BLANE STEFFES, LEONA FRAZIER, DIANA FISCHER, and LEONA FRAZIER and DIANA FISCHER as Executors of the Estate of Cordellia Steffes, Deceased , Plaintiff s - Appell ants , vs. BARRY T. BRUNER , Defendant - Appell ee .
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-831 / 08-0126
Filed December 31, 2008
BLANE STEFFES, LEONA FRAZIER,
DIANA FISCHER, and LEONA FRAZIER
and DIANA FISCHER as Executors of
the Estate of Cordellia Steffes, Deceased,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
BARRY T. BRUNER,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Carroll County, Carl D. Baker,
Judge.
The plaintiffs appeal from the district court’s order granting summary
judgment in favor of the defendant on the plaintiffs’ legal malpractice suit.
AFFIRMED.
Christopher P. Welsh of Welsh & Welsh, P.C., L.L.O., Omaha, Nebraska,
for appellants.
Kevin J. Driscoll and Eric G. Hoch of Finley, Alt, Smith, Scharnberg, Craig,
Hilmes & Gaffney, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee.
Heard by Vogel, P.J., and Mahan and Miller, JJ.
2
MAHAN, J.
Blane Steffes, individually, and Leona Frazier and Diana Fischer,
individually and as executors of the estate of Cordellia Steffes, (Plaintiffs) appeal
from the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Barry
Bruner.
The Plaintiffs argue the district court erred in finding their legal
malpractice claim barred under Iowa Code section 614.1(4) (2005). We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
This case arises from Barry Bruner’s representation of Cordellia Steffes
and his alleged simultaneous representation of her son, Alden Steffes.
The
Plaintiffs in this case are Cordellia’s three other children. Cordellia was married
to Frank Steffes, and Cordellia and Frank were parents to the four children.
In 1972 Frank and Cordellia gave Alden a 184-acre farm. From 1977 to
1982, Frank and Cordellia provided Alden with the money to purchase three
farms, consisting of 160, 191, and 115 acres. The understanding was that Alden
would hold title to the farms until Frank and Cordellia passed away, at which time
he would sell the land and split the proceeds with his siblings. Frank passed
away in 1982, and Cordellia inherited two more farms, consisting of the 180-acre
“East Place” and the 160-acre “Home Place.” Although Bruner did not draft
Frank’s will, he probated his estate.1
In 1984 Bruner represented Cordellia in a transfer to Alden of the “Home
Place” for one dollar. Between 1984 and 1987 Bruner allegedly represented both
Cordellia and Alden in several land transfers from Cordellia to Alden. In 1987
Blane questioned Bruner about the transfers between Cordellia and Alden.
1
Cordellia and Bruner did not know each other before the probate of Frank’s estate.
3
Bruner allegedly told Blane that he was looking out for Cordellia’s best interests.
In 1997 Alden filed for dissolution of his marriage from his wife, Sharon. Blane’s
attorney, Robert Kohorst, drafted a motion to intervene for Blane due to Blane’s
concerns that Sharon might receive land in the dissolution that was supposed to
be held in trust for Blane and his siblings. The motion was denied.2
In 1997, following Alden and Sharon’s dissolution proceedings, Blane
spoke with Alden and Alden’s attorney for the dissolution, Greg Siemann. Blane
claimed Bruner represented both Cordellia and Alden during the land transfers
and that Bruner’s dual representation created a conflict of interest.
In his
deposition, Siemann stated he specifically remembered Blane using the term
“conflict of interest” because he was surprised Blane used a legal term to
describe the situation.
In 1998 Cordellia filed a lawsuit against Alden to get back the property she
transferred to him. Robert Kohorst represented Cordellia in that action. Trial
was set for December 1999. Alden’s attorney became ill and had to withdraw
from the case. Trial was reset for October 2000. At trial, Kohorst introduced into
evidence Alden’s deposition testimony from Alden’s dissolution proceedings
where he stated that Bruner represented him on the land transfers between
2
Sharon did ultimately receive some of the property Frank and Cordellia conveyed to
Alden. The district court later ordered Sharon to return property to Blane and his sisters
because it had been held in a constructive trust. However, in Levis v. Steffes, No. 041117 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2006), this court determined Frank and Cordellia had not
established a family trust for the benefit of their children and the children could not claim
ownership in the property conveyed to Alden or property Sharon received in the
dissolution of her marriage to Alden.
