PELLA CORPORATION , P etitioner - Appell ant , vs. MARY JANE FRANKS , Respondent - Appell ee .
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-835 / 08-0222
Filed October 29, 2008
PELLA CORPORATION,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
MARY JANE FRANKS,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Carla T. Schemmel,
Judge.
Employer appeals from the district court‟s ruling on its petition for judicial
review affirming the workers‟ compensation commissioner‟s award of mental
health treatment benefits to employee. AFFIRMED.
David L. Jenkins of Bradshaw, Fowler, Proctor & Fairgrave, P.C., Des
Moines, for appellant.
Dennis L. Hanssen and Wendy D. Boka of Hopkins & Huebner, P.C., Des
Moines, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and Potterfield, JJ.
2
HUITINK, P.J.
Pella Corporation (Pella) appeals from the district court‟s ruling on its
petition for judicial review affirming the workers‟ compensation commissioner‟s
award of mental health treatment benefits to Mary Jane Franks. Pella complains
Franks‟ mental condition is not causally related to an injury to her fingers and
therefore it should not be held responsible for treatment. Pella also argues that
even if it is properly obligated to provide mental health treatment, the agency
erred in concluding treatment should continue with providers chosen by Franks.
We affirm.
I.
Background Facts and Proceedings.
Franks sustained a work-
related injury to her right hand on January 25, 2000, while employed by Pella.
Four fingers of Franks‟ right hand were cut when her hand was pulled into
machinery and pinched between rollers of the machine and the glass of the
window on which she had been working. The cuts required several sutures and
resulted in permanent restrictions.
On March 11, 2002, Dr. Kip Burkman evaluated Franks and his
“Impressions of Findings Caused By 1-25-00 Work Injury” included “development
of multiple right finger contractures . . . [s]econdary effect of right shoulder
pain . . . [s]econdary depression.” Following the January 2000 injury, Franks
was no longer able to use her right hand, but doctors could find no physiological
reason for the condition.
A deputy workers‟ compensation commissioner
determined Franks sustained a fifty percent disability to her right hand and
awarded permanent partial benefits.
3
In July 2004 Franks filed a petition for medical benefits seeking to have
her ongoing psychological care paid for by Pella. Pella denied responsibility for
any work-related injury involving a mental or psychological component.
A
hearing was scheduled before a deputy commissioner to determine whether
Franks was “entitled to additional medical care in the form of psychiatric and
psychological care to treat an alleged work related mental or psychological
condition.”
Franks sought a continuance of the hearing in order to obtain deposition
testimony of her treating psychiatrist, which she had been unable to obtain earlier
due to scheduling conflicts.
The hearing proceeded as scheduled, and the
deputy allowed additional time after the hearing for the parties to submit
“additional expert testimony . . . needed by both sides.”
At the hearing held on April 19, 2005, Franks testified about her hand
injury, the “loss” of her hand, and her subsequent feelings of depression,
including thoughts of suicide.
She testified she had experienced depression
since the injury and that she had “tried to manage it” on her own until March 2003
when she “couldn‟t take it anymore.” She testified she told Dr. Alan Jensen she
was extremely depressed and he prescribed antidepressants.
(Alan Jensen,
M.D., was the doctor to whom she had been referred for treatment in the form of
pain management.
Apparently, neither Franks nor Pella was aware that Dr.
Jensen was a psychiatrist, as well as physician.) She testified Pella “fired Dr.
Jensen” and referred her to Dr. Jay G. Shaaf. She testified at the time of hearing
she was receiving mental health treatment from Dr. Michael Egger, M.D., and
4
Susan Narducci, M.S., which she found helpful.
She also testified she was
contemplating the amputation of her index finger on her right hand.
Exhibits submitted to the deputy include notes from Dr. David Clough, who
treated Franks for her hand injury. Dr. Clough referred Franks to Dr. Jensen for
pain management. Dr. Jensen‟s notes of March 3, 2003, indicate that Franks
brought up the fact that she is totally depressed . . . she sees her
situation as hopeless and helpless. . . . At this point, I believe that
she has developed a mood disorder, secondary to her general
medical condition or an adjustment reaction with mixed emotional
features. I believe that she is off of work completely due to the
depression that is related to her Workers‟ Compensation-related
injury.
A letter dated April 11, 2003, from Pella‟s insurer to Dr. Jensen stated:
It is my understanding that this patient was referred to you
for pain complaints to her hand, which was injured at work on
1/25/00. It is our position that she was not referred to you for
orthopedic treatment of the shoulder, nor was she referred to you
for treatment of depression. Please be advised that we will not
authorize any more treatment for depression or the shoulder.
