STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff - Appellee, vs. RICHARD LAWRENCE WARNER , Defendant - Appellant.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-864 / 07-1199
Filed November 26, 2008
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RICHARD LAWRENCE WARNER,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Davis County, Daniel P. Wilson
and Annette Scieszinksi, Judges.
Richard Warner appeals from the district court’s denial of his request to
limit the presentence investigation and from the district court’s sentencing order.
AFFIRMED.
Ryan J. Mitchell of Orsborn, Milani & Mitchell, L.L.P., Ottumwa, for
appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sheryl A. Soich, Assistant Attorney
General, and Rick L. Lynch, County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Eisenhauer and Doyle, JJ.
2
DOYLE, J.
Richard Warner appeals from the district court’s denial of his request to
limit the Iowa Department of Correctional Services presentence investigation and
from the trial court’s sentencing order, which provides Warner “shall comply with
any evaluations and participate in all treatments and programs recommended by
his supervision officer.” Warner further contends the sentencing court should
have ordered the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections not to require him to
complete a sexual evaluation because the crime was not sexual in nature. Upon
our review, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
On August 26, 2005, Warner, a Pennsylvania resident, was charged by
trial information with sexual abuse in the third degree (Count I), a class “C”
felony, in violation of Iowa Code section 709.4 (2005). On September 16, 2005,
Warner was charged by additional trial information with practicing medicine
without a license (Count II), a class “D” felony, in violation of sections 147.2 and
147.103(A)(1).
According to the minutes of testimony and investigative
materials, Warner performed a “female exam” upon a nineteen-year-old woman.
Warner denied performing an internal examination, but did admit to performing
an abdominal examination by placing his hands on the woman’s abdomen and
pressing on her liver, spleen, stomach, intestinal areas, and ovaries.
On December 1, 2006, Warner pled guilty to Count II, practicing medicine
without a license, pursuant to a plea agreement. In exchange for his plea, the
State agreed that, among other things, it would dismiss Count I and recommend
that Warner receive a five-year suspended sentence with no jail time and
3
probation, which would be subsequently transferred to Warner’s home state of
Pennsylvania. The district court accepted the plea, set sentencing for hearing,
and ordered the Eighth Judicial District Department of Correctional Services to
complete a presentence investigation.
Warner then filed a motion for “Judicial Review of Preparation of
[Presentence] Investigation.” Warner asserted that, in preparing the presentence
investigation, the “Department of Corrections”1 was improperly including a sexual
history report when he had not pled guilty to a sexual crime. Consequently, he
requested the court “direct the Department of Corrections to not prepare a sexual
history report as part of their [Presentence] Investigation . . . .”
On December 15, 2007, a hearing on Warner’s motion for judicial review
was held before the district court.
At the hearing, the State and Warner
stipulated that Counts I and II “were out of the same incident that occurred at the
same time in the same place.”
Additionally, Sue Boggs, a probation/parole
officer for the Eighth Judicial District Department of Correctional Services
(Department), testified regarding the sexual history report she was asked
complete in Warner’s presentence investigation. Boggs explained that a sexual
history report is different than a psychological evaluation, and that having a
sexual history report in a presentence investigation in no way places a defendant
on the sex offender registry. Boggs acknowledged that Warner had pled guilty to
a charge that was not associated with any sexual act or sex-related crime, but
stated that pursuant to Iowa Code section 901.3 subsections (3), (5), and (7), the
1
Although Warner’s motion refers to the department of corrections, it is understood he
meant the department of correctional services, as it is the department of correctional
services that completes the presentence investigation.
4
investigator was required to inquire into any mitigating circumstances related to
the offense and the defendant’s potential as a candidate for deferred judgment,
deferred sentence, suspended sentence, or probation, as well as the
circumstances of the offense and harm to the victim.
Consequently, Boggs
testified that based upon the minutes of testimony in this case, she was asked to
complete a sexual history report. Boggs further noted that the sexual abuse
charge was still pending in the case, but that it was scheduled to be dismissed at
sentencing.
Following the hearing, the district court denied the relief requested. In so
ruling, the court determined:
Here, there is sufficient nexus between Warner’s admitted conduct
in Practicing Medicine without a License and the surrounding
circumstances of that offense—alleged to have been sexual in
nature—to warrant inquiry into his sexual history. The presentence
investigation, including a sexual history investigation, should
continue.
On March 9, 2007, the sentencing hearing was held. The district court
denied Warner’s request for deferred judgment.
The court then imposed a
suspended sentence of incarceration not to exceed five years, a fine of $750,
and three years’ probation, and the State dismissed the sexual abuse charge.
Additionally, the court imposed special conditions of probation, one of which
ordered that Warner “shall comply with any evaluation and participate in all
treatments and programs recommended by his supervising officer.”