4
himself and Cordellia. Alden failed to appear at the trial, and the court granted a
default judgment.3
Cordellia passed away in 2002. Following several unsuccessful lawsuits
in an effort to recover the land transferred to Alden, the Plaintiffs, in their
individual capacities, filed a legal malpractice action against Bruner in August
2005.
The basis for the action was that Bruner simultaneously represented
Alden’s interest on various transactions and therefore breached his duty to
Cordellia with regard to the transfer of certain real property.4 Finding Blane had
knowledge of the alleged conflict of interest in 1997, the district court determined
the Plaintiffs’ action was barred by the five-year statute of limitations and granted
Bruner’s motion for summary judgment.
The Plaintiffs requested that the court reconsider its ruling. The court
confirmed its ruling and further found the Plaintiffs did not have standing to bring
the claim as individuals. The court’s second ruling prompted Leona and Diana, 5
as executors of Cordellia’s estate, to bring a claim on behalf of the estate against
Bruner.
Determining Cordellia was on inquiry notice of the potential legal
malpractice claim against Bruner in 1998 when she filed suit against Alden in an
attempt to retrieve land she had transferred to him, the court again found the
action barred by the five-year statute of limitations and granted Bruner’s motion
for summary judgment. The Plaintiffs now appeal.
3
Alden’s whereabouts continue to be unknown.
We note that nothing in the record actually establishes that Bruner breached his duty to
Cordellia. Previous motions and rulings in this case have assumed, arguendo, a
potential legal malpractice claim existed for Cordellia against Bruner in order to
determine whether such claim would be viable under the statute of limitations. In order
to review the district court’s ruling, we continue to assume the existence of a potential
legal malpractice claim.
5
Blane passed away in early 2008.
4
5
II. Standard of Review.
We review a district court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment for
correction of errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4; Wallace v. Des Moines Indep.
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Dirs., 754 N.W.2d 854, 857 (Iowa 2008). Summary judgment is
available only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Buechel v. Five Star Quality
Care, Inc., 745 N.W.2d 732, 735 (Iowa 2008); Rodda v. Vermeer Mfg., 734
N.W.2d 480, 483 (Iowa 2007). An issue of material fact occurs when the dispute
involves facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable law.
Wallace, 754 N.W.2d at 857. Such issue is “genuine” when the evidence allows
a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. The burden of
showing the nonexistence of a material fact is on the moving party, and every
legitimate inference that reasonably can be deduced from the evidence should
be afforded the nonmoving party. Id.; Rodda, 734 N.W.2d at 483.
III. Issues on Appeal.
A. Imputed Knowledge.
The statute of limitations for legal malpractice actions is five years. See
Iowa Code § 614.1(4). The district court found Cordellia’s claim accrued and the
statute of limitations began to run in September 1998 (when her attorney at that
time, Kohorst, filed a lawsuit on behalf of Cordellia in attempt to retrieve land she
had transferred to Alden) and determined the Plaintiffs’ claim filed in August 2005
was time-barred.6 Prior to filing the lawsuit, Kohorst reviewed Alden’s deposition
6
After the court determined the statute of limitations on Cordellia’s claim began to run in
September 1998, the court found the statute expired in September 2003. The court
6
testimony from his dissolution proceeding in which Alden stated that Bruner
represented him on the land transfers between himself and Cordellia. The court
determined Kohorst’s knowledge of Alden’s statements was imputed to Cordellia.
See Robinson v. State, 687 N.W.2d 591, 594 (Iowa 2004) (“Our courts have long
recognized the general rule that notice to an attorney in respect to a matter in
which he is then acting for a client is notice to the client.” (quotations omitted)); In
re R.E., 462 N.W.2d 723, 728 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990).
There are four exceptions to the general rule that knowledge of an
attorney is chargeable to the client:
(1) the knowledge possessed by the attorney came from a
privileged source and is therefore not legally or properly
communicable to the client; (2) the attorney had a personal interest
that was adverse to the client; (3) the attorney acted fraudulently; or
(4) the particular facts of the case allow the general rule to be
avoided.
