RICHARD MICHAEL, Plaintiff - Appellant, vs. NUCKOL L S CONCRETE SERVICES, INC., d/b/a/ AMERICAN CONCRETE PRODUCTS, INC., and LIBERTY MUTUAL COMPANY, Jointly and Severally, Defendants - Appellees.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-885 / 08-0582
Filed November 26, 2008
RICHARD MICHAEL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
NUCKOLLS CONCRETE SERVICES, INC.,
d/b/a/ AMERICAN CONCRETE PRODUCTS,
INC., and LIBERTY MUTUAL COMPANY,
Jointly and Severally,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Karen A. Romano,
Judge.
Plaintiff appeals the district court‟s ruling granting defendant insurance
company‟s motion for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff could not
establish a claim for bad faith since plaintiff‟s workers‟ compensation claim was
“fairly debatable” as a matter of law. AFFIRMED.
Linda Channon Murphy of The Law Office of Linda Channon Murphy,
P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Patrick J. McNulty & Allison J. Doherty of Grefe & Sidney, P.L.C., Des
Moines, for appellees.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Eisenhauer and Doyle, JJ.
2
SACKETT, C.J.
Plaintiff, Richard Michael (Michael), appeals from the district court‟s grant
of summary judgment in favor of defendant insurance company, Liberty Mutual
(Liberty), on the ground that Michael could not establish his claim of bad faith
against the company since it had a reasonable basis to deny Michael‟s workers‟
compensation claim as a matter of law. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS.
On August 12, 2004, Michael
sustained an injury while working in the scope and course of his employment as
a cement truck driver. The injury occurred when another person became angry
and hit Michael over the head on top of Michael‟s hard hat. Michael reported the
injury and received medical treatment through his employer‟s workers‟
compensation insurer, defendant Liberty Mutual. Liberty authorized Michael to
receive treatment from Dr. Daniel McGuire, a physician with Iowa Spine Care.
Dr. McGuire treated Michael from August 19, 2004 to December 15, 2004,
generally seeing Michael once every two weeks, but occasionally more
frequently. He diagnosed Michael as having myofascial aches and pains and a
sprain of the neck and lower back.
Dr. McGuire prescribed regular physical
therapy, pain relievers, and work restrictions. On December 15, 2004, McGuire
saw Michael for the last time and released Michael to work full-time without
restrictions. His report from this visit states in part:
Neck is going to bother him off and on during the winter. It is safe
for him to continue to work.
He is at [maximum medical improvement] as of today. I am not
going to assign any permanent lifelong restrictions as a result of
this freak accident. I am not going to assign any permanent lifelong
impairment. He will return to see us on an as-needed basis.
3
Michael continued to work for American driving a cement truck but
requested additional treatment and a second opinion. Liberty agreed to pay for
Michael to obtain a second opinion from Dr. Cassim Igram, an orthopaedic
surgeon.
Dr. Igram evaluated Michael on March 17, 2005.
He diagnosed
Michael also with myofascial neck pain and reported:
I have reviewed Dr. McGuire‟s notes. His treatment seems to be
perfectly appropriate. I would really have nothing further to add at
this time.
...
As far as additional treatment is concerned, I think ongoing therapy
is appropriate. He can certainly continue with his current course of
treatment. I do not anticipate surgical treatment at this time.
...
If further treatment is desired at this office, I would suggest one of
our physiatrists or a pain management specialist since again I do
not believe surgery is going to be appropriate for this patient.
He also noted that he was unable to predict whether Michael would have chronic
disabling pain or be susceptible to further injury. Michael continued to work for
American until he was terminated on April 27, 2005.
On May 5, 2005, Michael‟s attorney sent Liberty a letter requesting
approval for Michael to have “ongoing therapy” and see a physiatrist as
recommended by Dr. Igram. Liberty responded that no further treatment would
be approved given that Dr. McGuire released Michael for full duty work.
Michael‟s attorney responded on May 17, 2005, explaining that a second opinion
had been obtained that recommended continued treatment.
Liberty did not
respond and Michael‟s attorney sent a follow up letter on August 9, 2005,
requesting a new treating physician be named since Michael was still in pain
4
from the work-related injury even though Dr. McGuire prescribed no further
treatment.
Michael
filed
a
petition
for
arbitration
with
the
Iowa
Workers‟
Compensation Commissioner on September 27, 2005. After learning that an
attorney would be representing Liberty regarding the claim, Michael‟s attorney
sent letters on October 21 and December 20, 2005, requesting authorization for
Michael to receive treatment. On January 6, 2006, Michael filed a petition for
alternate care. Liberty‟s attorney sent a letter on January 19, 2006 stating that
Liberty would allow Michael to see Dr. McGuire again for another evaluation to
determine whether Michael should receive additional therapy.
