JOHN DOE, D.O. , P etitioner - Appell ant , vs. IOWA BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS , Respondent - Appell ee . No. 8 - 1025 / 08 - 0064 RONNIE B. MARTIN, D.O., Petitioner - Appellant, vs. IOWA BOARD OF MEDIC INE , Respondent - Appellee. Consolidated a ppeal s from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Richard G. Blane II (John Doe), and Karen A. Romano (Ronnie B. Martin) , Judge s . A non - resident physician appeals from district court rulings upholding the decisions of the Iowa Board of Medic al Examiners. AFFIRMED AND REMANDED . Michael M. Sellers of Sellers Law Office , Des Moines , for appellant s . Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General , Theresa O‘Connell Weeg, Assistant Attorney General , for appellee s . Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and Potterfield ,
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-1008 / 07-0332
Filed February 4, 2009
JOHN DOE, D.O.,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
IOWA BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS,
Respondent-Appellee.
______________________________________________
No. 8-1025 / 08-0064
RONNIE B. MARTIN, D.O.,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
IOWA BOARD OF MEDICINE,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Consolidated appeals from the Iowa District Court for Polk County,
Richard G. Blane II (John Doe), and Karen A. Romano (Ronnie B. Martin),
Judges.
A non-resident physician appeals from district court rulings upholding the
decisions of the Iowa Board of Medical Examiners.
AFFIRMED AND
REMANDED.
Michael M. Sellers of Sellers Law Office, Des Moines, for appellants.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Theresa O‘Connell Weeg, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellees.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and Potterfield, JJ.
2
POTTERFIELD, J.
In this consolidated appeal, Ronnie B. Martin challenges the rulings of the
district court that affirm the decisions of the Iowa Board of Medical Examiners
(Board).1 We find Martin‘s first petition for judicial review was untimely and affirm
the district court‘s dismissal.
With respect to his second petition for judicial
review, the district court did not err in finding the Board had authority with respect
to Martin‘s licensure. We remand to the Board.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
This proceeding stems from matters referred to the Board of Medical
Examiners concerning Dr. Ronnie B. Martin‘s practice of medicine in Iowa.
Martin is a family practice physician who received his license to practice
medicine in Iowa in 1999.
He later moved to Florida, and his Iowa license
became inactive in December 2002 and expired in February 2003. Three years
later, on February 3, 2006, the Board found probable cause to issue an order for
a comprehensive clinical competency evaluation based on information sent to the
Board regarding Martin‘s practice in Iowa. See Iowa Code § 272C.9(1) (2005
Supp.). Martin objected to the order and requested a hearing. See Iowa Admin.
Code r. 653-12.3 (2005).
A contested case hearing was held on June 21, 2006, at which Martin
moved to dismiss, arguing the Board had no authority to order an evaluation of a
non-resident doctor with an expired Iowa license. The Board denied the motion
to dismiss and the hearing continued on the merits of Martin‘s objections to the
competency evaluation.
1
Now known as the board of medicine. See Iowa Code § 147.13(1) (2007 Supp.).
3
In a written ruling dated July 13, 2006, the Board confirmed its previous
denial of the motion to dismiss and held it had jurisdiction to order Martin to
submit to a competency evaluation and that there was probable cause to order
Martin to submit to a professional competency examination. The Board ordered
Martin to comply within sixty days. The ruling was mailed by certified mail to
Martin‘s attorney on July 14, 2006.
Martin filed his petition for judicial review of the order on August 15, 2006.
The district court dismissed the petition as untimely.
Martin appealed that
dismissal.
On September 14, 2006, while Martin‘s appeal was pending, the Board
issued a statement of charges against Martin alleging a violation of the previous
order requiring a professional competency examination within sixty days. Martin
again filed a motion to dismiss arguing, among other things, that his appeal of the
previous order made the charges premature. On March 28, 2007, a contested
case hearing was scheduled to take place before the Board. At the time of the
hearing, the parties asked—and the Board agreed—to continue the evidentiary
hearing and instead hear arguments on Martin‘s motion to dismiss. On April 30,
2007, the Board issued a decision denying the motion to dismiss.
The
evidentiary hearing was re-scheduled for May 22, 2007.
On May 15, 2007, however, Martin filed a second petition for judicial
review asking the district court to reverse the ruling on his motion to dismiss.
Martin sought and received a stay of the evidentiary hearing. The Board argued
the petition for judicial review should be dismissed as there was no final agency
4
action from which Martin was entitled to appeal. On December 18, 2007, the
district court ruled:
There has not been final agency action in the sense that no
discipline has actually been imposed; however, Dr. Martin is only
seeking judicial review of the legal issues surrounding the Board‘s
denial of his motion to dismiss. The issues of the Board‘s
jurisdiction and authority to discipline Dr. Martin were fully decided
in the Board‘s April 30, 2007 decision and are final agency action
on those issues. Therefore, the Court determines that there is final
agency action as to the legal issues that Dr. Martin has sought to
have this Court review.