R.E., 462 N.W.2d at 728. The supreme court has noted that the fourth exception
is not well-defined or well-based. Moser v. Thorp Sales Corp., 312 N.W.2d 881,
888 (Iowa 1981). The district court did not find any of the exceptions to be
present in this case.
The Plaintiffs argue the district court erred in imputing the knowledge of
Cordellia’s attorney to Cordellia and finding the statute of limitations on her claim
began to run in September 1998. They contend there is a genuine issue of
material fact as to when Kohorst reviewed the deposition of Alden, and the only
noted, however, that Cordellia passed away in 2002. The statute of limitations can be
extended when the potential claimant dies within one year of the expiration of the
statute. Iowa Code § 614.9. In such a situation, the limitation shall not apply until one
year after the claimant’s death. Id. Therefore, the court concluded the statute of
limitations expired on the first anniversary of Cordellia’s death in 2003. The Plaintiffs
filed the original petition in August 2005, after the statute of limitations had run.
7
definitive evidence that could be imputed to Cordellia is that Kohorst introduced
the deposition at the trial on Cordellia’s claim in October 2000.7 Further, the
Plaintiffs allege they did not individually have actual knowledge of Bruner’s dual
representation until Bruner testified in 2004 in the case brought against Alden’s
ex-wife, Sharon. The Plaintiffs filed the present claim against Bruner in August
2005.
Therefore, the Plaintiffs contend that considering either situation, the
present claim was filed within the five-year statute of limitations.
The Plaintiffs further allege the district court misapplied Iowa law in
determining Kohorst’s knowledge of Bruner’s dual representation was imputable
to Cordellia. The Plaintiffs argue that under Farnsworth v. Hazelett, 197 Iowa
1367, 199 N.W. 410, 412 (1924), the presumption of imputed knowledge applies
only to the case the attorney was retained to litigate and not to everything the
attorney may have knowledge of. The Plaintiffs contend (1) the court had no
basis for imputing any knowledge of Kohorst regarding Bruner’s dual
representation of Alden and Cordellia because that knowledge was not relevant
to Cordellia’s claim against Alden and (2) there is nothing in the evidence to
prove Kohorst communicated to Cordellia that he discovered Bruner had been
involved in concurrent representation of Alden while he represented her and that
she could bring a claim against Bruner for breach of fiduciary duty.
Bruner contends the Plaintiffs’ claim against him is barred by the statute of
limitations because Cordellia was on inquiry notice of the potential conflict of
interest claim in 1998 when her attorney, Kohorst, reviewed Alden’s deposition
7
Kohorst originally filed the petition in September 1998, and trial was set for December
1999. Alden’s attorney became ill, however, and had to withdraw from the case. Trial
was therefore reset for October 2000.
8
testimony from Alden’s dissolution proceedings where Alden stated that Bruner
represented him on the land transfers from Cordellia to Alden. Bruner further
argues that Blane was aware of a potential conflict of interest in 1997.8
We agree with the district court that Kohorst’s knowledge, imputable to
Cordellia, initiated the statute of limitations on Cordellia’s legal malpractice claim
against Bruner in September 1998. Kohorst not only represented Cordellia in her
claim against Alden in 1998, he also drafted Blane’s motion for intervention in
Alden’s dissolution proceedings in 1997. The record reveals that prior to filing
the original petition in Cordellia’s action in September 1998, Kohorst conducted
an independent investigation to determine whether the petition was well
grounded in fact. He reviewed two depositions of Alden in which Alden stated
that Bruner represented him on the land transfers from Cordellia to Alden. 9
Kohorst also reviewed documents of real estate transfers and correspondence
from Alden. Kohorst clearly had knowledge of this information and used it to
make Cordellia’s case against Alden.
We find the Plaintiffs’ contention that Bruner’s dual representation of Alden
and Cordellia was not relevant to Cordellia’s claim against Alden to be without
merit. Cordellia brought her claim against Alden to get back the property she
transferred to Alden.
Any evidence of simultaneous representation by one
attorney throughout these land transfers would be relevant to Cordellia’s claim
8
Bruner alleges the record shows Blane was aware of a potential conflict of interest in
1997, when Blane claimed Bruner represented both Cordellia and Alden during the land
transfers and that Bruner’s dual representation created a conflict of interest.
