROSS IAN CASHEN, Defendant-Appellee.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-719 / 07-2109
Filed February 19, 2009
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
ROSS IAN CASHEN,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marshall County, William J.
Pattinson, Judge.
The State seeks discretionary review of two district court pretrial rulings
related to disclosure of mental health records.
AFFIRMED IN PART AND
REVERSED IN PART.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jean Pettinger, Assistant Attorney
General, Jennifer Miller, County Attorney, and Suzanne Lampkin, Assistant
County Attorney, for appellant.
Kelly T. Bennett of Bennett, Steffens & Grife, P.C., Marshalltown, for
appellee.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Potterfield, JJ.
2
SACKETT, C.J.
The State sought discretionary review of two district court pretrial rulings in
the prosecution of the defendant-appellee, Ross Cashen, for domestic abuse and
willful injury. The ruling on the State’s motion in limine determined the medical
and mental health records of the complaining witness were admissible for the
limited purposes of providing “a basis for an expert’s opinion on [the complaining
witness’s] violent propensities and/or her ability to accurately observe, recall, and
relate events.” The State contends the defendant did not show a compelling
need for the evidence that outweighed the witness’s privacy interest. The court’s
order on discovery mandated that the State obtain waivers from the complaining
witness for release of her medical records. The State contends the court lacked
authority to order it to obtain waivers from the witness, who is not a party to this
case. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
I.
SCOPE OF REVIEW.
The district court is vested with wide discretion in rulings on discovery
matters. Pierce v. Nelson, 509 N.W.2d 471, 473 (Iowa 1993). Discovery rules
are to be liberally construed to effectuate disclosure of all relevant and material
information to the parties. Hutchinson v. Smith Lab., Inc., 392 N.W.2d 139, 14041 (Iowa 1986).
We will not find an abuse of discretion unless the court's
discretion was exercised on grounds or for reasons that are clearly untenable or
to an extent clearly unreasonable. State v. Blum, 560 N.W.2d 7, 9 (Iowa 1997).
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II.
BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS.
Cashen was charged with domestic abuse and willful injury. He claims he
acted with justification.
In order to support his defense, Cashen sought the
mental health records of his former wife, Chastity Schulmeister, the complaining
witness.1
The State filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence
concerning Schulmeister’s mental health history.
The court ruled the mental
health records were admissible “to the extent that they provide a basis for an
expert’s opinion on her violent propensities and/or her ability to accurately
observe, recall, and relate events.” Cashen filed an application to reconvene
Schulmeister’s deposition and to obtain her mental health and medical records.
The district court ordered the State to “secure from its complaining witness a
patient waiver” for the requested records. The court further ruled that Cashen
could reconvene the deposition after receipt of the records.
The State contends the district court erred in ordering the disclosure of
these records, arguing that Cashen failed to show a compelling interest that
outweighed the complaining witness’s privacy.
Cashen responds that the
records are necessary to establish Schulmeister’s propensity for violence and
thus strengthen his justification defense.
III.
1
RELEASE OF MENTAL HEALTH RECORDS.
From the record, it appears Cashen obtained Schulmeister’s medical records through
a private investigator. The State alleges they were obtained by subpoena, but the
record is unclear how the investigator obtained the records because he refused to
answer questions about his methods, citing the Fifth Amendment.
4
Iowa protects the privacy of communications between patient and
physician, including patient records.
McMaster v. Iowa Bd. of Psychology
Exam'rs, 509 N.W.2d 754, 758 (Iowa 1993).
That privilege, however, is not
absolute. Id. at 759. Limited disclosure of the privileged information is allowed
when there is a “compelling need” for the evidence that outweighs the patient’s
privacy interest. State v. Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d 549, 563 (Iowa 2006) (citing
McMaster, 509 N.W.2d at 759). Schulmeister has twice entered a guilty plea to a
prior instance of domestic abuse. Cashen believes that this history combined
with her admission of mental health problems will strengthen his justification
defense.