. . .
If final agency action is not had until discipline is
imposed, judicial review at that point is not an adequate remedy for
Dr. Martin. . . . [O]nce discipline is imposed it is public and cannot
be stayed pending judicial review. The issues in this case, and the
prior case now on appeal, revolve around whether the Board can
order a competency evaluation of Dr. Martin, and if Dr. Martin can
be disciplined if he has refused to complete the evaluation despite
that issue being on appeal. If it is determined that either (1) the
Board cannot order Dr. Martin to complete a competency
evaluation; or (2) that Dr. Martin did not refuse to complete the
evaluation then discipline would not be imposed. If judicial review
is not allowed at this time, the discipline likely will be imposed and
that is a consequence which cannot be ―undone‖ even by a
subsequent reversal by the courts. Therefore, the court concludes
that even if the current matter is not final agency action, Dr. Martin
has established that intermediate judicial review is appropriate.
(Footnote omitted.)
The district court then rejected Martin‘s argument that the Board does not
have authority to pursue disciplinary action against a nonresident physician with
an expired license for an alleged failure to comply with an evaluation order. The
court affirmed the Board‘s ruling that it had jurisdiction and authority to discipline
Martin and remanded to the Board for a determination on the factual issue of
Martin‘s compliance. Martin appealed.
The two appeals have been consolidated for purposes of
consideration.
our
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II. Scope and Standard of Review
We review a contested administrative proceeding for errors of law. Iowa
Code § 17A.19(8); Arora v. Iowa Bd. of Medical Exam’rs, 564 N.W.2d 4, 6 (Iowa
1997). Our review under Iowa Code section 17A.20 is limited to determining
whether the district court correctly applied the law in exercising its judicial review
function under Iowa Code section 17A.19(8). Arora, 564 N.W.2d at 6.
III. General Statutory Framework
Martin is a doctor of osteopathy and, as such, was required to obtain a
license to practice medicine in the State of Iowa. See Iowa Code §§ 147.2,
147.5 (2005 Supp.). Martin received an Iowa medical license in 1999, which is
presumptive evidence of his right to practice medicine in this state. Id. § 147.6
(―Every license issued under this subtitle shall be presumptive evidence of the
right of the holder to practice in this state the profession therein specified.‖).
Under Iowa Code section 272C.9(1):
Each licensee . . . as a condition of licensure, is under a duty to
submit to a physical, mental, or clinical competency examination
when directed in writing by the board for cause . . . . The licensing
board, upon probable cause, shall have the authority to order
physical, mental, or clinical competency examination, and upon
refusal of the licensee to submit to the examination the licensing
board may order that the allegations pursuant to which the order of
. . . examination was made shall be taken to be established.
The Board ordered Martin, an Iowa licensee, to present himself for a
competency evaluation.
Martin sought judicial review of the Board‘s order,
contending that he is not subject to the authority of the Board because his Iowa
medical license had expired.
untimely.
The district court dismissed the petition as
6
IV. The Dismissal of Martin’s First Petition
The Board‘s competency evaluation order was dated July 13, 2006, and
was sent to Martin‘s counsel by certified mail on July 14, 2006. Martin‘s petition
for judicial review was mailed on August 11 and file-stamped on August 15,
2006. The district court dismissed the petition for judicial review as untimely.
On appeal, Martin contends that the Board‘s decision was not a contested
case decision subject to the thirty-day requirement of Iowa Code section
17A.19(3). He also argues that if the order was a contested case decision, the
time began to run when he received the ruling, not when it was mailed. We
reject both arguments.
A ―contested case‖ is defined as a proceeding in which the
legal rights, duties, or privileges of a party are required by
Constitution or statute to be determined by an agency after an
opportunity for an evidentiary hearing. This evidentiary hearing is
an oral proceeding whose purpose is to determine disputed facts of
particular applicability known as adjudicative facts—the who, what,
when, where, and why of particular individuals in specified
circumstances. If a hearing is not required, or the hearing required
is not an evidentiary hearing, the adjudication will be categorized as
―other agency action.‖
Purethane, Inc. v. Iowa State Bd. of Tax Review, 498 N.W.2d 706, 708-09 (Iowa
1993) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Martin objected to the evaluation order and asked for a hearing.