Purportedly in
reliance on this letter, Michael dismissed his petition for alternate care. However,
Michael‟s attorney sent a letter to Liberty‟s attorney on February 17, 2006,
requesting Liberty authorize Michael to see a different physician besides Dr.
McGuire and again asking for additional treatment.
Liberty insisted on another evaluation by Dr. McGuire prior to approving
additional treatment. Michael then scheduled an appointment to see Dr. McGuire
on March 8, 2006. Dr. McGuire cancelled the appointment on that day and
refused to see Michael again. Michael‟s attorney advised Liberty‟s attorney of
this problem and again requested authorization for Michael to see other
physicians and obtain physical therapy. No response to this letter appears in the
record; however on June 21, 2006, Liberty‟s attorney forwarded Michael‟s
attorney a report from Dr. McGuire. It was written on May 25, 2006, and stated in
relevant part:
5
I see no reason for ongoing medical care. There is no
surgical lesion. Passive and active modalities at home, mixed with
some [anti-inflammatories] are appropriate care at this point.
Considering his occupation and lack of hard findings on
physical examination and diagnostic studies I would not
recommend a pain management consultation and I would not
recommend evaluation by a [physiatrist] as a result of the 2004
work incident.
Michael independently obtained an evaluation by Dr. Kuhnlein on July 7,
2006. This doctor reviewed Michael‟s medical records and examined him. Dr.
Kuhnlein diagnosed Michael with a pre-existing degenerative disc disease that
was aggravated by the August 2004 injury and caused chronic cervical pain. He
assigned Michael a five percent impairment rating due to the injury.
On
November 8, 2006, a deputy workers‟ compensation commissioner awarded
Michael benefits from this injury but found Michael was not entitled to penalty
benefits under Iowa Code section 86.13 (2005). This decision was not appealed.
On February 22, 2007, Michael filed a petition alleging, among other
things, that he was entitled to damages due to Liberty‟s bad faith denial of
continued medical care. Liberty filed a motion for summary judgment. Liberty
urged that Michael was required to pursue remedies for the denial of medical
care through the workers‟ compensation claims procedures provided in Chapter
85. It alternatively claimed that it was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law
because it had a reasonable basis to deny Michael‟s request for additional care.
The motion was initially denied as the court found the workers‟ compensation
statutes did not provide the exclusive remedy for Michael‟s claim and because
genuine issues of material fact existed. After Liberty filed a motion to reconsider,
6
the district court granted the motion concluding there were no genuine issues of
material fact because Michael‟s claim was fairly debatable as a matter of law.
The court‟s order reiterated that its prior ruling on the exclusivity of remedies
would stand. Michael appeals.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW. Our review of a ruling granting a party‟s motion for
summary judgment is for errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4; Green v. Racing
Ass’n of Cent. Iowa, 713 N.W.2d 234, 238 (Iowa 2006). The motion should be
granted if the record shows “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Iowa R.
Civ. P. 1.981(3). If the dispute is over facts that may affect the suit‟s outcome
under the applicable law, the issue of fact is “material.” Weddum v. Davenport
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 750 N.W.2d 114, 117 (Iowa 2008). “[A] „genuine‟ issue of fact
means the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
non-moving party.” Wallace v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Dirs.,
754 N.W.2d 854, 857 (Iowa 2008).
We must view the facts in a light most favorable to the party resisting the
motion and the moving party bears the burden of proving there is no genuine
issue of material fact. Rodda v. Vermeer Mfg., 734 N.W.2d 480, 483 (Iowa
2007).
If the conflict only concerns the legal consequences flowing from
undisputed facts, summary judgment is appropriate.
Kragnes v. City of Des
Moines, 714 N.W.2d 632, 637 (Iowa 2006).
III. ANALYSIS. Michael contends genuine issues of material fact exist regarding
whether Liberty had a reasonable basis to deny the treatment and thus the
7
court‟s grant of summary judgment was error. Liberty counters that summary
judgment was proper because (1) Michael needed to litigate his bad faith claim
during the workers‟ compensation proceedings under Chapter 85, and (2) the
record undisputedly shows Michael‟s claim was “fairly debatable.”