9
In his deposition testimony, Alden stated Bruner was his attorney for all of Alden’s farm
purchases, with the possible exception of the very first farms. Specifically, Alden stated
Bruner was his attorney when he purchased the “Home Place” and the “East Place” that
Cordellia had inherited upon Frank’s death in 1982.
9
against Alden. We therefore find Kohorst’s knowledge in September 1998 put
Cordellia on inquiry notice of a potential legal malpractice claim against Bruner.
Rathje v. Mercy Hosp., 745 N.W.2d 443, 450 (Iowa 2008) (discussing the rule
that “the knowledge needed to start the statute of limitations only meant that the
plaintiff needed that amount of information to allow a reasonably prudent person
to discover the fraud or wrong by making inquiries”); Christy v. Miulli, 696 N.W.2d
694, 703 (Iowa 2005) (“Once a person has inquiry notice, he is held to have
knowledge of all the facts that would have been disclosed by a reasonably
diligent investigation.” (quotations omitted)).
We further find none of the four exceptions to the general rule of imputed
knowledge apply in this case.
Kohorst’s information did not come from a
privileged source. Furthermore, the record does not contain any evidence that
Kohorst had any interest adverse to Cordellia or that Kohorst acted fraudulently.
Finally, we find the facts of this case did not compel the court to apply the rarely
used fourth exception to the general rule.10
We decline to find error in the court’s ruling that Cordellia’s claim accrued
and the statute of limitations began to run in September 1998 when Kohorst filed
a lawsuit on behalf of Cordellia in attempt to retrieve land she had transferred to
Alden.
Kohorst’s knowledge of Alden’s deposition testimony was properly
imputed to Cordellia. We find there is no genuine issue of material fact as to
whether Cordellia was on inquiry notice of a potential legal malpractice claim
10
The Plaintiffs allege the district court erred in failing to find the fourth exception
applicable in this case. The Plaintiffs contend Bruner’s fraudulent concealment of his
actions is an example of the fourth exception allowing the general rule of imputed
knowledge to be avoided. We will discuss the Plaintiffs’ argument with regard to
fraudulent concealment below.
10
against Bruner in 1998, and the statute of limitations on such claim began to run
at that time. We therefore agree with the district court and affirm with regard to
this issue.
B. Fraudulent Concealment.
Plaintiffs argue the court erred in failing to find Bruner’s alleged fraudulent
concealment of his actions tolled the statute of limitations in this case.
The
Plaintiffs contend the statute of limitations should be tolled until 2004, when
Bruner admitted he represented Alden while he represented Cordellia.11 The
Plaintiffs allege that prior to 2004, Bruner fraudulently concealed his dual
representation of Cordellia and Alden.
Under Iowa law, fraudulent concealment is a form of equitable estoppel.
Christy, 696 N.W.2d at 701.
Fraudulent concealment is a defense to the
application of the statute of limitations. Id. at 700. “[F]raudulent concealment
does not affect the running of the statutory limitations period; rather it estops a
defendant from raising a statute-of-limitations defense.”
Id. at 701.
As our
supreme court has noted:
This doctrine is intended to prevent a party from benefitting from
the protection of a limitations statute when by his own fraud he has
prevented the other party from seeking redress within the period of
limitations. It should not matter what particular fact is concealed so
long as the defendant’s conduct prevents the timely filing of the
claim and the other prerequisites for equitable estoppel are
established.
Id. at 702 (citations omitted).
11
In Levis v. Steffes, Bruner testified before the district court that he was both Cordellia
and Alden’s attorney. Levis, No. 04-1117 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2006). He denied,
however, that their interests were adverse. Id.
11
To prove equitable estoppel, a plaintiff must prove the following elements
by a clear and convincing preponderance of the evidence: (1) the defendant has
made a false representation or has concealed material facts; (2) the plaintiff lacks
knowledge of the true facts; (3) the defendant intended the plaintiff to act upon
such representations; and (4) the plaintiff did in fact rely upon such
representations to his prejudice. Id. As the supreme court has determined:
With respect to the first element, a party relying on the doctrine of
fraudulent concealment must prove the defendant did some
affirmative act to conceal the plaintiff’s cause of action independent
of and subsequent to the liability-producing conduct. Furthermore,
the plaintiff’s reliance must be reasonable. The circumstances
justifying an estoppel end when the plaintiff becomes aware of the
fraud, or by the use of ordinary care and diligence should have
discovered it. At that point the plaintiff must file suit within a period
of time not exceeding the original statutory period applicable to the
particular cause of action.