In her deposition, Schulmeister was questioned about any sort of mental
health diagnosis, she stated:
A: Well, I have posttraumatic stress disorder, so they tell
me, but I seem to be all right. And I have seen counselors and
therapists since I was about 15. And I’ve been in abusive
relationships my whole life, but they have never said I have, like,
any mental health disorders or anything, but I have been through a
lot, and I have seen counselor for that.
....
Q: Any other diagnosis of which you’re aware of? A: Well, I
think that – I’ve seen a few different doctors, and I’m not really sure
what’s in my chart, and I don’t know if they’re even the same thing
everywhere.
....
Q: PTSD, does that usually come with, like, diagnoses of
depression and anxiety as well? A: I have depression and anxiety.
Q: And there can be some—how do I tactfully put it—some
impulse control issues with posttraumatic stress syndrome; correct?
A: I have in the past been really impulsive, and I have reacted to
things. I’m getting a lot better at controlling that.
Cashen asserts this testimony is indicative of Schulmeister’s behavior and
warrants access to her medical records in order to explore her impulsiveness and
5
violent tendencies in greater detail because they support his justification defense.
Schulmeister responds that her testimony does not demonstrate a relation to any
sort of mental health diagnosis or illness; she contends that many people get
frustrated and act impulsively, yet do not have mental health problems.
Cashen relies heavily on State v. Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d 549, 563 (Iowa
2006), which allowed for the disclosure of medical records. The State contends
the facts in Heemstra differ from the present case and make it distinguishable,
arguing that Heemstra involved a criminal charge with a penalty of life in prison,
and the subject of the privilege was deceased. Cashen argues that the penalty
should not be a distinguishing factor, as his sentence could still require
imprisonment for up to ten years.
In Heemstra, the court recognized a right to privacy in medical records,
but suggested the use of a balancing test to determine whether a “compelling
need” to obtain the evidence “override[s] the privacy interest.” Heemstra, 721
N.W.2d at 563 (quoting McMaster v. Iowa Bd. of Psychology Exam'rs, 509
N.W.2d 754, 759 (Iowa 1993). Applying the balancing test to the circumstances
before it, the supreme court allowed for limited disclosure of the medical records.
Id. The court stated:
The information sought might reasonably bear on the defendant’s
possibility of success in supporting his claim of self-defense.
Specifically, he might be able to use this evidence, if it shows an
explosive disposition on [the deceased’s] part, to cross-examine
[the deceased’s] widow, who stated that [the deceased] sought
medical treatment only for depression.
This conclusion did not waive the medical privilege, but only provided for an incamera examination of the records, as the trial judge had ordered previously.
6
Cashen argues that he seeks Schulmeister’s medical records only for the
limited purpose of further investigating her propensity toward violence and to
show her past volatile behavior.
During the hearing on the pretrial motion,
Cashen stated he would use Schulmeister’s medical records for the limited
purpose of expert testimony concerning her violent propensities. During trial, if
Schulmeister denied her mental health diagnoses, then Cashen would “provide
her a copy of her deposition and ask her if that information was true and correct
when she provided it and ask her if she had been diagnosed.” Only if she denied
those two statements, would Cashen discuss her mental health records. The
district court determined Schulmeister’s medical records were admissible “to the
extent that they provide a basis for an expert’s opinion on her violent propensities
and/or her ability to accurately observe, recall, and relate events.”
Following the court’s order that the records were admissible, Cashen filed
an application to reconvene Schulmeister’s deposition and an application
“pursuant to Iowa Code section 6222 and 42 U.S.C.A. section 290”3 seeking “an
order authorizing the defendant to obtain the medical records of the complaining
witness and to do so at State expense.” The State resisted both applications.
2
We note section 622.10 allows for a defendant to request and receive confidential
mental health records of a plaintiff “[i]n a civil action in which the condition of the plaintiff
in whose favor the prohibition is made is an element or factor of the claim or defense of
the adverse party.” (Emphasis added.) It does not appear to apply to criminal actions,
nor to records of parties other than the plaintiff. “Generally, the statutes and rules of
procedure governing proceedings under one docket have no applicability to proceedings
under another docket.” Woodbury County Attorney v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 448 N.W.2d 20, 21
(Iowa 1989).
