STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff - Appellee, vs. LORI MARIE CHILDERS , Defendant - Appellant.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-894 / 08-0808
Filed November 13, 2008
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
LORI MARIE CHILDERS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Muscatine County, Gary P.
Strausser, District Associate Judge.
Lori Childers appeals from her sentence following her guilty plea to the
charge of driving while barred. AFFIRMED.
David Scieszinski, Wilton, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary Tabor and Kyle Hanson,
Assistant Attorneys General, Gary Allison, County Attorney, and Korie Shipee,
Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Eisenhauer and Doyle, JJ.
2
DOYLE, J.
Lori Childers appeals from her sentence following her plea of guilty to
driving while barred.
She claims the trial court abused its discretion in
sentencing her to serve a jail sentence and pay a fine.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
The minutes of evidence indicate that on August 29, 2007, a Wilton police
officer observed Lori Childers operating a vehicle.
The officer had been
previously advised that Childers’s driving privileges had been barred.
After
conducting a traffic stop, Childers stated to the officer that she did not have a
driver’s license and was barred. After confirming the barred driving status, the
officer placed Childers under arrest and seated her in the squad car. As the
officer began conducting an inventory of Childers’s vehicle, she could smell a
strong odor of marijuana, and she found four partially smoked cigars with a green
leafy substance in the ashtray. The officer also found a colored glass pipe in the
glove box, as well as unpackaged marijuana tucked in between some papers.
On October 3, 2007, Childers was charged by trial information with driving
while barred in violation of Iowa Code sections 321.560 and 321.561 (2007)
(Count I) and possession of a controlled substance (marijuana) in violation of
section 124.401(5) (Count II). On April 22, 2008, Childers filed a written guilty
plea to the driving while barred charge and waived filing a motion in arrest of
judgment. She appeared in open court and pleaded guilty to the driving while
barred charge and consented with going forward with sentencing. The State
recommended 150 days in jail, with ninety days suspended, and a $625 fine.
Childers agreed to the fine, but requested her incarceration be suspended or that
3
the court grant her in-home detention with work release. The court sentenced
Childers to pay a fine of $625 and incarceration of 365 days in county jail, with all
but sixty days suspended. Childers was granted work release and also placed
on probation for twenty-four months. The State dismissed the possession of a
controlled substance charge and the citation for the possession of drug
paraphernalia. On appeal, Childers argues the court abused its discretion in
sentencing her to pay a fine and serve a jail sentence.
II. Scope and Standards of Review.
Our review is for correction of errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4; State v.
Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). “[T]he decision of the district court
to impose a particular sentence within the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong
presumption in its favor, and will only be overturned for an abuse of discretion or
the consideration of inappropriate matters.”
Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 724.
Because the challenged sentence does not fall outside statutory limits, we review
the court’s sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion. State v. Cooley, 587
N.W.2d 752, 754 (Iowa 1998). “In applying the abuse of discretion standard to
sentencing decisions, it is important to consider the societal goals of sentencing
criminal offenders, which focus on rehabilitation of the offender and the
protection of the community from further offenses.” Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 724
(citing Iowa Code § 901.5). An abuse of sentencing discretion is found only if the
sentencing court’s discretion has been exercised on grounds or for reasons
clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.
N.W.2d 57, 62 (Iowa 1999).
State v. Laffey, 600
4
III. Merits.
On appeal Childers contends the trial court did not address any of the
factors relevant in mitigation of punishment.
Specifically, she says she “has
additional burdens in that she was responsible and is responsible for care and
maintenance of her two children.” She argues she could save the expense of
babysitting fees if she was permitted to serve her sentence by in-house
detention. She also argues she could save the fees payable to the jailer for the
time she is incarcerated and would be able, under the work permit provision of
her sentence, to have income, which she could apply to her fine. Finally, she
suggests that if she completed a sentence as she requested, she could be in a
position to again get a valid driver’s license and avoid future violations for driving
while barred.
In exercising its discretion, the sentencing court should weigh and
consider all pertinent matters, including the nature of the offense, the attending
circumstances, the defendant’s age, character and propensities, and chances for
reform. State v. August, 589 N.W.2d 740, 744 (Iowa 1999) (quoting State v.
Hildebrand, 280 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Iowa 1979)).
In determining a proper
sentence the courts owe a duty to the public as much as to the defendant, and
the punishment should fit both the crime and the individual.
Id.
A court’s
exercise of sentencing discretion is demonstrated by its statement on the record
of reasons for selecting a particular sentence.
See, e.g., Iowa R. Crim. P.
2.23(3)(d) (requiring the court to state on the record its reasons for selecting a
particular sentence); State v. Loyd, 530 N.W.2d 708, 714 (Iowa 1995) (finding no
5
abuse of sentencing discretion, based on the district court’s statement of factors
considered in reaching its sentencing decision).
In this case the trial court took into consideration positive factors “including
gainful employment and, of course, family support, including children that she
supports.” The court also took into consideration negative factors including:
her criminal history as outlined by the State and a prior conviction
for driving while barred, wherein she served forty-five days, some
prior convictions for driving while revoked and driving while
suspended, and deferred judgments for child endangerment and
operating while intoxicated.
The court then concluded “based upon your criminal history, it’s clear to the court
that you haven’t learned yet to quit driving while your privilege to do so is either
suspended or revoked or barred, so a jail sentence is appropriate.” In rejecting
the suggestion for in-home detention, the court said,
I am familiar with that program in Scott County, but given the fact
that you’ve previously served a jail sentence for driving while barred
and have committed this offense again—well, the offense date is
approximately two years later, almost three—the court does not
believe a more lenient sanction such as in-home detention is
appropriate under the circumstance.
IV. Conclusion.
The district court considered relevant sentencing factors and clearly stated
valid reasons for the sentence it imposed. We find no abuse in its exercise of
sentencing discretion and affirm its sentence.
AFFIRMED.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