Id. (citations omitted). The doctrine of fraudulent concealment and the plaintiff’s
duty to exercise diligence to discover the defendant’s alleged concealment are
therefore separate and distinct from the discovery rule and inquiry notice.
A fiduciary relationship may excuse the plaintiff’s failure to investigate the
alleged concealment when the plaintiff, in the “use of ordinary care and diligence
should have discovered it,” because of the plaintiff’s trust or confidence in the
fiduciary. See id. at 702-03. However, the plaintiff’s “knowledge of pertinent
facts and circumstances may affect the reasonableness of his continued reliance
on the tortfeasor’s representations.” Id.
Upon our review of the record, taken in a light most favorable to the
Plaintiffs and considering every legitimate inference it bears, we agree with the
district court that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the application of
12
the fraudulent concealment doctrine. The Plaintiffs have not established that a
conflict of interest existed, nor have they established that Bruner concealed his
alleged negligence by actions independent and temporally distinct from such
alleged negligence. We have already found the statute of limitations began to
run in 1998. The Plaintiffs contend, however, they did not have knowledge of
Bruner’s alleged negligence until 2004 and the statute of limitations should be
tolled until that time.
The Plaintiffs rely on Pride v. Peterson, 173 N.W.2d 549, 555 (Iowa 1970),
to support their contention that Bruner’s fiduciary duty to Cordellia required him to
disclose that he was also representing Alden, and Bruner’s failure to do so
constituted fraudulent concealment which tolled the statute of limitations until
Bruner disclosed his actions to Cordellia. We find this argument to be without
merit. The facts of Pride are not comparable to the facts in this case. In Pride,
the court found the statute of limitations may be tolled because the plaintiff did
not have knowledge of the transaction at issue which involved the alleged legal
malpractice. Pride, 173 N.W.2d at 555. Here, Cordellia was on inquiry notice in
1998 of the potential legal malpractice claim against Bruner when her attorney at
that time, Kohorst, filed a lawsuit on behalf of Cordellia in attempt to retrieve land
she had transferred to Alden.
Furthermore, our supreme court has more recently expressly declared that
fraudulent concealment is not a form of the discovery rule. Christy, 696 N.W.2d
at 701. As the supreme court stated:
That is because equitable estoppel has nothing to do with the
running of the limitations period or the discovery rule; it simply
13
precludes a defendant from asserting the statute as a defense
when it would be inequitable to permit the defendant to do so.
Id. The Plaintiffs, however, continue to rely on Pride, which refers to fraudulent
concealment as a form of the discovery rule. See Pride, 173 N.W.2d at 555;
Kurtz v. Trepp, 375 N.W.2d 280, 282-83 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985).
We decline to find error in the court’s ruling that the Plaintiffs cannot prove
the elements of fraudulent concealment and equitable estoppel. We conclude
there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the court’s application of the
fraudulent concealment doctrine and hold as a matter of law that the defense
does not apply in this case. We affirm with regard to this issue.
C. Lack of Standing.
The Plaintiffs also argue the district court erred in finding the Plaintiffs
lacked standing to file a legal malpractice claim against Bruner. The Plaintiffs
contend the court erred in failing to find they were third-party intended
beneficiaries of Cordellia’s land transfer agreements with Alden in which Alden
was to hold the property in trust and divide it equally among the four children
upon the death of Frank and Cordellia. With regard to this issue, the district court
noted:
The plaintiffs in the present case do not contest the fact that they
were not clients of Mr. Bruner, nor do they argue that they were
involved in the land sale transactions. There is nothing in the
evidence to suggest the plaintiffs were intended beneficiaries of the
land sale transactions between Alden and Cordellia. No testimony
or documents have been offered to show that the plaintiffs were to
receive the land under inheritance had Alden not purchased it. The
plaintiffs were clearly not a part of the sales, nor were they even
contemplated as parties to the transactions.
