WILLIAM LOVELLE STRINGER , Applicant - Appellant, vs. STATE OF IOWA, Respondent - Appellee.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-922 / 08-0188
Filed December 17, 2008
WILLIAM LOVELLE STRINGER,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Karen A. Romano,
Judge.
Petitioner appeals the dismissal of his third application for postconviction
relief as time-barred, contending that had the doctrine of equitable tolling been
applied, his application would have been timely. AFFIRMED.
Brandon Brown of Parrish, Kruidenier, Dunn, Boles, Gribble, Cook,
Parrish, Gentry & Fisher, L.L.P., Des Moines, and Angela Campbell of Dickey &
Campbell Law Firm, PLC, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sharon Hall, Assistant Attorney
General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Joseph P. Weeg, Assistant
County Attorney, for appellee State.
Considered by Mahan, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and Potterfield, JJ.
2
VAITHESWARAN, J.
The district court dismissed William Stringer’s third application for
postconviction relief on the ground that it was time-barred. Stringer appeals the
dismissal, contending that had the court applied the equitable tolling doctrine, his
application would have been timely.
I.
Background Proceedings
In 1987, a jury found Stringer guilty of first-degree murder. This court
affirmed his judgment and sentence in 1988. State v. Stringer, No. 87-473 (Iowa
Ct. App. Aug. 24, 1988). Stringer then petitioned for a federal writ of habeas
corpus. A United States district court held the application in abeyance pending
Stringer’s exhaustion of state remedies. Stringer next filed two state applications
for postconviction relief, both of which were denied. He returned to federal court
and pursued his habeas corpus petition.
The United States District Court
granted habeas corpus relief, but the federal Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed that decision in 2002. Stringer v. Hedgepeth, 280 F.3d 826, 831 (8th
Cir. 2002). Stringer requested a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme
Court. That request was denied on October 7, 2002. Stringer v. Hedgepeth, 537
U.S. 909 (2002).
Stringer filed his third state application for postconviction relief on October
25, 2006. The State moved to dismiss the application as untimely. Following an
evidentiary hearing, the district court granted the motion and this appeal followed.
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II.
Analysis
The sole issue on appeal is whether Stringer’s third postconviction relief
application was timely filed. Our review of this issue is for correction of errors at
law. Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 519 (Iowa 2003).
Postconviction relief proceedings are generally governed by a three-year
statute of limitations, but an exception exists for “a ground of fact or law that
could not have been raised within the applicable time period.”
Iowa Code
§ 822.3 (2005).
As a preliminary matter, Stringer asserts that the three-year limitations
period began to run only after the United States Supreme Court denied his
request for certiorari in 2002. Neither Iowa Code section 822.3 nor Iowa case
law supports that reading.
Section 822.3 states that an application for
postconviction relief “must be filed within three years from the date the conviction
or decision is final or, in the event of an appeal, from the date the writ of
procedendo is issued.” Id. This language refers to the direct appeal from the
state court conviction, not final review of rulings on federal habeas corpus
petitions. Id. (referring to the date the writ of procedendo is issued). Stringer’s
third postconviction relief application was filed approximately eighteen years after
his direct appeal was finalized. Therefore, the application was untimely.
Stringer cannot circumvent this bar by repackaging his claim under an
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel rubric. See Dible v. State, 557 N.W.2d 881,
885 (Iowa 1996), (“If the legislature had intended that ineffective assistance of
counsel serve as an exception to the statute of limitations, it would have said
so.”) abrogated on other grounds by Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509 (Iowa
4
2003); Wilkins v. State, 522 N.W.2d 822, 824 (Iowa 1994) (“Wilkins labels his
claim ineffective-assistance-of-postconviction-counsel in the hope that the court
will reach the merits of his contention that his trial counsel was ineffective.
However, his claims neither involve new evidence nor are they new legal
claims.”).
The substantive claim he raised in his third postconviction relief
application was known to him and indeed raised in his direct appeal from his
judgment and sentence. See State v. Stringer, No. 87-473 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug.
24, 1988).
Nor can Stringer avail himself of an equitable tolling doctrine. See Pace v.
DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1814, 161 L. Ed. 2d 669, 679
(2005) (authorizing tolling of federal statute of limitations if (1) the litigant pursued
his rights diligently and (2) some extraordinary circumstance stood in the way of
filing habeas corpus petition within the statutory period). In Pace, the doctrine
was raised in an effort to circumvent a one-year limitations period for filing federal
habeas corpus petitions. Id. at 410, 125 S. Ct. at 1810, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 674.
The United States Supreme Court recognized the doctrine but concluded it did
not apply. Id. at 419, 125 S. Ct. at 1815, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 679–80.
Stringer concedes “Iowa courts have yet to officially recognize the defense
of equitable tolling” as a means of circumventing the state limitations period for
postconviction relief actions. The district court acknowledged this, stating, “There
is no Iowa case law to support Stringer’s assertion that the statute of limitations
contained in Iowa Code § 822.3 can be equitably tolled.” The court nonetheless
applied the doctrine and concluded Stringer “would not be entitled to equitable
tolling under these circumstances.”
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We conclude the equitable tolling doctrine is unavailable to Stringer, as it
has not been recognized in Iowa. We find it unnecessary to take the additional
step of applying the doctrine. See Feaker v. Bulicek, 538 N.W.2d 662, 664 (Iowa
Ct. App. 1995) (declining to adopt an interpretation of an attorney’s lien statute
that had no support under Iowa case law).
The district court correctly concluded Stringer’s third application for
postconviction relief was time-barred.
dismissing the application.
AFFIRMED.
Accordingly, the court did not err in
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