IN THE MATTER OF C.M., Alleged To Be Seriously and Mentally Impaired, C.M., Respondent - Appellant.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-893 / 08-0772
Filed November 26, 2008
IN THE MATTER OF C.M., Alleged To
Be Seriously and Mentally Impaired,
C.M.,
Respondent-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clarke County, Gary G. Kimes,
Judge.
C.M. appeals from the district court‟s decision finding that she is seriously
mentally impaired and is a danger to herself or others.
REVERSED AND
REMANDED.
Leanne Striegel of Booth Law Firm, Osceola, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Gretchen Kraemer, Assistant Attorney
General, and Ronald Wheeler, County Attorney.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Potterfield, J. and Robinson, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2007).
2
POTTERFIELD, J.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
C.M. is a thirty-two-year-old female. On March 26, 2008, C.M.‟s mother
filed an application alleging that C.M. was seriously mentally impaired pursuant
to Iowa Code section 229.6 (2007). C.M‟s sister filed an affidavit in support of
the application. Both C.M.‟s mother and sister stated concern that C.M. was
living in an unsafe house with no running water. They both expressed concern
that C.M. was not able to care for herself or protect herself from danger. C.M.
was taken into immediate custody.
Dr. Brown evaluated C.M. on four different occasions and completed a
report indicating that C.M. was mentally ill and diagnosing her with
schizophrenia. Dr. Brown stated that “[d]ue to her delusions and fragmented
thought processes, [C.M.] presents a clear danger to herself and others.”
The hospitalization hearing pursuant to Iowa Code section 229.12 took
place April 1, 2008. Dr. Brown appeared and testified that C.M. did have a
mental illness, which she diagnosed as schizophrenia. Dr. Brown further testified
that C.M. was a “danger to herself and others because she does not recognize
danger” and that “she does not realize that she could be in a situation that would
be dangerous to herself.” The magistrate concluded that C.M. was seriously
mentally impaired and that she demonstrated “neglect or inability to care for
oneself.” The magistrate ordered that C.M. be placed in Clarinda Mental Health
Institute immediately. C.M. appealed the magistrate‟s finding to the district court.
On April 17, 2008, the district court conducted a de novo hearing pursuant
to Iowa Code section 229.21. Dr. Brown did not testify at this hearing, but the
3
district court admitted her report.
The court also admitted a report from Dr.
Rosales, a physician who evaluated C.M. on April 14, 2008, diagnosing her with
schizophrenia, a serious mental illness. Dr. Rosales also reported that C.M. was
not capable of making responsible decisions with respect to hospitalization or
treatment and that she was likely to injure herself or others. The district court
overruled motions by C.M. to have Rosales testify via telephone and to continue
the hearing to a date on which Rosales would be available to testify. C.M.‟s
mother testified at trial that C.M. would be a danger if left to care for herself. The
district court concluded that C.M. was mentally ill and posed a danger to herself
or others.
C.M. appeals the district court‟s decision arguing: (1) the district court
failed to conduct the trial de novo as prescribed in Iowa Code section 229.21(3);
and (2) the district court did not have substantial evidence to find that C.M. was
seriously mentally impaired.
II. Standard of Review
An involuntary civil commitment proceeding is tried as an ordinary action
at law. Matter of Oseing, 296 N.W.2d 797, 800-01 (Iowa 1980). Our review is for
errors at law. Id. at 801. The applicant has the burden of supporting allegations
of serious mental impairment by clear and convincing evidence.
Iowa Code
§ 229.12(3). The district court‟s findings of fact are binding on us if supported by
substantial evidence. In re J.P., 574 N.W.2d 340, 342 (Iowa 1998). We will not
set aside the district court‟s findings of fact unless they are not supported by
clear and convincing evidence. Id.
4
III. Trial De Novo
C.M. argues that the district court failed to conduct the trial de novo as
required under Iowa law. When a magistrate‟s findings are appealed, “the matter
shall stand for trial de novo.” Iowa Code § 229.21(3)(c). “Trial de novo” is a
“new trial on the entire case . . . conducted as if there had been no trial in the first
instance.” Black‟s Law Dictionary 1544 (8th ed. 2004). The trial shall be held as
prescribed by Iowa Code section 229.12. Iowa Code § 229.21(5). Iowa Code
section 229.12(3) requires that the “licensed physician or qualified mental health
professional who examined the respondent shall be present at the hearing unless
the court for good cause finds that the licensed physician‟s or qualified mental
health professional‟s presence or testimony is not necessary.” Id. “Because a
person's liberty interests are at stake, „it is imperative that the statutory
requirements and procedures [of the involuntary commitment statutes] be
followed.‟” In re T.S., 705 N.W.2d 498, 502 (Iowa 2005) (quoting In re M.T., 625
N.W.2d 702, 706 (Iowa 2001)).
Because this was a trial de novo, the State had the burden to present
evidence supporting contentions made in the application.
§ 229.12(3).
Iowa Code
The State was required to arrange for Rosales‟s presence or
telephonic appearance at the trial as a witness in the absence of C.M.‟s waiver.
The State failed to do so.
The State asserts that the district court found with good cause that
Rosales‟s presence was not necessary.
According to the State, the district
court‟s good cause for refusing to allow Rosales‟s presence stemmed from the
fact that C.M. did not request her presence until the day of the hearing, and
5
Rosales was unavailable at that time.
At trial, the State contended that the
inconvenience of transporting C.M. for a continued hearing justified denying the
continuance. We determine that this does not constitute good cause given the
circumstances. The court‟s failure to require Rosales to appear denied C.M. her
right to cross examine the physician. See Id. While section 229.12 states that a
waiver of the physician‟s presence by the applicant, respondent, and
respondent‟s attorney may constitute good cause, we conclude that C.M. did not
consent to such a waiver. We find that the district court did not have good cause
for refusing to require Rosales‟s presence or telephonic appearance at the trial
de novo. Accordingly, the district court should have granted C.M.‟s motion to
continue the trial until a date when Rosales could be present to testify.1 We
reverse the district court and remand for another trial de novo consistent with our
opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
1
Because we reverse on the above stated grounds, we decline to address C.M.‟s
argument for reversal due to lack of substantial evidence.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
