IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF LARRY GORDON BULLOCK, JR. AND THERESA MARIE BULLOCK, Upon the Petition of THERESA M. BULLOCK , Petitioner - Appell ee , And Concerning LARRY BULLOCK, JR. , Respondent - Appell ant . ________
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-878 / 08-0181
Filed November 26, 2008
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF LARRY
GORDON BULLOCK, JR. AND
THERESA MARIE BULLOCK,
Upon the Petition of
THERESA M. BULLOCK,
Petitioner-Appellee,
And Concerning
LARRY BULLOCK, JR.,
Respondent-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Hamilton County, Timothy J. Finn,
Judge.
A husband appeals a district court order upon a petition for dissolution
filed by his wife, claiming that the court acted inequitably in awarding both parties
joint physical care of the couple’s teenage son and in distributing the couple’s
marital property and debts. AFFIRMED.
Elizabeth Overton of Sullivan & Ward, P.C., West Des Moines, for
appellant.
Christine Keenan, Ames, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Potterfield, J., and Robinson, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2007).
2
VAITHESWARAN, J.
Larry and Theresa Bullock married in 1989, had a son, Jacob, in 1991,
and divorced in late 2007. At the time of trial, Larry was living on an acreage
owned by his parents and Theresa was staying with friends. Jacob spent most of
his time at the acreage but visited his mother on Wednesday evening through
Thursday morning and every other weekend from Friday evening through
Monday morning.
At the dissolution trial, Theresa requested joint physical care of Jacob, and
Larry requested physical care.
The district court granted the parents joint
physical care as Theresa requested.
The court also entered a property
distribution scheme.
Larry appeals that order. He contends the district court acted inequitably
in granting joint physical care and in dividing the property. Our review of these
issues is de novo. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4.
I.
Joint Physical Care
The primary consideration in determining physical care arrangements is
the best interests of the child. In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 691
(Iowa 2007). The district court had ―little difficulty‖ concluding that Jacob’s best
interests would be served by maximum contact with both parents. We agree with
this conclusion.
Jacob was sixteen years old at the time of trial. He testified outside the
presence of his parents that he liked the existing arrangement but he wished he
could see both of his parents equally. A therapist who visited with Jacob and met
separately with each of his parents testified that Jacob voiced a similar desire at
3
a meeting eight months earlier. The therapist supported Jacob’s wishes. He
stated,
My sense is that more of a shared [physical care
arrangement] would minimize the win/lose attitude coming out of
this. [Jacob] wouldn’t have to be concerned about either parent
being -- feeling disadvantaged in terms of financially, child custody
payment, nor time shared with him.
The therapist continued, ―I think that would probably minimize his emotional
struggle with being caught in the middle.
Kind of feel that he has a fairly
balanced opportunity to share his time with both parents.‖
We recognize the parents experienced some communication difficulties
following their separation.
See id. at 698.
These difficulties were
understandable, given the circumstances of the separation. See In re Marriage
of Ellis, 705 N.W.2d 96, 103 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005) (―[W]hen a marriage is being
dissolved we would find excellent communication and cooperation to be the
exception and certain failures in cooperation and communication not to be
surprising.‖), overruled on other grounds by In re Marriage of Hansen, 733
N.W.2d 684 (Iowa 2007). In our view, they did not preclude a joint physical care
arrangement, given Jacob’s age, maturity, and relative independence, as well as
each parent’s willingness to promote his relationship with the other and each
parent’s commitment to fostering Jacob’s well-being. Accordingly, we affirm this
aspect of the court’s decree.
II.
Property Division
Larry contends the district court inappropriately (A) ―included property not
owned by the parties in the property division‖ and (B) allocated ―approximately 83
percent of the marital debt‖ to him.
4
A. Property Subject to Division
Only property of the parties to the dissolution is divisible. In re Marriage of
Sullins, 715 N.W.2d 242, 251 (Iowa 2006). Larry maintains that ―assets worth
approximately $8000 were not owned by the parties and should not have been
included in the property distribution.‖ He points to the fact that the district court
included in his asset column fixtures that were part of the home his parents let
him use. The items he labeled as fixtures were the following:
(1) blue swing doors—vintage, (2) furnace approx. 5 y/o, (3)
water heater, (4) windows/drywall/lighting etc., (5)
door/hardware/screen door, (6) ceiling fans, (7) front porch,
(8) yard fence, (9) garage-concrete slab, (10) garage door
opener, (11) shutters/awnings, (12) lot fence/panels,1 (13)
automatic water—3, and (14) propane tank.
He valued these items at $6130.
Theresa does not question Larry’s characterization of the items as
fixtures. See Young v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 490 N.W.2d 554, 556 (Iowa 1992)
(explaining when personal property becomes a fixture).2 Indeed, at trial, she
conceded, ―They are fixtures to the property.‖
On appeal, Theresa simply
contends the property should be subject to division because the couple ―made
1
There is some indication that the panels were movable. However, Theresa does not
argue that the panels were not fixtures by virtue of this fact.
