STANLEY RANCH and MOLLY STANLEY, Plaintiffs - Appellants, vs. AMANDA BOYL and ZALEA LLC, Defendants - Appellees.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-765 / 07-1890
Filed November 13, 2008
STANLEY RANCH and
MOLLY STANLEY,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
AMANDA BOYL and ZALEA LLC,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Harrison County, Greg W.
Steensland, Judge.
Plaintiffs were granted discretionary review of a district court appeal
decision that affirmed in part and reversed in part a judgment in a small claims
action. REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.
Reta Noblett-Feld, Iowa City, for appellant.
Amanda Boyle, Woodbine, pro se.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Miller and Potterfield, JJ.
2
MILLER, J.
The plaintiffs, Stanley Ranch and Molly Stanley,
were granted
discretionary review of a district court appeal decision that affirmed in part and
reversed in part a judgment in their favor and against the defendants Amanda
Boyle and Zalea, LLC in a small claims action. We reverse in part the district
court appeal decision and remand for entry of judgment in accord with this
opinion.
The defendants, from Iowa, purchased a horse, Wystyrea, from the
plaintiffs’ ranch in Nevada by way of a written purchase agreement requiring
periodic payments and providing the sellers with a security interest to secure the
buyers’ obligation.
When the defendant buyers failed to make required
payments, the plaintiffs brought a small claim action denominated an “Action for
Money Judgment.” However, in the body of the small claim “Original Notice” the
plaintiffs demanded not only $3200 in damages but also the return of Wystyrea
and any offspring. The damages sought were identified as consisting of $2000
for the “[c]ost associated with transporting/board/feed/worming of all horses back
to
Stanley Ranch”; “$400
for “[a]ll Veterinarian
bills associated
with
transportation/coggins test/health papers on ALL horses requested”; and $800
for “[c]ourt costs and appearances.”
The plaintiffs appeared for the scheduled small claim hearing, but the
defendants did not. Following the hearing the magistrate entered a written ruling.
In part the magistrate determined that the plaintiffs’ action was in fact a replevin
action. The magistrate ordered the issuance of a writ of replevin for the return to
the plaintiffs of Wystyrea and any offspring.
The magistrate also entered
3
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants for $2400 1 for the
detention of Wystyrea and any offspring, and taxed court costs of $74.70 to the
defendants.
The defendants appealed. On appeal the district judge affirmed in part
and reversed in part. In reversing in part the court concluded that Iowa Code
section 643.2 (2007) “prohibited joinder of an action for damages with an action
for replevin” and set aside the judgment for money damages. The court taxed
costs of the appeal to the parties equally.
The plaintiffs sought and were granted discretionary review. They claim
the district court on appeal erred in determining that the plaintiffs’ action
impermissibly joined an action for damages with a replevin action.
More
specifically, they claim that (1) the small claims court properly awarded damages
in the replevin action, and (2) the defendants waived their right to object to any
misjoinder by failing to timely object. They request that we reverse the district
court’s order and reinstate the small claims court’s judgment for damages.
An action of replevin is by ordinary proceedings. Iowa Code § 643.2. Our
review is thus for correction of legal error.
Iowa R. App. P. 6.4; Keppy v.
Lilienthal, 524 N.W.2d 436, 438 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994).
On appeal of the magistrate’s judgment the defendants correctly asserted
that no cause of action other than replevin may be joined with an action of
replevin. See Iowa Code § 643.2. Damages may, however, be sought and
awarded as part of a replevin action, if the sought damages are “for the
1
The record appears to indicate that the $2400 consists of the $2000 and the $400
sought by the plaintiffs.
4
detention” of the property involved in the replevin action. See id. § 643.1(6); see
also id. § 643.16 (“for the taking or detention”); § 643.17 (“for the illegal
detention”).
Damages for the “detention” of property have been characterized as those
“incidental to the purpose of regaining possession.”2 Roush v. Mahaska State
Bank, 605 N.W.2d 6, 9 (Iowa 2000). Whether the $2000 and $400 sought by the
plaintiffs for such things as veterinarian expenses and transportation costs can
properly be characterized as damages incidental to the purpose of regaining
possession, and thus “for the detention” of the property, such as loss of its use, is
not free from all doubt. Assuming however, without so deciding, that the $2000
and $400 sought by the plaintiffs were not properly part of the replevin action, the
defendants’ remedy for misjoinder was to have the misjoined request for
damages docketed separately or stricken through the use of a timely pursued
motion. Id. at 10. Any such motion in this small claims action had to be made at
such a time that it could be heard at the time set for the small claims hearing.
See Iowa Code § 631.7(2) (motions in small claims action, except motions to
bring in a third-party defendant, “shall be heard only at the time set for a hearing
on the merits”). No such motion was made by the defendants, and no such
motion was heard or ruled on by the magistrate. The defendants thus waived
any claim of misjoinder. See Roush, 605 N.W.2d at 10 (approving consideration
of misjoined actions where no motion attacking the misjoinder was made);
Interfirst Bank v. Hanson, 395 N.W.2d 857, 859 (Iowa 1986) (same).
2
Perhaps the clearest example of such damages is the value of the loss of use of the
property. See, e.g., Barry v. State Surety Co., 154 N.W.2d 97, 100 (Iowa 1967).
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We conclude the district court erred in reversing that portion of the
magistrate’s judgment awarding money damages.
As a result, we further
conclude all court costs of the appeal in the district court should have been taxed
to the defendants rather than taxed to the parties equally.
We note that the plaintiffs, in their written response to the defendants’
appeal of the magistrate’s small claims appeal, stated that although the
magistrate had entered a money judgment for $2400 their actual damages for the
detention of Wystyrea consisted of $910 for transportation from Iowa to Nevada,
$180 for veterinary services, $190 for board, $40 for food and other supplies,
$479.18 for transportation, and $58 for telephone charges (a total by our
calculation of $1857.18). They requested that on appeal from the magistrate’s
judgment their damages be reduced to reflect these actual costs. The district
judge did not address this request, as he reversed the money judgment in its
entirety.
In reversing the district court’s appeal decision in part we find it
appropriate to acknowledge the plaintiffs’ forthright concession and direct that
judgment be entered accordingly.
In conclusion, we reverse those parts of the district court’s appeal decision
that reversed the magistrate’s judgment for money damages and that taxed onehalf of the court costs to the plaintiffs. We remand to the district court to enter
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants for money damages
in the amount of $1857.18 and to tax the district court costs against defendants.
Costs on appeal are taxed to the defendants/appellees.
REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.
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