By
administrative rule, the hearing requested ―shall be considered a contested case
proceeding and shall be governed by‖ the Board‘s procedural rules for contested
case hearings. Iowa Admin. Code r. 653-12.3(3).2 At the beginning of the June
2
Iowa Admin. Code 653 r. 12.3(3) (2005) provides:
Objection to order. A licensee who is the subject of a board order and
who objects to the order may file a request for a hearing. The request for
7
21, 2006 hearing, it was announced that the matter was a contested case.
Martin was represented by counsel; motions were considered; evidence and
testimony were offered. We find no merit to Martin‘s present contention that the
Board‘s ruling was not a contested case proceeding.
See Purethane, 498
N.W.2d at 709 (noting that under agency rules a controversy regarding a
dismissal of a protest of assessment is a ―contested case‖ and a formal
evidentiary hearing is provided); see also Paulson v. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 592
N.W.2d 677, 680 (Iowa 1997) (finding that where procedural rule called for a
hearing, the order that issued was ―a final decision in a contested case‖).
A petition for judicial review ―must be filed within thirty days after the
issuance of the agency‘s final decision in a contested case.‖
Iowa Code
§ 17A.19(3) (2005). Because the Board‘s evaluation order constituted a final
decision in a contested case, Martin was required to file his petition for judicial
review within thirty days after the ―issuance‖ of the order. The district court found
that the order ―issued‖ on the date of certified mailing—July 14, 2006. This
finding is consistent with the holding in Purethane, 498 N.W.2d at 710.
In
Purethane, our supreme court addressed the question of when an Iowa State
Board of Tax Review order ―issued‖ for purposes of determining the statutory
hearing shall specifically identify the factual and legal issues upon which
the licensee bases the objection. The hearing shall be considered a
contested case proceeding and shall be governed by the provisions of
rules 12.11(17A) to 12.43(242C). A contested case involving an objection
to an examination order will be captioned in the name of Jane Doe or
John Doe in order to maintain the licensee‘s confidentiality.
The rule has been amended and is now found at rule 24.4(3), but the rule continues to
provide that a licensee who objects to an evaluation order may ask for a hearing and the
―hearing shall be considered a contested case proceeding and shall be governed by the
provisions of 653 – Chapter 25 [entitled ‗contested case proceedings‘].‖
8
appeal. The court ruled: ―Absent board rules which make decisions public by
filing and entry, this date means the date the order is mailed by certified mail.‖
Id. at 710.
As already noted, the Board‘s evaluation order was mailed by certified
mail to Martin on July 14, 2006. Martin nonetheless argues that the Purethane
decision must be read to mean that the appeal period began to run on the date
he received the decision because that is the date on which the parties became
aware of the ruling. This reading is contrary to Purethane and without support.
The Board‘s ruling issued on the date it was mailed by certified mail—July 14,
2006.
The Iowa Supreme Court has explicitly stated that the filing requirement of
section 17A.19(3) is jurisdictional and untimely filing of the petition requires
dismissal of the action. See Sharp v. Iowa Dep’t of Job Serv., 492 N.W.2d 668,
669-70 (Iowa 1992). Mailing of the notice to the clerk‘s office does not constitute
filing in the clerk‘s office for purposes of section 17A.19(3). Id. at 669. In this
case, the petition was filed on August 15, beyond the thirty-day period provided
by section 17A.19(3) for its filing.
Consequently, the district court lacked
jurisdiction to consider the petition and properly dismissed it. Sharp, 492 N.W.2d
at 669-70; accord Strickland v. Iowa Bd. of Med., No. 07-1805 at 6-7 (Iowa Ct.
App. Jan. 22, 2009). Accordingly, the district court‘s ruling dismissing the first
petition for judicial review is affirmed.
9
V. The District Court’s Ruling on Martin’s Second Petition
In his second petition for judicial review, Martin challenged the Board‘s
authority to pursue disciplinary action against him—a non-resident physician who
holds an expired Iowa medical license. His motion to dismiss was denied by the
Board. On judicial review, the district court affirmed the denial, concluding that
the Board did have jurisdiction and authority to pursue the disciplinary action.
The district court noted that the competency issues arose during the time Martin
was practicing in Iowa; it concluded the Board‘s discipline related to matters that
affect the citizens and residents of Iowa because the underlying complaints
occurred while Martin was practicing in this State.
On appeal, Martin argues the Board does not have jurisdiction or authority
to pursue disciplinary action against him because his license has lapsed and is
therefore invalid. He states that the Board‘s authority to impose discipline is
further restricted to circumstances directly and presently affecting the citizens of
Iowa, citing Iowa Code sections 272C.1(4)3 and 272C.34.
We address the merits of Martin‘s appeal despite the fact that there is not
yet final agency action in this disciplinary matter.
intermediate review.