After
announcing Warner’s sentence and the conditions of probation, the following
exchange took place:
[WARNER’S COUNSEL]: I did have a question, Your
Honor. You mention that Mr. Warner complete all evaluations that
5
the Department of Corrections recommends. I guess I’m not clear
as to does this include [participation in the Sex Offender Treatment
Program]? I guess what’s your order about that?
....
[COUNTY ATTORNEY]: Your Honor, I talked to [Sue
Boggs], and it’s my understanding that [Warner]—if this works the
ways it’s planned, [Warner’s] probation will be transferred to the
State of Pennsylvania. So the Eighth Judicial District is not asking
for or planning on doing any kind of an evaluation with [Warner] for
this purpose of the [Sex Offender Treatment Program].
What I think needs to be understood is, if [Warner] does get
transferred to Pennsylvania . . . , he’s going to have to do whatever
their requirements are. And if that’s the requirement to do the [Sex
Offender Treatment Program], or I’m sorry, to do any kind of an
evaluation to determine if [the Sex Offender Treatment Program] is
necessary, then . . . [Warner’s] going to have to do that or
[Pennsylvania’s] not going to supervise him and he’s going to be
shipped back to the Eighth. And we don’t want to do that. So in
Iowa, we’re not asking for that to happen, but Pennsylvania could
very well. And if they do, he’s going to have to do what they’re
asking for or else he’s going to have to come back to Iowa for his
probation. . . .
[WARNER’S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, we have no problem
with an evaluation to be done as long as the Court isn’t sentencing
him to [the Sex Offender Treatment Program].
THE COURT: I don’t think there is a problem.
[WARNER’S COUNSEL]: Okay.
In entering judgment in the matter, the district court’s judgment entry noted:
[T]he . . . “suggested special probation conditions” listed on page
24 of 25 of the Presentence Investigation Report filed January 31,
2007, . . . included a requirement that . . . [Warner] complete all
requirements for an evaluation to determine his appropriateness for
placement in a Sex Offender Treatment Program.
At this time, the court declines to impose the foregoing . . .
conditions . . . .
Warner returned to his home state of Pennsylvania and was then subject
to the jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections. Thereafter, on
April 12, 2007, Warner filed his “Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence.”
Warner’s motion alleged that the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections placed
him on their sex offender registry and restricted Warner to a four-county radius
6
as part of his probation. Warner maintained his “plea bargain was made in such
a way to avoid . . . being placed on the [sex offender] registry.” Consequently, he
requested the Iowa court order the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections to
not place him on their sex offender registry. Following a hearing on the matter,
the district court denied the motion, concluding:
[A]lthough this court has declined to impose special terms and
conditions of probation in the sentencing order, the state of
Pennsylvania is within its rights, under the provision of the
[Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision], to supervise
Warner pursuant to its own rules, laws and regulations. An Iowa
court cannot require otherwise . . . .
Warner appeals.
II. Scope and Standard of Review.
We review a sentence imposed by the district court for corrections of
errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4; State v. Grandberry, 619 N.W.2d 399, 401
(Iowa 2000). We will not reverse the decision of the district court absent an
abuse of discretion or some defect in the sentencing procedure.
State v.
Witham, 583 N.W.2d 677, 678 (Iowa 1998). To the extent Warner claims the
district court erred in denying his motion for a protective order, our review is or
corrections of errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4. To the extent Warner presents
any constitutional claims, our review is de novo.
N.W.2d 852, 854 (Iowa 1992).
State v. Godbersen, 493
7
III. Merits.
A. Presentence Investigation.
On appeal, Warner argues there is not sufficient nexus between his
admissions and the crime he pled guilty to in order to allow the department of
corrections to prepare a sexual history report. We disagree.
Iowa Code section 901.2 provides, in part, that upon a plea of guilty the
court shall receive from the judicial district department of correctional services
any information which is relevant to the question of sentencing. Further, the
court shall order a presentence investigation when the offense is, as in this case,
a class “D” felony. Iowa Code § 901.2. This requirement cannot be waived for a
class “D” felony. Id.
If a presentence investigation is ordered by the court, the investigation
shall inquire into, among other things, the defendant’s characteristics, the
defendant’s social history, the circumstances of the offense, and the harm to the
victim.
Id. § 901.3(1), (2), (3), (5).
The primary function of the presentence
investigation is to provide pertinent information to aid the district court in
sentencing. State v. Uthe, 541 N.W.2d 532, 533 (Iowa 1995).
Although it is clear that Warner did not plead guilty to a sex act or anything
sexual in nature, the sexual abuse charge was still pending at the time of the
presentence investigation. Under the unique circumstances of this case, there
was no error in ordering the sexual history and investigation to proceed.
Certainly the sexual history falls under the circumstances of the offense, one of
the proper factors to be considered in a presentence investigation report.