14
The court further stated, “Without evidence that Blane, Leona, and Diana were
contemplated, intended, specifically identified beneficiaries to the land sale
transactions, they do not have standing to bring a claim against Mr. Bruner on
the basis of legal malpractice.”
The Plaintiffs contend the court’s finding was in error because the court
failed to consider Cordellia’s will as evidence of the Plaintiffs’ contention that they
were intended beneficiaries of the land transfers. Article IV of Cordellia’s will
states as follows:
Over the years, my late husband, Frank Steffes, and I transferred to
my son, Alden Steffes, and his former spouse, Sharon Steffes,
certain real property.
This property was transferred without
consideration and the intent of my husband and me in transferring
this property was that, after our deaths, this property would be
divided equally between the children, Leona Frazier, Blane Steffes,
Diana Fischer, and Alden Steffes. Because this property was
transferred without consideration, I consider this property to be
mine to dispose of in accordance with my wishes and that Alden
Steffes and Sharon Steffes were merely fiduciaries. Consequently,
I hereby devise and bequeath to my children Leona Frazier, Blane
Steffes, Diana Fischer, and Alden Steffes such real property
previously transferred to Alden Steffes and/or Sharon Steffes,
including any houses purchased after my husband’s death, share
and share alike, to be theirs absolutely.
As further evidence of the Plaintiffs’ contention that they had standing to bring a
claim against Bruner, the Plaintiffs point out Alden’s statements that his parents’
intent in providing financing for him was for him to hold the properties he
acquired in trust to later divide among the four children. The Plaintiffs argue this
evidence provides, at the very least, a fact question as to whether the Plaintiffs
were intended beneficiaries of the land transfers between Cordellia and Alden.
Generally, an attorney is liable for malpractice only to a client. Estate of
Leonard v. Swift, 656 N.W.2d 132, 144 (Iowa 2003); Ruden v. Jenk, 543 N.W.2d
15
605, 610 (Iowa 1996).
However, a third-party claim may be allowed “under
severely limited circumstances.” Estate of Leonard, 656 N.W.2d at 145. Such
circumstances exist where the third party is a direct and intended beneficiary of
the lawyer’s services. Id.
For example, Iowa law will recognize third-party claims by intended
beneficiaries of a testamentary instrument. Schreiner v. Scoville, 410 N.W.2d
679, 682 (Iowa 1987) (“[A] lawyer owes a duty of care to the direct, intended, and
specifically identifiable beneficiaries of the testator as expressed in the testator’s
testamentary instruments.”). Iowa law will also recognize third-party claims by
the intended beneficiaries of a nontestamentary instrument where the third
parties can prove (1) they were specifically identified, by the donor, as an object
of the grantor’s intent and (2) the expectancy was lost or diminished as a result of
professional negligence. Estate of Leonard, 656 N.W.2d at 145.
Upon our review of the record, we agree with the district court that the
Plaintiffs lacked standing as intended beneficiaries to bring a claim for legal
malpractice against Bruner. The evidence upon which the Plaintiffs rely occurred
after the land transfers at issue. Cordellia’s will is dated April 7, 1998. Robert
Kohorst represented her in the creation of her will. The will was drafted after the
land transactions between Cordellia and Alden occurred and in the same year
Cordellia filed a claim against Alden in attempt to retrieve the land she had
transferred to him.
Furthermore, the Plaintiffs have not offered evidence to establish a
genuine material fact as to whether Bruner acted negligently to the detriment of
Blane, Leona, and Diana as intended beneficiaries of the land transactions.
16
Although Alden testified at his dissolution that it was his parents’ intent to keep
the land within the family by having him hold it in trust, there is no evidence
Bruner acted negligently and not in accordance with this intent. To the contrary,
the record shows that Bruner’s representation sufficiently accommodated
Cordellia’s wishes to sell and transfer land to Alden in furtherance of Frank and
Cordellia’s wishes.
We conclude there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
Plaintiffs had standing to file a legal malpractice claim against Bruner.
We
therefore agree with the district court and affirm with regard to this issue.
IV. Conclusion.
Having considered all issues raised on appeal, we affirm the grant of
summary judgment in favor of Bruner.
AFFIRMED.
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