A. Exclusivity of Remedies. Our courts recognize a tort claim against
workers‟ compensation insurance carriers for bad faith conduct in the
administration of benefits. Boylan v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 489 N.W.2d 742,
744 (Iowa 1992). However, it is uncertain whether a bad faith claim will lie in the
specific circumstances before us. The law is unsettled as to whether a workers‟
compensation insurer can be liable in tort for bad faith conduct in the furnishing
of care to an employee seeking treatment for a work-related injury.
Michael argues his claim is not precluded under Tallman v. Hanssen, 427
N.W.2d 868, 870 (Iowa 1988), which stated that the exclusivity principle of the
workers‟ compensation scheme “is limited to matters surrounding a job-related
injury and does not extend to subsequent dealings during which a tort may arise
by reason of bad faith on the part of an employer‟s insurer.” Tallman‟s claim
alleged the workers‟ compensation insurer, among other things, failed to provide
a physician. Tallman, 427 N.W.2d at 470. Liberty asserts this case is more akin
to Kloster v. Hormel Foods Corp., 612 N.W.2d 772, 774-75 (Iowa 2000), where
the court found Kloster‟s claim was preempted by the workers‟ compensation
statutes because his claim in essence expressed a dissatisfaction with medical
care, an issue directly addressed by Iowa Code section 85.27. In this case, the
district court found Michael‟s claim of bad faith was not precluded because it
8
concerned conduct outside the workers‟ compensation laws of chapter 85. It
reasoned the claim concerned not only Michael‟s dissatisfaction with medical
care, but also concerned Liberty‟s mishandling of the claim by purportedly
breaking promises to authorize treatment.
The Eighth Circuit discussed this very issue in Petrillo v. Lubermens Mut.
Cas. Co., 378 F.3d 767 (8th Cir. 2004). Petrillo sued her employer‟s workers‟
compensation insurer for bad faith “failure to monitor and direct the medical
treatment being furnished” to her. Petrillo, 378 F.3d at 768. She argued the
insurer “acted in bad faith by not having her sent to a physician, rather than a
physical therapist” which resulted in aggravating her injury. Id. at 769. The court
explained that under Iowa Code section 85.27, “„the employer is obliged to
furnish reasonable services . . . to treat an injured employee, and has the right to
choose the care.‟” Id. (quoting Iowa Code § 85.27(4)). Petrillo argued that case
dicta and workers‟ compensation regulations established that there was a joint
obligation between employers and insurers to provide suitable care. Id. The
court disagreed “that the insurer has a duty to supervise and control an employer
exercising its right under § 85.27(4) to choose the medical provider.” Id. It
declined to “consider whether the insurer could be liable in bad faith if the policy
delegated the employer‟s right to choose the care to the insurer, or if the insurer
in fact chose the medical provider in a particular case.” Id. at 770. The court
stated that in such a case, the question would remain whether such claim would
lie for an employee that failed to file a petition for alternate care, the statutory
9
remedy available under Iowa Code section 85.27 for when an employee is
dissatisfied with the care offered. Id.
We cannot determine from the record whether the employer chose the
medical provider in this case or delegated this duty to the insurer. Although this
information would aid our analysis of whether section 85.27 provides the
exclusive remedy for this type of complaint, due to our analysis of the bad faith
claim, we need not decide the issue on the record before us. Even if section
85.27 was not the exclusive remedy and Liberty could be liable in tort for bad
faith conduct in failure to authorize medical care, such claim can only survive a
motion for summary judgment if the record shows a genuine issue of material
fact disputed by the parties. We need not decide the exclusivity issue since we
conclude no such dispute exists.
B.
Bad Faith Claim.
We review rulings on a motion for summary
judgment in bad-faith claims the same as other types of cases.
Rodda v.
Vermeer Mfg. & EMC Risk Servs., Inc., 734 N.W.2d 480, 483 (Iowa 2007);
Galbraith v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 698 N.W.2d 325, 328 (Iowa 2005).
“[T]o
succeed on such motions the insurer must demonstrate that a reasonable trier of
fact could not determine that the insurer lacked a reasonable basis for denying or
for delaying payment of the claim.” Gailbraith, 698 N.W.2d at 328. There is a
reasonable basis to deny benefits if the claim is fairly debatable on an issue of
fact or law. Bellville v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 702 N.W.2d 468, 473 (Iowa
2005); Christensen v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 554 N.W.2d 254, 260 (Iowa 1996).
If the claim can be disputed on any logical basis, the “fairly debatable” standard
10
is met. City of Madrid & EMC Ins. Co. v. Blasnitz, 742 N.W.2d 77, 82 (Iowa
2007); Bellville, 702 N.W.2d at 473.