2
Personal property becomes a fixture when:
(1) it is actually annexed to the realty, or to something appurtenant
thereto;
(2) it is put to the same use as the realty with which it is connected; and
(3) the party making the annexation intends to make a permanent
accession to the freehold.
The intention of the party annexing the improvement is the
―paramount factor‖ in determining whether the improvement is a fixture . .
. . [A] building which cannot be removed without destruction of a
substantial part of its value becomes ―almost unavoidably an integral part
of the real estate.‖
Young, 490 N.W.2d at 556.
5
several capital improvements to the property with the realistic expectation that
they would receive title to the property.‖ The problem with this argument is that
Larry and Theresa did not own the home to which the fixtures were attached
either at the time they were living in it or at the time of trial. While Larry believed
he would inherit the home, he stated his parents had the power to change their
wills and there was presently no contract to sell it to him. He also testified that if
he removed the specified fixtures he would have to replace them, because he did
not own the house.
Theresa similarly agreed that these items would likely
remain with the house if it were sold.
Based on this testimony, we conclude the items were fixtures attached to
realty that the parties did not own. We further conclude the items should not
have been included in the assets subject to division.
See In re Marriage of
Rhinehart, 704 N.W.2d 677, 682–83 (Iowa 2005) (stating undistributed trust
income should not have been included as an asset subject to division); In re
Marriage of Muelhaupt, 439 N.W.2d 656, 661 (Iowa 1989) (reversing trial court’s
award to husband of percentage of wife’s expected future inheritance). Although
Larry expected to inherit the acreage, that future interest in the property had yet
to materialize. See In re Marriage of Schriner, 695 N.W.2d 493, 499 (Iowa 2005)
(―[A] future interest is properly considered as a marital asset subject to
distribution at the time of the divorce to the extent the future interest accrues
during the marriage.‖). Accordingly, $6130 should have been subtracted from
Larry’s asset total.
Larry further contends that some of the property subject to division was
not owned by either of the parties. Specifically, he states that a spreader, baler,
6
and one of the hayracks listed on Theresa’s itemization of personal property
were actually owned by his father. He also asserts his son and others owned
snowmobiles and fans listed on the itemization.
He maintains these items,
valued at $2250 should not have been included in the assets subject to division.
The district court considered Theresa’s itemization of personal property as
well as Larry’s response to that itemization. The district court chose to accept
Theresa’s itemization in all material respects and made an explicit determination
that her valuation of the personal property was more credible than Larry’s. We
give weight to this credibility determination.
Sullins, 715 N.W.2d at 251.
Accordingly, we decline to exclude the specified items from the property subject
to division.
(1) Allocation of Debts
The district court allocated certain debts and held Larry responsible for
―the remainder of the parties’ bills and loans.‖ Larry maintains the district court
allocated a disproportionate share of the debt to him. He seeks an equalization
payment to compensate for this allocation.
Debt accumulated during the marriage is a factor to consider in equitably
dividing property in a dissolution. In re Marriage of Johnson, 299 N.W.2d 466,
467 (Iowa 1980). On our de novo review, we are persuaded that the debts
explicitly identified in the district court’s ruling were equitably allocated.
We turn to certain debts not explicitly mentioned in the decree. First are
Jacob’s medical bills that were not covered by insurance.
These bills are
addressed in the decree under a provision requiring Theresa to pay the first $250
of unreimbursed medical expenses and requiring the balance to be allocated
7
equally between the parents. Second are veterinary supply and hay bills. As
Larry was awarded all the parties’ sheep and three or four of seven horses, we
conclude these bills were equitably allocated to him.
Remaining is a $282
payment for a four-wheeler belonging to Jacob. While the district court could
have required Theresa to pay half of this bill, we are not convinced the court
acted inequitably in allocating the debt to Larry.
III.
Disposition
We conclude the district court acted equitably in granting the parents joint
physical care of Jacob.
With respect to the property distribution, we conclude fixtures valued at
$6130 should not have been included in Larry’s asset column. This does not end
our discussion, because we must also decide whether the district court’s final
property distribution scheme was equitable. Larry and Theresa were of similar
age and health, were married for nineteen years, and had roughly the same
earnings at the time of trial. These factors would support an equal property
division. In re Marriage of Fennelly, 737 N.W.2d 97, 102 (Iowa 2007) (―Although
an equal division is not required, it is generally recognized that equality is often
most equitable.‖ (citation omitted)).
The countervailing consideration is Larry’s future interest in the acreage.
While we may not allocate this interest to either party, we may consider it in
determining an equitable division.
Rhinehart, 704 N.W.2d at 683.
Larry
conceded he would likely inherit the acreage. This would afford him a paymentfree residence and sixty to eighty acres of land.
There is no evidence that
Theresa could expect a similar financial windfall. Under these circumstances, we
8
conclude Theresa should not have to make an equalizing payment to Larry to
compensate for the fixtures that were included in Larry’s asset column.
Accordingly, we decline to modify the property division.
AFFIRMED.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