....
We would ask that you confine your activities to the condition
for which the referral was made.
Dr. Jensen continued to treat Franks for the next five months and then referred
her to Dr. Schaaf. Pella authorized Dr. Schaaf to treat Franks for pain, but not for
depression. Dr. Schaaf continued to treat Franks for depression, but Franks was
required to pay for her Zoloft prescription, an anti-depressant medication.
On April 16, 2003, Pella sent Franks for evaluation by Dr. Bruce Gutnik, a
psychiatrist. Dr. Gutnik‟s report summarizes his opinion:
Ms. Franks has an Anxiety Disorder NOS [not otherwise specified]
that includes some symptoms of depression and a history of
phobias. At the present time she has either a Conversion Disorder
or is Malingering his [sic] physical symptoms, and in either case
these are not a result of the injury per se, but rather, unconscious
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or conscious secondary gain.
Since Ms. Franks‟ physical
symptoms are in my opinion not caused by a physical injury, it
follows that her Anxiety Disorder NOS is also not related to the
physical injury. In my opinion, with a reasonable degree of medical
certainty Ms. Franks suffers from no psychiatric or psychological
symptoms directly related to her physical injury.
By letter dated July 3, 2003, Dr. Jensen provided Franks with the following
medical opinions:
1.
The last time I saw Mary Franks was on 6/20/03. The
history that she had given me was that she had improved with the
Zoloft, Seroquel, Bextra and Lasix. However she still has issues
surrounding her ability to work and felt that she had been discarded
by Pella Windows. She still had depressive features of a sleep
disturbance, decreased interest in her activities, a degree of
hopelessness and helplessness regarding her present situation
after hand injury at Pella Windows, a decreased energy level, some
degree of impairment of memory and concentration . . . . My
diagnosis at this time was depression secondary to a general
medical condition related to her hand. . . .
2.
I believe that Ms. Franks depressive features are directly
causally related to the work related injury that she sustained at
Pella Windows in January 25, 2000. Referring to the proper
definition outlined in your letter, a work related injury is a substantial
factor in bringing about the change in her mood and her inability to
adjust to her present circumstances after her injury.
3.
I would recommend that Mary continue with the Zoloft . . . I
would like to have her see a vocational counselor for a two-fold
purpose. I would like to see her get help in obtaining employment
for which she will be capable within the context of her injury. In
addition, I would like her to see a counsel who would be able to
deal with the psychotherapeutic issues of adjustment reaction with
mixed emotional features. . . . .
I believe that if Ms. Franks‟ psychiatric symptoms are
addressed in the above manner she will have an optimal outcome.
However, I believe that if she does not have significant intervention
at the time that she may become permanently totally disabled from
a psychiatric basis. I believe that the further investment by the
worker‟s compensation carrier are minimal compared to what has
already been invested, and both the carrier and Ms. Franks will
reap maximum medical benefit from a timely intervention as
outlined above.
6
Dr.
Egger,
practicing
psychiatry
with
Alegent
Health
Psychiatry
Associates, first examined Franks on March 10, 2004. He diagnosed Franks with
a major depressive disorder, status post right hand injury with contracture.
Dr. Egger recommended drug therapy and psychotherapy. Franks began seeing
Susan Narducci, an associate at Alegent Health for cognitive therapy.
Also submitted was deposition testimony of Dr. Gutnik, taken on
March 23, 2005 prior to the workers‟ compensation benefits hearing. Dr. Gutnik‟s
deposition testimony includes the following exchanges:
Q. It seemed like there was some conflict then as to the
information she gave you as to when these various signs or
symptoms began. Did you ever resolve the conflict? A. The best I
could resolve it was the notion that she‟s given me a history
suggestive to me of the correct diagnosis of anxiety disorder not
otherwise specified, which entails not only anxiety symptoms, but
signs of depression when stressed. And she had a history of
several depressive episodes when stressed, and it appears to me
that that‟s where her depression came from. So it‟s all part of an
ongoing long-term kind of problem. I got the impression that she –
based on what she told me -- it wasn‟t an impression – she flat out
told me that she started having crying spells and was depressed
from day one at the time of the injury, but that it got worse. I guess,
about a year before I saw her.
....
Q. And in what way would that generalized grouped anxiety
disorder have any causal relationship to the injury to her fingers?
A. In my opinion, it would have none.
Q. Why not? A. As far as I can tell, she was really no
different than she had been prior to the injury. Her reaction of
depression while present she said from day one, apparently blew
up sometime after more than a year went by. I wouldn‟t relate that
to the injury, the exaggeration or increased symptoms.
