WILLIAM C. LEE, Plaintiff - Appellant, vs. STATE OF IOWA and CHEROKEE MENTAL HEALTH INSTITUTE, Defendants - Appellees.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-1020 / 07-2132
Filed February 19, 2009
WILLIAM C. LEE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA and CHEROKEE
MENTAL HEALTH INSTITUTE,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Arthur E. Gamble,
Judge.
William C. Lee appeals the district court‟s ruling denying his motion for the
certification of class action. AFFIRMED.
James L. Sayre of James L. Sayre, P.C., Clive, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Jeffery C. Peterzalek, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellees.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Eisenhauer and Doyle, JJ.
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DOYLE, J.
William C. Lee appeals the district court‟s ruling denying his motion for the
certification of class action. Lee contends that requirements for the certification
of a class action were met. Upon our review, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
On March 10, 2007, Lee filed his petition at law individually and as a
representative of a class of individuals against defendants State of Iowa and
Cherokee Mental Health Institute (hereinafter collectively “State”) alleging the
following facts: Effective July 1, 2006, the State implemented its “Sick Leave
Insurance Program” (SLIP) for the benefit of all State employees who were
eligible for a bona fide retirement and who had accumulated sick leave to the
extent of having a sick leave account balance in the amount of $2000, plus the
cost of one month of the State‟s share of the State group health insurance
program. Upon retirement the employee would be paid the $2000 stipend and
the remaining balance would be converted to a bank for purposes of purchasing
health insurance. Pursuant to the SLIP, the State would pay, upon retirement for
those qualifying employees, an amount ranging from sixty percent to one
hundred percent of the employer‟s share of the State group health insurance
premium for each employee until the converted value of the employee‟s sick
leave balance is exhausted or the employee attains Medicare eligibility,
whichever comes first. However, other than the $2000 stipend, State employees
who had attained Medicare eligibility would receive no benefits, and employees
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who had attained the age of fifty-five, but who were not yet Medicare eligible,
would receive reduced benefits.
Lee, an employee of the State, retired on September 30, 2006. Lee was
eligible for a bona fide retirement and had the requisite amount in his sick leave
account balance to participate in the SLIP. However, Lee was Medicare eligible.
Because he was Medicare eligible, the State would not allow Lee to participate in
the SLIP, in the form of paying the employer‟s share of the state group health
insurance premium, to the extent he had the requisite sick leave account
balance.
Based upon these alleged facts, Lee asserted that the State‟s
disallowance of his participation in the SLIP upon his retirement because he was
already Medicare eligible was age discrimination in violation of the Iowa Civil
Rights Act of 1965, codified at Iowa Code chapter 216 (2007). Additionally, Lee
asserted that accumulation of sick time as provided in the SLIP constituted
“wages” as defined by Iowa‟s Wage Payment Collection Act, Iowa Code chapter
91A, and that the State‟s denial to provide benefits to Lee, in the form of payment
of the State‟s share of the State group health plan insurance premium, was an
intentional failure to pay wages due and owing to Lee in violation of chapter 91A.
Lee‟s complaint filed with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission (ICRC) did not
indicate that he intended to bring a class-based action before the ICRC. Lee‟s
petition filed in district court stated that he filed a timely complaint with the ICRC
alleging age discrimination, and that he requested and received a right-to-sue
letter from the ICRC pursuant to Iowa Code section 216.16(2). However, Lee‟s
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petition did not assert that the members he sought to represent had filed a timely
complaint with the ICRC and had received right-to-sue letters from the ICRC.
On August 30, 2007, Lee filed his motion for certification of class action
before the district court. The motion alleged the class of individuals he sought to
represent was composed of present and former employees of the State who:
a) were, on or after July 1, 2006, eligible for a bona fide
retirement, as that term is defined by the Iowa Public Employees
Retirement System (“IPERS”); and
b) had or have a sick leave account balance of more that
$2,000, plus the cost of at least one month of the [State‟s] share of
the State group health insurance premium; [and]
c) either were already eligible for Medicare benefits, or
d) would receive reduced benefits, pursuant to [the State‟s
SLIP], because of their respective ages.
Among other things, Lee asserted:
That once the individual members of the class are identified, the
questions of law and fact are common to them, the claims or
defenses of the parties are typical of the claims and/or defenses of
the class, and the representative party, [Lee], will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.
On September 12, 2007, the State filed its resistance to Lee‟s motion.
The State argued that Lee had failed to comply with the “single filing rule” and
therefore could not bring a class civil rights claim. Additionally, the State argued,
among other things, that Lee failed to establish the requisite typicality with
respect to his requested class, and that individual issues relating to law and fact
dominated over common issues in the litigation.
On November 26, 2007, the district court entered its ruling denying Lee‟s
motion for class certification. The court found Lee‟s representation of the entire
class would not promote the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy
because certain defenses may apply to Lee‟s situation that would not apply to
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other class members, and that other defenses may apply to the claims of all or
most of the potential class that do not apply to Lee. Additionally the court found
that there was a lack of commonality of their claims depending on whether they
are contract or non-contract covered employees. Also, the court found that Lee
could not represent a class before the court because he failed to take advantage
of the “single filing rule” since his complaint did not alert the ICRC that he
intended to submit a class-based complaint.
Lee appeals. Lee contends the “single filing rule” does not apply in this
case. Additionally, Lee contends the prerequisites for filing a class action have
been met.
II. Scope and Standards of Review.
“Our review of the district court‟s ruling granting or denying certification of
a class action is limited because the district court enjoys broad discretion in the
certification of class action lawsuits.” Vos v. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 667
N.W.2d 36, 44 (Iowa 2003) (citing Stone v. Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp., 497
N.W.2d 843, 845 (Iowa 1993)). We therefore review a district court‟s decision on
class certification for an abuse of discretion. Comes v. Microsoft Corp., 696
N.W.2d 318, 320 (Iowa 2005) (citing Vos, 667 N.W.2d at 44). “A court abuses its
discretion when it exercised its discretion on „grounds or for reasons clearly
untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.‟” State v. Helmers, 753 N.W.2d
565, 567 (Iowa 2008) (citations omitted).
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III. Discussion.
We have reviewed the thorough and well-reasoned decision of the district
court.
We approve of the reasons and the conclusions in the opinion and
conclude the district court‟s ruling should be affirmed pursuant to Iowa Court
Rule 21.29(1)(d).
AFFIRMED.
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