3
42 U.S.C. § 290 (2006) relates to the “National Institutes of Health Management Fund;
establishment; advancements; availability; final adjustments of advances” and appears
to have no applicability to the circumstances before us.
7
The district court resolved the “discovery dispute” by ordering the State to obtain
from Schulmeister patient waiver forms for each healthcare provider that
provided “care for emotional or psychiatric difficulties.”
The court placed the
responsibility for obtaining the records on Cashen, and allowed for reconvening
Schulmeister’s deposition after Cashen obtained the records.
Depending on the unique circumstances of a case, limited disclosure of
privileged information is allowed when a case presents “bona fide claim of
compelling interest sufficient to require a limited disclosure of the privileged
information.” Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d at 563. In ruling on the motion in limine, the
trial court allowed evidence regarding Schulmeister’s previous arrests for
domestic assault, indicating this was applicable to the decision.
During her
deposition, Schulmeister’s admitted she had mental health issues in the past.
Based on these facts, Cashen has a shown a compelling need for the mental
health records.
We affirm the trial court’s ruling to allow disclosure of the medical records
and conclude Schulmeister’s medical records may be admissible for the limited
purpose of “an expert’s opinion on her violent propensities and/or her ability to
accurately observe, recall, and relate events.”
IV.
COURT AUTHORITY TO ORDER STATE TO OBTAIN WAIVERS.
The State contends the district court lacked authority to order it to obtain
waivers from Schulmeister because she is not a party to this action. See State v.
Gabrielson, 464 N.W.2d 434, 438 (Iowa 1990) (finding no constitutional,
statutory, or common-law authority for a district court to order the victim of sexual
8
abuse to undergo a psychiatric evaluation).
The supreme court gave two
reasons for its determination:
First, as discussed above, there is no statutory authority or
common law precedent granting a trial court authority to order such
psychiatric examinations of sexual abuse victims. Second, even if
we were to create the authority for trial courts to order psychiatric
examinations, courts would be left in the awkward position of
having no method of enforcing such an order because neither the
trial court nor the state has the power to compel a sexual abuse
victim, a non-party to the case, to submit to a psychiatric
examination ordered by the court.
Gabrielson, 464 N.W.2d at 438.
The principle set forth in the second point
suggests a similar, but distinct problem in the case before us. Schulmeister, the
complaining witness, like the victim in Gabrielson, is not a party to this criminal
case. Even if we were to hold the court had authority to order the State to obtain
the waivers, we see no method of enforcing that order as it relates to a non-party.
Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.14(2)(b)(2) gives district courts the
discretion to:
order the attorney for the state to permit the defendant to inspect
and copy or photograph any results or reports of physical or mental
examinations, and of scientific tests or experiments, made in
connection with the particular case, or copies thereof, within the
possession, custody or control of the state.
(Emphasis added.)
The medical records at issue here were not made “in
connection with” this case and are not within the State’s “possession, custody, or
control.” Rule 2.14 does not provide authority for the court to order the State to
obtain the waivers.
V.
CONCLUSION.
9
The
district
court
correctly
applied
a
balancing
test,
weighing
Schulmeister’s privacy interest against the public interest in Cashen’s right to
seek out the truth in the process of presenting his justification defense. See
Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d at 562-63.
We affirm the court’s determination that
Schulmeister’s medical records are admissible to the limited “extent that they
provide a basis for an expert’s opinion on her violent propensities and/or her
ability to accurately observe, recall, and relate events.”
See Iowa R. Evid.
5.405(a) (allowing expert testimony to prove the violent nature of a complaining
witness if relevant to the reasonableness of a defendant’s response); State v.
Clay, 455 N.W.2d 272, 273 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990). We affirm the district court’s
ruling on the State’s motion in limine filed on November 26, 2007.
We reverse the district court’s order filed on December 11, 2007, that
ordered the State to obtain waiver forms from the complaining witness.
AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.
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