....
A. Sure. There‟s no question that she had an injury to her hand,
that she cut her four fingers. The way she presented to me was,
she said that she severed four fingers, which is not what happened.
But in her own mind, she‟s blown this out of proportion to the actual
physical injury. She developed a contracture of the hand, but it‟s
not a physiologic contracture. . . . If it‟s not a physiologic reason,
then we have to go to something psychological or we have to
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assume she‟s malingering. . . . I couldn‟t tell which of those two
was the case, but it is clear from all the records that the symptoms
she has were not being generated by a physical problem and were
psychological in origin.
....
Q. The fact that there‟s a temporal relationship between the
anxiety disorder and the work injury is purely consequential, in your
opinion? A. Well, in my opinion, she doesn‟t have much of a
physical injury. And again, as I just outlined a few minutes ago, I
feel that the symptoms that she‟s complaining of are
psychologically generated. Not physically generated. And as such,
I wouldn‟t relate the anxiety or the depressive symptoms to the
physical injury. . . .
Q. . . . So when she became depressed and anxious in the
months following the work injury, was there any relationship at that
time between the anxiety and the depression and the work injury?
A. There may well have been. Sure.
Q. Well, within a reasonable degree of medical probability,
was the anxiety and the depression that she had in the – let‟s say
the twelve months following the injury – was that related to the work
injury? A. I‟m going to say based on her telling me that she
became depressed and had crying spells immediately following,
that that depression was related to the injury.
Q. So would that be a situation where her preexisting anxiety
disorder, as you call it, was lit up or aggravated by the work injury?
A. Sure.
Following submission of briefs,1 the deputy ruled that Franks was entitled
to alternate medical care and Pella was liable for Iowa Code section 85.27 (2003)
medical benefits necessary to treat a work-related condition. Pella was ordered
to provide continued reasonable and necessary treatment “and said care shall
rest with Michael Egger, M.D. and Susan Narducci, M.S.”
Pella appealed. The workers‟ compensation commissioner affirmed and
adopted the deputy‟s decision. The commissioner agreed with the causation
findings of the deputy and concluded Dr. Gutnik‟s opinion was less convincing
than those of Drs. Jensen and Egger, because he “initially denied that the work
1
Additional deposition testimony was later determined to be erroneously allowed and
therefore is not included or considered here.
8
injury aggravated or lit up claimant‟s mental condition but he then appeared to
change that opinion.”
Pella sought judicial review before the district court, which affirmed. The
district
court determined
determination
of
the
substantial evidence
commissioner.
The
supported
court
also
the
causation
concluded
the
commissioner‟s conclusion that Franks should continue to receive treatment from
Dr. Egger and Narducci was based on “entirely reasonable grounds” and was
“well within the agency‟s authority.” Pella appeals.
II. Scope and Standard of Review. Our scope of review in workers‟
compensation cases is governed by the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act,
chapter 17A (2005). Meyer v. IBP, Inc., 710 N.W.2d 213, 218 (Iowa 2006). Our
review of the commissioner‟s decision is for errors at law, not de novo. Finch v.
Schneider Specialized Carriers, Inc., 700 N.W.2d 328, 330 (Iowa 2005). “Under
the Act, we may only interfere with the commissioner‟s decision if it is erroneous
under one of the grounds enumerated in the statute, and a party‟s substantial
rights have been prejudiced.” Meyer, 710 N.W.2d at 218.
The district court acts in an appellate capacity to correct errors of law on
the part of the agency. Mycogen Seeds v. Sands, 686 N.W.2d 457, 463 (Iowa
2004).
In reviewing the district court‟s decision, we apply the standards of
chapter 17A to determine whether our conclusions are the same as those
reached by the district court. Clark v. Vicorp Rests., Inc., 696 N.W.2d 596, 603
(Iowa 2005).
Factual findings regarding the award of workers‟ compensation benefits
are within the commissioner‟s discretion, so we are bound by the commissioner‟s
9
findings of fact if they are supported by substantial evidence. Mycogen Seeds,
686 N.W.2d at 464-65. Because factual determinations are within the discretion
of the agency, so is its application of law to the facts. Clark, 696 N.W.2d at 604;
see also Meyer, 710 N.W.2d at 219 (stating the reviewing court should “allocate
some degree of discretion” in considering the agency‟s application of law to facts,
“but not the breadth of discretion given to the findings of facts”). We will reverse
the agency‟s application of the law to the facts if we determine its application was
“irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable.” Meyer, 710 N.W.2d at 218.