The district court allowed
See Iowa Code § 17A.19(1) (authorizing intermediate
review ―if all adequate administrative remedies have been exhausted and review
of the final agency action would not provide an adequate remedy‖). The parties
3
Section 272C.1(4) provides: ―‗Licensee discipline‘ means any sanction a licensing
board may impose upon its licensees for conduct which threatens or denies citizens of
this state a high standard of professional or occupational care.‖
4
Section 272C.3 allows discipline where ―the licensee has demonstrated a lack of
qualifications which are necessary to assure the residents of this state a high standard of
professional and occupational care.‖
10
have fully briefed and argued the authority of the Board to pursue the disciplinary
action against Martin and, if the Board imposes discipline, appeal does not
automatically stay that action. We find no error in the district court‘s granting
intermediate review in this particular circumstance.
We conclude Martin reads the Board‘s authority too narrowly. The Iowa
Code specifically grants the Board the power to ―[i]nitiate and prosecute
disciplinary proceedings‖ against ―licensees.‖ Id. § 272C.3 (authority of licensing
boards). Martin‘s argument presumes the only form of licensee is an active or
current licensee. On the contrary, the Iowa Code identifies licensees in various
stages of practice.
For example, section 272C.1(3) defines the process of
―inactive licensee re-entry‖ as the ―process a former or inactive professional or
occupational licensee pursues to again be capable of actively and competently
practicing as a professional or occupational licensee.‖ This language identifies
two different types of licensees: active licensees and former/inactive licensees.
Similarly, section 272C.2(2)(f) directs the Board to issue rules for
continuing education requirements that ―[d]efine the status of active and inactive
licensure and establish appropriate guidelines for inactive licensee re-entry.‖
These code sections illustrate that the legislature contemplated that a licensee
could be either ―active‖ or ―inactive.‖ The legislature gave the Board authority
over all licensees. It did not limit the Board‘s authority only to active licensees.
Moreover, the Iowa Code specifically states that an expired license is not
invalid. Iowa Code section 147.10 provides:
Every license to practice a profession shall expire in multiyear
intervals and be renewed as determined by the board upon
application by the licensee, without examination . . . . Failure to
11
renew the license within a reasonable time after the expiration shall
not invalidate the license, but a reasonable penalty may be
assessed by the board.
(Emphasis added).
This is because a dentist, doctor, lawyer or the member of any
other profession, does not devote the years of study and
preparation necessary to qualify as a practitioner merely that [the
practitioner] may be accorded the right to practice for one year.
When [the practitioner] qualifies for the practice, [the practitioner]
does so for life. That right cannot be taken from [the practitioner]
except by due process of law.
Gilchrist v. Bierring, 234 Iowa 899, 915, 14 N.W.2d 724, 732 (Iowa 1944)
(emphasis added); accord State v. Otterholt, 234 Iowa 1286, 1291, 15 N.W.2d
529, 532 (1944) (holding that a professional license is a property right that cannot
be taken away without due process and ―the mere failure to renew annually does
not lessen the value of that license.‖). We therefore conclude the Board has
authority to discipline all licensees, not only licensees with active Iowa practices.
Under section 272C.9(1), the Board is authorized to order a licensee to
submit to a clinical competency examination.
The Board is authorized to
administer and enforce its administrative rules and to impose licensee discipline.
Iowa Code § 272C.3 (2005).
Failure to submit to a board-ordered clinical
competency examination is grounds for disciplinary action under the applicable
administrative rules. Iowa Admin. Code r. 653-12.3(7) (2005). The fact that
Martin‘s Iowa license has expired does not rob the Board of its authority to
discipline.
As our supreme court has stated:
We do not consider the question involved moot, merely because
the appellee is not at present making full use of his license to
practice. It may be noted that the question whether a provision in a
12
decree confers a particular right upon a party is not rendered moot
on appeal merely because such party testified at the trial that he did
not expect to exercise such right. To hold otherwise places in the
hands of the accused practitioner himself the power to escape the
penalty provided by law for a violation of the rules governing the
conduct of his profession, no matter how gross his misconduct may
have been. The cause of action has not ceased to exist so long as
there remain rights undetermined and all matters involved in the
action have not been adjudicated.
Otterholt, 234 Iowa at 1291-92, 15 N.W.2d at 532 (internal citations and
quotations omitted). The merits of the disciplinary proceeding have not yet been
considered.
We find only that the Board has the authority to pursue the
proceeding.
VI. Conclusion
Martin‘s first petition for judicial review was untimely and the district court
properly dismissed it. The district court properly concluded that the Board had
authority to pursue disciplinary proceedings against Martin, who is an Iowa
licensee, even if his license has expired.
proceedings.
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.
We affirm and remand for further
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