8
Warner further argues it would be impossible for the sentencing court to
not have been improperly prejudiced when given the information in the
presentence investigation. In its judgment entry, the district court specifically
noted it declined to impose the presentence investigation’s probation condition
recommendation that Warner complete all requirements for an evaluation to
determine his appropriateness for placement in a sex offender treatment
program. Additionally, in denying Warner’s request for deferred judgment, the
court stated:
The main reason is that although you do not have a felony record,
you do have some fairly serious misdemeanor records compiled
over your many years, starting back in March of 1974. You had
some substance abuse issues which you had talked about. More
recently in the 90s, you had some criminal charges based upon, as
you say, business practices and/or financial circumstances. But
nevertheless, convictions. And also more recently an OWI in 1999
in Pennsylvania.
You need to have a really clean record for me to seriously
look at a deferred.
It is apparent that the inclusion of the sexual history in the presentence
investigation was not a factor considered by the district court in sentencing.
Furthermore, Warner’s comparison of his case to State v. Valin, 724
N.W.2d 440 (Iowa 2006), is without merit. In Valin, Valin was convicted of OWI
and then ordered to participate in sex offender counseling and submit to certain
tests as a condition of his probation. Valin, 724 N.W.2d at 441-43. The supreme
court found the sentencing court abused its discretion in imposing those special
terms of probation. Id. at 448-49. The court concluded there was no reasonable
relationship between Valin’s required participation in the sex offender treatment
program and the imposition of other special terms of probation, and the goals of
9
probation for Valin’s current operating while intoxicated conviction. Id. Such is
not the case here. The sexual history was part of the presentence investigation,
not a condition of probation. As stated earlier in this opinion, there was sufficient
nexus between the circumstances surrounding the offense and the presentence
investigation sexual history.
Consequently, we conclude the district court did not error in denying
Warner’s motion for protective order.
We further conclude the district court
considered relevant sentencing factors and clearly stated valid reasons for the
sentence it imposed. We find no abuse in its exercise of sentencing discretion
and therefore affirm the sentence.
B. Placement on Pennsylvania Sex Offender Registry.
Warner next contends the district court should have ordered the
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections not to require him to complete a sexual
evaluation because his crime was not sexual in nature. The State responds that
Warner is not entitled to relief because the Pennsylvania authorities are free to
supervise Warner as they see fit. We agree.
Iowa and Pennsylvania are both participants of the Interstate Compact for
Adult Offender Supervision (Compact). See Iowa Code ch. 907B; 61 Pa. Cons.
Stat. § 324.1 (2007). The Compact is “a formal agreement between member
states that seeks to promote public safety by systematically controlling the
interstate movement of certain adult offenders.” Interstate Compact for Adult
Offender Supervision Rules (2008)2 at 1, http://www.interstatecompact.org
2
The 2008 Compact rules are the only rules available to this court. However, it appears
that the applicable rules here have not been substantively changed since 2005.
10
/Portals/0/library/legal/ICAOS_Rules.pdf. In joining in the Compact, both Iowa
and Pennsylvania agreed that “[a]ll lawful actions of the interstate commission,
including all rules and bylaws promulgated by the interstate commission, are
binding upon the compacting states.” Iowa Code § 907B.2, Article XIII(2)(a); 61
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 324.1, Article XIV(B).
Rule 4.101 of the Compact provides: “A receiving state shall supervise an
offender transferred under the interstate compact in a manner determined by the
receiving state and consistent with the supervision of other similar offenders
sentenced in the receiving state.”
Interstate Compact for Adult Offender
Supervision Rules (2008) at 37, http://www.interstatecompact.org/Portals/0
/library/legal/ICAOS_Rules.pdf (emphasis added).
Additionally, rule 4.103(a)
provides:
At the time of acceptance or during the term of supervision, the
compact administrator or supervising authority in the receiving state
may impose a special condition on an offender transferred under
the interstate compact if that special condition would have been
imposed on the offender if sentence had been imposed in the
receiving state.
Id. at 39.
In this case, Warner does not dispute that he requested his probation be
transferred to Pennsylvania. In accepting Warner’s supervision, it is clear under
the Compact rules that it is Pennsylvania, not Iowa, that determines the manner
in which Warner is to be supervised. Furthermore, Pennsylvania, in accepting
Warner’s probation supervision, was free to impose special conditions upon
Warner.
Moreover, at Warner’s sentencing hearing, the county attorney
expressly advised Warner that if Warner requested his probation supervision be
11
transferred to Pennsylvania, he would be subject to Pennsylvania’s supervision
conditions. Consequently, we conclude the district court did not err determining
that Pennsylvania is within its rights, under the provision of the Compact, to
supervise Warner pursuant to its own rules, laws, and regulations, and that an
Iowa court cannot require otherwise.
We therefore affirm the judgment and
sentence of the district court.
IV. Conclusion.
Based upon the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment and sentence
of the district court.
AFFIRMED.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.