DAMION ARMOND RUT U E S, Applicant - Appellant, vs. STATE OF IOWA, Respondent - Appellee.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-828 / 08-0027
Filed October 29, 2008
DAMION ARMOND RUTUES,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert B. Hansen,
Judge.
Postconviction relief petitioner appeals the district court’s grant of the
State’s motion for summary judgment. AFFIRMED.
Erin M. Carr of Carr & Wright, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Elisabeth S. Reynoldson, Assistant
Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Susan Cox, Assistant
County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Eisenhauer and Doyle, JJ.
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EISENHAUER, J.
In December 2004, Damion Rutues was charged with eleven counts of
sexually abusing children. In September 2005, pursuant to a plea agreement,
Rutues entered an Alford plea to three counts of lascivious acts with a child. See
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 32-38, 91 S. Ct. 160, 164-68, 27 L. Ed. 2d
162, 168-72 (1970) (holding sentencing allowed where accused is unwilling to
admit guilt but is willing to waive trial and accept sentence). In October 2005,
Rutues filed a motion in arrest of judgment and a motion to withdraw guilty plea.
At the subsequent hearing, Rutues’s mother testified that she had been told by
another person that a third person had coerced the victim children’s testimony
against Rutues. The court denied the motions and sentenced Rutues to three,
consecutive five-year terms of imprisonment. In August 2006, Rutues’s direct
appeal was dismissed as frivolous. Rutues sought postconviction relief and, in
December 2007, the district court granted the State’s motion for summary
disposition of Rutues’s application. We affirm.
I.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Regarding Motions.
Rutues argues trial counsel was ineffective by failing to adequately
investigate, appropriately file, and present evidence supporting his motion in
arrest of judgment and motion to withdraw guilty plea. We review ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claims de novo. State v. Bearse, 748 N.W.2d 211, 214
(Iowa 2008). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a claimant must
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence “(1) his trial counsel failed to
perform an essential duty, and (2) this failure resulted in prejudice.” State v.
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Straw, 709 N.W.2d 128, 133 (Iowa 2006). We may affirm the district court’s
rejection of an ineffective assistance-of-counsel claim if either element is lacking.
State v. Greene, 592 N.W.2d 24, 29 (Iowa 1999).
Summary disposition of a postconviction relief application is analogous to
the summary judgment procedure contained in the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure.
Summage v. State, 579 N.W.2d 821, 822 (Iowa 1998).
“Whether a genuine
issue of material fact exists, so as to preclude summary disposition, turns on
whether reasonable minds could draw different inferences and reach different
conclusions from them.” Boge v. State, 309 N.W.2d 428, 430 (Iowa 1981).
In support of his post-plea motions, Rutues presented testimony about
new evidence that allegedly changed his view about the strength of the State’s
case. At the postconviction stage and here, Rutues argues counsel failed to
perform an essential duty when he failed to provide the court with authority from
other jurisdictions discussing the withdrawal of an Alford plea.
In Iowa, a plea of guilty is a waiver of all defenses or objections that are
not intrinsic to the plea itself. State v. Speed, 573 N.W.2d 594, 596 (Iowa 1998).
A defendant’s claim that newly-discovered evidence allows a plea to be
withdrawn “fails to distinguish between a defendant’s tactical rationale for
pleading guilty and a defendant’s understanding of what a plea means and his or
her choice to voluntarily enter the plea.” Id. Factors affecting the defendant’s
assessment of the evidence against him, but not affecting the knowing and
voluntary nature of the plea, are not intrinsic to the plea.
Id. Here, Rutues
argues the newly-discovered evidence affects his analysis of the State’s
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evidence and led him to try to withdraw his plea. Consequently, Rutues’s claim
falls squarely under the category of matters not intrinsic to the plea itself and is
appropriate for summary disposition.
We have reviewed the cases Rutues alleges should have been argued by
his trial counsel and do not find a breach of an essential duty. First, the cases
are from other jurisdictions and, therefore, are not controlling. Second, the cases
use a “manifest injustice” test as the standard for plea withdrawal due to new
evidence and none of the cases discuss Iowa’s tests of “intrinsic to the plea” and
“knowing and voluntary.” Third, we agree with the postconviction trial court: “No
authority has been presented in support of the proposition that the requirements
for a conventional guilty plea and an Alford plea differ in terms of the
voluntariness requirement.” Fourth, the Iowa Supreme Court has instructed: “An
Alford plea is a variation of a guilty plea. In effect, the pleas are the same as the
defendant is agreeing to the imposition of a criminal sentence for the crime
charged.” State v. Burgess, 639 N.W.2d 564, 567 (Iowa 2001). Though an
Alford defendant does not admit guilt, he “may voluntarily, knowingly, and
understandingly consent to the imposition of a sentence.” Id. n.1.
We also note all pleas, including Alford pleas, must be supported by a
factual basis.
See State v. Schminkey, 597 N.W.2d 785, 788 (Iowa 1999).
Therefore, an Alford plea is conditioned on the court’s ability to find factual
support for every element of the offense in the record from sources other than
the defendant. See id.
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We conclude counsel did not breach an essential duty by failing to present
cases from other jurisdictions which fail to discuss the key Iowa considerations
concerning plea withdrawal. Accordingly, the district court’s summary disposition
is affirmed.
Since no duty was breached, we need not consider Rutues’s claim of
prejudice. See Greene, 592 N.W.2d at 29.
II.
New Evidence and Iowa Code Section 822.2(1)(d).
Rutues argues he is entitled to postconviction relief and vacation of his
plea under Iowa Code section 822.2(1)(d) (2007) (allowing relief where “there
exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented and heard”). We
review postconviction relief proceedings for errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4.
See Millam v. State, 745 N.W.2d 719, 721 (Iowa 2008). Under this standard, we
affirm if the court’s fact findings “are supported by substantial evidence and the
law was correctly applied.”
Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 520 (Iowa
2003). The summary disposition standard is the same as detailed above.
We cannot improve upon the district court’s language summarily
dismissing Rutues’s claim.
First, case law interpreting section 822.2(1)(d) has done so only in
the context of a defendant who has previously gone to trial and is
seeking a new trial on the basis of newly-discovered evidence. See
Jones v. Scurr, 316 N.W.2d 905 (Iowa 1982). No case law
interprets section 822.2(1)(d) to allow a defendant making any sort
of a plea to vacate the plea based on newly-discovered evidence.
An interpretation of section 822.2(1)(d) which allows the grant of a
new trial, but not the withdrawal of a guilty plea, squares clearly
with the Iowa Supreme Court’s position in Speed that a plea cannot
be challenged based on newly-discovered evidence. See State v.
Speed, 573 N.W.2d 594 (Iowa 1998). Lastly, the presiding judge
considered the evidence presented by [Rutues], and concluded
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that, even if the evidence presented was pursued to its logical
conclusion, the evidence would not entitle [Rutues] to vacate his
plea.
AFFIRMED.
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