PAT ROOFF, d/b/a PAT'S AUTO, Plaintiff - Appellant, vs. CITY OF WATERLOO, Defendant - Appellee.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-865 / 07-1430
Filed November 13, 2008
PAT ROOFF, d/b/a PAT’S AUTO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
CITY OF WATERLOO,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Stephen C.
Clark, Judge.
The plaintiff-appellant appeals from the district court order dismissing his
petition for writ of certiorari that alleged the Waterloo city council acted illegally in
denying his application for a license to operate an automobile recycling yard.
AFFIRMED.
Michael Pederson, Waterloo, for appellant.
David Zellhoefer of Zellhoefer Law Office, Waterloo, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Eisenhauer and Doyle, JJ.
2
SACKETT, C.J.
The plaintiff-appellant appeals from the district court order dismissing his
petition for writ of certiorari that alleged the Waterloo city council acted illegally in
denying his application for a license to operate an automobile recycling yard. He
contends the court erred in holding (1) that the certiorari action was moot, and (2)
that the city has unfettered discretion to grant or withhold licenses to operate
legal businesses. We affirm.
I.
BACKGROUND
This case has a convoluted and contentious background, most of which is
not relevant to the appeal before us. Waterloo city ordinances set forth the
requirement that a recycling yard have a license and detail the annual license
application procedures and requirements. In 2004 the plaintiff filed applications
for the three locations in which he operates Pat’s Auto Salvage.
Following
inspection of the locations by city departments, the city council considered the
recommendations to approve the application for one location and disapprove the
applications for two locations. The plaintiff appeared at the meeting and spoke to
the city council. The council then accepted the recommendations as made. It
sent the plaintiff a notice that it denied his applications for two salvage yards that
were not in compliance with city zoning ordinances. The letter also notified the
plaintiff that the city would reinspect the properties a month later and, if compliant
then, would put the applications back on the agenda for issuance of the licenses.
When inspectors arrived, the plaintiff denied them access, stating he had
appealed the council’s action.
3
After a hearing on the city’s motion to dismiss the appeal, the court
refused to dismiss the appeal, but ordered the plaintiff to re-cast the pleadings
because an appeal under Iowa Code chapter 17A is only available to challenge
the action of state agencies. The plaintiff filed a petition for writ of certiorari
challenging the legality of the council’s action. The parties fought over discovery
for more than two years.
The court held a hearing in May of 2007 on the
plaintiff’s motion for sanctions on discovery and the city’s motion to dismiss on
mootness grounds.
The court first considered the mootness issue and
determined this case fell within the exception to the mootness doctrine. The
court analyzed what process the plaintiff was due to protect whatever property
interest he had in receiving a license to operate his business. The court then
concluded “the quality and nature of the hearing provided by the city was
sufficient” to satisfy the requirements of due process. The court overruled the
city’s motion to dismiss; sustained the plaintiff’s motion for sanctions, finding the
city in default and awarding attorney fees and costs; and dismissed the plaintiff’s
petition for writ of certiorari, finding the city did not act illegally.
II.
SCOPE OF REVIEW
Neither party complied with Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.14(1)(f) by
discussing the scope or standard of appellate review for each issue in their briefs
or by setting forth their argument “in separately numbered divisions
corresponding to the separately stated issues.” Appeals from a judgment of the
district court in a certiorari action are governed by the rules for appeals in
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“ordinary actions.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.412. Our review is for correction of errors at
law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4.
III.
DISCUSSION
Mootness. The plaintiff contends the district court erred in holding his
certiorari action is moot.
This claim is without merit because the court
determined this case falls within the exception to mootness for “issues of broad
public importance likely to recur.” See State v. Hernandez-Lopez, 639 N.W.2d
226, 234 (Iowa 2002). We affirm the district court on this issue.
Certiorari. The plaintiff contends the district court erred in dismissing his
petition for writ of certiorari. He argues many of the fact findings of the court and
its conclusions are in error. He contends the case should be remanded for a
hearing. We conclude the plaintiff’s arguments are without merit. The district
court properly determined the city had not acted illegally in denying the plaintiff’s
application for a license. He was present at the city council meeting where the
license applications for his and other businesses were decided. He spoke to the
council, but provided no evidence he was in compliance with the applicable city
ordinances or zoning laws. After the denial of his application, he was given a
month to remedy the problems so his application could be reconsidered, but he
did not allow the city to reinspect the businesses to determine if the problems
had been remedied. Because this was a denial of a license application rather
than a license revocation, the plaintiff’s citation to the city ordinance relating to
license revocations is inapposite.
The city’s process for considering annual
license applications did not violate the plaintiff’s due process rights. He had
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actual notice1 of the city council meeting and was given an opportunity to be
heard.
The evidence before us supports the district court’s conclusions that the
city did not act illegally and that the plaintiff did not dispute the violations
occurred. We affirm the district court on this issue.
We have considered all the claims properly presented for our review and
conclude those not specifically addressed above are either disposed of by our
resolution of the plaintiff’s enumerated claims or are without merit.
AFFIRMED.
1
Actual notice, even if written notice were required, is sufficient in the circumstances
before us. See In re Estate of Falck, 672 N.W.2d 785, 792 (Iowa 2003).
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