III.
Causation.
Pella argues that “if Franks is now depressed, such
depression cannot logically be found to causally result from the January 24, 2000
injury to her fingers.” It is true that Dr. Gutnik opined, “Since Ms. Franks‟ physical
symptoms are in my opinion not caused by a physical injury, it follows that her
Anxiety Disorder NOS is also not related to the physical injury.” However, Dr.
Gutnik also testified:
Q. . . . So when she became depressed and anxious in the
months following the work injury, was there any relationship at that
time between the anxiety and the depression and the work injury?
A. There may well have been. Sure.
Q. Well, within a reasonable degree of medical probability,
was the anxiety and the depression that she had in the – let‟s say
the twelve months following the injury – was that related to the work
injury? A. I‟m going to say based on her telling me that she
became depressed and had crying spells immediately following,
that that depression was related to the injury.
Q. So would that be a situation where her preexisting anxiety
disorder, as you call it, was lit up or aggravated by the work injury?
A. Sure.
(Emphasis added.)
Drs. Jensen and Egger also opine that Franks‟ mental
condition is a result of her physical injury.
10
Moreover, contrary to Dr. Gutnik‟s apparent belief, a lack of physiologic
basis for Franks‟ contracture of her fingers does not necessarily negate that the
same was caused by the work-related injury. See, e.g., Dowell v. Wagler, 509
N.W.2d 134 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993) (recognizing “phantom pain” as compensable
injury).
“The injury contemplated by the [workers‟ compensation statutory
provisions] “„is broader than mere reference to some objective physical break or
wound to the body, but includes also the consequences therefrom, including
mental ailments or nervous conditions.‟” Id. at 137 (quoting Deaver v. Armstrong
Rubber Co., 170 N.W.2d 455, 466 (Iowa 1969)).
We conclude there is ample evidence in the record from which the
commissioner could reasonably find that Franks‟ mental condition was caused by
her work-related injury.
The district court did not err in affirming the
commissioner‟s ruling.
IV.
Specific Treatment.
Pella contends the commissioner erred in
concluding Franks should continue to receive treatment from her chosen
providers, Dr. Egger and Susan Narducci.
Pella argues the commissioner
abused its discretion in concluding Dr. Egger and Narducci were providing
beneficial treatment to Franks. Franks responds that Pella has lost its right to
control her medical care because it denied liability for her injury and has failed to
offer appropriate treatment.
Like the district court, we conclude the commissioner‟s ruling was within
its discretion. Pursuant to Iowa Code section 85.27, an employer is to furnish
reasonable medical care. Id. § 85.27(1). If an employee is dissatisfied with the
care offered, and the employer and employee cannot agree on alternate care,
11
“the commissioner may, upon application and reasonable proofs of the necessity
therefor, allow and order other care.” Id. § 85.27(4). Our supreme court has held
that an employer has only a qualified right to control treatment
because the treatment must be (1) prompt, (2) reasonably suited to
treat the injury, and (3) without undue inconvenience to the
claimant. . . . [I]f the treatment the employer offers fails to meet any
one of these qualifications, the commissioner has the authority to
order alternate care, including care from a doctor chosen by the
claimant.
West Side Transp. v. Cordell, 601 N.W.2d 691, 693 (Iowa 1999). Here, Pella has
continually refused to offer Franks psychological care of any kind.
Under the workers‟ compensation statutory provisions, Franks asked the
commissioner to order alternate care and, as recognized in Cordell, the
commissioner had the authority to order care chosen by Franks. The deposition
testimony of Dr. Gutnik, while disagreeing with diagnosis, acknowledges that the
treatment protocol of Dr. Egger and Ms. Narducci is appropriate. There was no
abuse of discretion in the commissioner‟s order to allow continuing care with
these providers.
Pella argues that the offers of proof were outdated and thus could not
reasonably be relied upon by the commissioner. An abuse of discretion occurs
only when the commissioner exercised its discretion on untenable grounds or its
exercise of discretion was clearly erroneous. IBP, Inc. v. Al-Gharib, 604 N.W.2d
621, 630 (Iowa 2000). Under the circumstances presented in this case, we find
no abuse of discretion.
12
V. Summary.
There is substantial evidence to support the commissioner‟s finding that
Franks‟s mental condition is causally related to an injury to her fingers sustained
in 2000.
The commissioner did not abuse its discretion in ordering Pella to
continue to provide mental health treatment with providers chosen by Franks,
where Pella had failed to offer medical care of any kind for her psychological
condition. We affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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