This issue can be decided by the court in ruling on a motion for summary
judgment because “[w]here an objectively reasonable basis for denial of a claim
actually exists, the insurer cannot be held liable for bad faith as a matter of law.”
Bellville, 702 N.W.2d at 473; Gardner v. Hartford Ins. Accident & Indem. Co., 659
N.W.2d 198, 206 (Iowa 2003). Yet we can only decide the issue as a matter of
law “when the evidence is undisputed and only one inference can be drawn from
the evidence.” McIlravy v. North River Ins. Co., 653 N.W.2d 323, 333 (Iowa
2002). In making this determination, we do not weigh the evidence that was
before the insurer, rather we only decide “whether evidence existed to justify
denial of the claim.” Bellville, 702 N.W.2d at 474 (citation omitted). Since Michael
complains of Liberty‟s conduct over a period of time, we will consider whether
Liberty initially had a reasonable basis to deny further treatment after releasing
Michael on December 15, 2004, and if so, whether Liberty continued to have a
reasonable basis to deny further treatment. See McIlravy, 653 N.W.2d at 331
(stating that the entire time period must be considered in cases where the
dispute “focuses on the point in time at which a court should look to determine
the reasonableness of an insurer‟s actions in denying benefits in light of the
evidence in its possession.”).
Michael argues summary judgment should not have been granted
because the evidence relied on by Liberty in denying the claim was based on
disputed facts and was susceptible to multiple inferences, some of which favored
11
authorizing more treatment for Michael. He notes that though Dr. McGuire‟s
December 15, 2004 report released Michael for full work duty and placed him at
maximum medical improvement, it also stated that Michael‟s neck would
continue to bother him throughout the winter and that he would return for
additional treatment “as needed.” Michael also contends McGuire‟s statement,
that he would not assign any permanent impairment rating since the injury was
caused by a “freak accident,” could not be used as a reasonable basis to deny
further care. Michael contends any reasonable basis for denying further care
ceased after Liberty received the second opinion report from Dr. Igram.
We fail to see how Dr. McGuire‟s December 15, 2004 report indicates
Liberty‟s bad faith refusal to provide care after this date. First, even if McGuire‟s
“freak accident” statement expressed a bias against awarding Michael workers‟
compensation benefits, it pertained to an impairment rating, not further
treatment.1 We agree that Dr. McGuire‟s recommendations of placing Michael at
maximum medical improvement and releasing him to full work duty could be
viewed as inconsistent with his prescription that Michael return on an as-needed
basis.2 However, the record does not show any evidence that Liberty refused
further treatment at this stage.
1
The record shows when Michael requested
Liberty concedes that employees can and do obtain workers‟ compensation benefits
when injured in “freak accidents” related to their work.
2
This is because “maximum medical improvement” is “[t]he point at which an injured
person‟s condition stabilizes, and no further recovery or improvement is expected, even
with additional medical intervention.” Black‟s Law Dictionary 1000 (8th ed. 2004).
Therefore, it would be inconsistent for Dr. McGuire to both place Michael at MMI and
order Michael to return on an as-needed basis.
12
further treatment, they authorized him to obtain a second opinion from Dr. Igram.
Only after they received Dr. Igram‟s report was further care denied.
Dr. Igram‟s report was consistent with Dr. McGuire‟s. Dr. Igram found Dr.
McGuire‟s treatment plan “appropriate.” His prescription for on-going therapy is
not inconsistent with Dr. McGuire‟s since Dr. McGuire acknowledged Michael
could be seen on an “as-needed” basis. Dr. Igram suggested consultation with a
physiatrist or pain specialist “if desired.”
Even though Michael‟s initial requests for further treatment at this stage
were denied, Liberty did agree to have Michael seen again by Dr. McGuire. Dr.
McGuire then refused to see Michael again, but we cannot translate Dr.
McGuire‟s action into bad faith conduct on the part of Liberty. There is simply no
evidence in the record to support this inference.
In our review of summary
judgment we consider legitimate inferences on behalf of the nonmoving party, but
an inference is not legitimate if it is based on speculation or conjecture. McIlravy,
653 N.W.2d at 328.
Reports from the various physicians, though somewhat
ambiguous, were consistent. The reports stated that further treatment could be
sought, but was not necessary. This recommendation gave Liberty a logical
basis to deny further treatment to Michael.
We agree with the district court that Michael‟s claim was “fairly debatable”
and therefore Liberty had an objectively reasonable basis to deny further
treatment to Michael. Liberty was correctly granted summary judgment since it
cannot be held liable for bad faith as a matter of law.
AFFIRMED.
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