STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff - Appellee, vs. SEAN MICHAEL GYLES, Defendant - Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-783 / 08-0233
Filed November 13, 2008
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
SEAN MICHAEL GYLES,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Joel D. Novak, Judge.
Sean Michael Gyles appeals his convictions for conspiracy to deliver
methamphetamine and possession of methamphetamine. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Robert P. Ranschau,
Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik, Assistant Attorney
General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Stephanie Cox, Assistant
County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Miller and Potterfield, JJ.
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MILLER, J.
Sean Michael Gyles appeals his convictions for conspiracy to deliver
methamphetamine and possession of methamphetamine.
He contends there
was insufficient evidence that he participated in a conspiracy to deliver
methamphetamine, and that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
We affirm his convictions and preserve his ineffective assistance claim for a
possible postconviction proceeding.
On July 12, 2007, law enforcement officers executed a search warrant at
the residence of Gyles and Nichole Cory. Drug paraphernalia, a digital scale with
drug residue on it, approximately fifty little plastic baggies, and .22 grams of
methamphetamine were found in the residence. After these items were found,
Gyles and Cory indicated to the officers they wanted to cooperate with them.
Gyles told the officers he had been involved with drug activity for some time. He
said he could buy methamphetamine from Armondo, who had supplied him with
fifteen to twenty ounces over the preceding couple of months and to whom he
still owed $1,400. He said he could buy methamphetamine from John Farrell,
with
whom
he
had
an
arrangement
pursuant
to
which
each
sold
methamphetamine to the other from time to time. Cory stated she had been with
and seen Gyles deliver drugs on over fifty occasions. She gave the officers
additional names of individuals she knew to be dealing drugs. Ultimately, the
State refused any cooperation with Gyles.
The State did enter into a plea
agreement with Cory and pursuant to that agreement she agreed to testify
against Gyles.
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At Gyles‟s trial Cory testified she had used methamphetamine off and on
from 1997 until 2007, and used it with Gyles from the time she moved in with him
in May of 2007. She stated she was frequently with Gyles when he purchased
the drugs from Armondo, at times driving him to Armondo‟s to get
methamphetamine. They started out buying small quantities from Armondo but
eventually increased how much they would buy. Their relationship with Armondo
progressed such that eventually he would “front” Gyles and Cory drugs,
essentially providing them drugs on credit. Gyles and Cory would then use some
of the “fronted” methamphetamine and sell some of it to finance their habit.
Cory also testified that John Farrell would both supply them with
methamphetamine and sell their excess. They would finance some of their own
drug purchases that way. She stated that most of the drugs they personally used
were paid for with money obtained through the sale of “fronted” drugs. Cory
testified she observed Gyles in possession of the scales and plastic baggies and
observed him weigh and package methamphetamine. She had seen him sell
methamphetamine out of their bedroom on fifty or more occasions. Cory also
testified she sometimes delivered the methamphetamine for Gyles after watching
him weigh and package it. The jury found Gyles guilty of conspiracy to deliver
methamphetamine and possession of methamphetamine.
Gyles appeals, contending there was insufficient evidence to support the
guilty verdict for conspiracy to deliver methamphetamine, and that he received
ineffective assistance of trial counsel. More specifically, he argues that because
the amount of methamphetamine found in his residence was consistent with
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personal use the jury could not conclude he was guilty of conspiracy to deliver
methamphetamine, and that other than Cory‟s testimony there was no
corroboration of his admissions to the officers.
We review claims of insufficient evidence for errors at law. State v. Rohm,
609 N.W.2d 504, 509 (Iowa 2000). We will uphold a finding of guilt if substantial
evidence supports the verdict.
Id.
“„Substantial evidence‟ is evidence upon
which a rational finder of fact could find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Id. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. State
v. Acevedo, 705 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Iowa 2005).
To prove the existence of a conspiracy, the State had to prove (1) Gyles
agreed with another that Gyles or the other would deliver a controlled substance,
(2) Gyles entered into an agreement with the intent to promote or facilitate
delivery of a controlled substance, (3) Gyles or the other participant in the
agreement committed an overt act, and (4) the agreement was not with a law
enforcement agent.
See Iowa Code § 706.1 (2007).
A conspiracy may be
proved by circumstantial evidence and an agreement may be inferred from the
surrounding circumstances. State v. Ruiz, 496 N.W.2d 789, 792 (Iowa Ct. App.
1992).
A tacit agreement will suffice, and there need not be any written
statement or even a speaking of words which expressly communicates the
agreement. State v. Larue, 478 N.W.2d 880, 882 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991).
Based on the evidence in the record before us, we conclude substantial
evidence supports the jury‟s verdict on the conspiracy charge. A digital scale
with drug residue and little plastic baggies were found in the bedroom shared by
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Gyles and Cory.
The police expert testified at trial that these items were
consistent with weighing and packaging or repackaging of methamphetamine for
sale.
This evidence of drug dealing corroborates Gyles‟s admissions to the
officers and Cory‟s statements and testimony that Gyles was engaged in
methamphetamine dealing in which he at times sought her assistance and in
which she at times agreed to participate and did so.
We conclude there is substantial evidence from which a rational jury could
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Gyles conspired with Cory to deliver
methamphetamine.
Gyles next claims his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
testimony elicited by the prosecution from one of the investigating officers.
Specifically, in the context of discussing the possibility of making a deal with
authorities for his cooperation the prosecuting attorney asked the officer, “And
what was the response from the county attorney‟s office about Mr. Gyles‟s
cooperation?”
The officer testified: “Dan [from the County Attorney‟s office]
advised Deputy Cook that there were some pending charges on Mr. Gyles and
also he owed the State some money on an earlier case or something like that.”
Gyles contends this evidence was inadmissible under Iowa Rule of Evidence
5.404(b), that counsel breached an essential duty in not objecting to its
admission, and this breach prejudiced him because the jury was lead to believe
he was of bad character.
In order to prevail on his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, Gyles
must show (1) counsel failed to perform an essential duty, and (2) prejudice
6
resulted. State v. Lane, 726 N.W.2d 371, 393 (Iowa 2007). We evaluate the
totality of the relevant circumstances in a de novo review. Id. at 392. Ordinarily,
we prefer to leave ineffective assistance of counsel claims for postconviction
relief proceedings. State v. Hischke, 639 N.W.2d 6, 8 (Iowa 2002). We do so to
allow a record on the performance of trial counsel to be developed, Berryhill v.
State, 603 N.W.2d 243, 245 (Iowa 1999), and to give the allegedly ineffective
attorney the opportunity to respond to and defend the allegation of ineffective
assistance. State v. Laffey, 600 N.W.2d 57, 60-61 (Iowa 1999). We preserve
Gyles‟s ineffective assistance claim for these reasons.
Accordingly, we affirm Gyles‟s convictions and preserve his claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel for a possible postconviction relief proceeding.
AFFIRMED.
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