STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff - Appellee, vs. CHRISTOPHER JAMES FARIS, Defendant - Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-936 / 08-0684
Filed December 17, 2008
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
CHRISTOPHER JAMES FARIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Winneshiek County, Margaret L.
Lingreen, Judge.
Defendant appeals his conviction for carrying weapons entered after his
Alford guilty plea. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Dennis D. Hendrickson,
Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary E. Tabor, Assistant Attorney
General, and Andrew Vandermaaten, County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Eisenhauer and Doyle, JJ.
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EISENHAUER, J.
On December 31, 2007, Christopher Faris was charged with carrying
weapons and third-degree harassment. On January 8, 2008, a trial information
was filed charging Faris with carrying weapons. On February 5, 2008, pursuant
to a plea agreement in which Faris would receive a suspended two-year
sentence, Faris entered an Alford plea to carrying weapons. See North Carolina
v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 32-38, 91 S. Ct. 160, 164-68, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162, 168-72
(1970) (holding sentencing allowed where accused is unwilling to admit guilt but
is willing to waive trial and accept sentence).
Faris’s written plea admits the State could prove he “went armed with a
knife concealed on or about my person and said knife was used in commission of
the crime of harassment.” The sentencing court entered judgment, ordered a
suspended two-year sentence, and dismissed a related simple misdemeanor
charge of harassment. On April 1, 2008, Faris filed a pro se letter of appeal.
Based on the police reports, the witness statements, and the minutes of
testimony, the following occurred. Faris lived above the Hillary Clinton campaign
headquarters in Decorah and frequently visited the office. His visits became
more bothersome as the campaign continued. On December 31, when the office
was staffed by Arneson and Neibauer, Faris made his third visit of the day. Faris
approached Arneson’s desk in the front room and, within minutes, showed her
the knife he was carrying in his jacket. When Neibauer heard Faris in the office
again, he moved to the front of the office and “made sure to join the two of them
to make sure that everything was alright.” After Neibauer arrived, Faris removed
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the knife from its holster to show him. Neibauer told Faris it was not a good idea
to have a knife, especially in public. Faris responded he needed the knife for
protection on this “crazy night” and also “spoke to an uncomfortable degree
about his plans to stab anyone who looked at him or talked to him the wrong
way.” The campaign workers were alarmed and concerned by Faris’s actions in
displaying/brandishing the knife and told Faris they were busy and “really needed
to get back to work.” Despite this suggestion, “Faris still lingered on his way out.”
After Faris left, Arneson called the campaign’s security team. During this call
Faris returned for the fourth time that day, but left quickly.
Faris appeals arguing ineffective assistance of counsel, a claim we review
de novo. See State v. Bearse, 748 N.W.2d 211, 214 (Iowa 2008). To succeed
on his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, Faris must show counsel failed to
perform an essential duty and he was prejudiced as a result.
See State v.
Reynolds, 670 N.W.2d 405, 411 (Iowa 2003). We resolve “such claims on direct
appeal where the record is adequate to determine as a matter of law the
defendant will be unable to establish one or both of the elements.” Id. We find
the record adequate in this case.
Faris argues his trial counsel was ineffective for permitting him to plead
guilty because the record does not contain a factual basis to support his Alford
plea. “Where a factual basis for a charge does not exist, and trial counsel allows
defendant to plead guilty anyway, counsel has failed to perform an essential
duty.” State v. Schminkey, 597 N.W.2d 785, 788 (Iowa 1999). Additionally,
prejudice is inherent under the circumstances. Id.
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All pleas, including Alford pleas, must be supported by a factual basis.
See id. Therefore, an Alford plea is conditioned on the court’s ability to find
factual support for every element of the offense in the record from sources other
than the defendant. See id.
Iowa Code section 724.4(2) (2007), carrying weapons, requires proof a
person armed with a concealed knife “uses the knife in the commission of a
crime.” The crime of harassment includes: a “person, purposefully and without
legitimate purpose, has personal contact with another person, with the intent to
threaten, intimidate, or alarm that other person.” Iowa Code § 708.7(1)(b).
Faris argues evidence to support an Alford plea must be “overwhelming”
and more is required than what is necessary to form the factual basis for a nonAlford plea.
We are not persuaded.
Rather, the Iowa Supreme Court has
instructed: “An Alford plea is a variation of a guilty plea. In effect, the pleas are
the same as the defendant is agreeing to the imposition of a criminal sentence
for the crime charged.” State v. Burgess, 639 N.W.2d 564, 567 (Iowa 2001)
(emphasis added). Though an Alford defendant does not admit guilt, he “may
voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a
sentence.” Id. n.1. Further, the purpose of an Alford plea, “the defendant’s costbenefit analysis of avoiding the risks associated with a trial,” does not suggest
the district court’s factual-basis requirement is somehow changed. See State v.
Klawonn, 609 N.W.2d 515, 521 (Iowa 2000).
We note the level of proof necessary to support a factual basis for a guilty
plea is not the same as the level of proof required to support a conviction. See
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State v. Keene, 630 N.W.2d 579, 581 (Iowa 2001). “[T]he trial court is not
required to extract a confession from the defendant. Instead, it must only be
satisfied that the facts support the crime, not necessarily that the defendant is
guilty.” Id. We are satisfied the facts support the crime. Therefore, a factual
basis exists to support Faris’s plea of guilty. Accordingly, Faris’s counsel was not
ineffective for permitting him to plead guilty.
AFFIRMED.
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