PATRICK A. HARRISON, Plaintiff - Appellant, vs. STATE OF IOWA and IOWA DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES, Defendants - Appellees.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-729 / 08-0384
Filed December 31, 2008
PATRICK A. HARRISON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA and IOWA DEPARTMENT
OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Donna L. Paulsen,
Judge.
Patrick A. Harrison appeals from a district court summary judgment ruling
in favor of the defendants. AFFIRMED.
James L. Sayre of James L. Sayre, P.C., Clive, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Mark Hunacek, John R.
Lundquist, and Heather L. Palmer, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellees.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Eisenhauer and Doyle, JJ.
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DOYLE, J.
Patrick A. Harrison appeals from a district court summary judgment ruling
in favor of the defendants. Harrison contends the district court erred in holding
that he could not recover on a claim for breach of contract as a matter of law.
Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the district court
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
The following facts are undisputed. On September 25, 2004, Harrison
commenced employment as an electrician with the Iowa Department of
Administrative Services (DAS).
As an electrician, Harrison was a covered
employee under the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) by and between the
State and the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees,
Council 61 AFL-CIO (Union).
Under the CBA, the State has the “exclusive
power, duty and right to . . . [s]uspend, discipline or discharge employees for
proper cause.” Additionally, under the CBA, the Union and the State “recognize
the authority of the [State] to suspend, discharge or take other appropriate
disciplinary action against employees for just cause.”
On June 21, 2005, Harrison severed a telephone cord with his personal
buck knife while another employee was talking on that telephone with a
contractor.
Based upon the incident, the DAS terminated Harrison‟s
employment. The DAS stated that Harrison‟s actions were in violation of the
DAS‟s work rules and its violence-free workplace policy. Harrison did not receive
any discipline prior to his termination, nor did he receive any progressive
discipline from the DAS involving the incident.
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Harrison timely grieved his termination pursuant to the CBA. Harrison‟s
grievance proceeded through step three of the CBA‟s grievance procedures, at
which time, on November 7, 2005, the DAS denied Harrison‟s grievance. On
March 21, 2006, the Union, Harrison‟s certified bargaining representative,
refused to take the matter to arbitration, step four of the CBA‟s grievance
procedures. Harrison conceded that he did not have the individual right to take
his grievance to arbitration under the provisions of the CBA.
On May 25, 2006, Harrison filed a “Prohibited Practice Complaint” against
the Union.
The Iowa Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) set the
hearing on Harrison‟s complaint for November 15, 2005, which was continued.
On January 8, 2007, Harrison and the Union filed a joint dismissal of the
“Prohibited Practice Complaint” pending before the PERB. The same day, the
PERB entered an order granting the joint dismissal.
On February 15, 2007, Harrison filed an action in district court against the
State and DAS (hereinafter referred to collectively as the State).
Harrison
alleged that the State breached the collective bargaining agreement between the
State and the Union by terminating his employment without just cause. Harrison
further asserted a claim for unpaid wages pursuant to Iowa Code section 91A
(2007). The State filed its answer on March 19, 2007, denying Harrison‟s claims
and affirmatively asserting that Harrison failed to exhaust required remedies
under the CBA and that the district court was without jurisdiction and/or authority
to hear Harrison‟s claims.
Thereafter, the parties filed competing motions for summary judgment.
On February 11, 2008, the district court entered its ruling granting the State‟s
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motion, finding both of Harrison‟s claims were derivative of the CBA and Harrison
failed to exhaust the remedies outlined in the CBA or prove that the Union
breached the duty of fair representation. Additionally, the court found it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over the necessary breach of the duty of fair
representation element of Harrison‟s claims.
As such, it denied Harrison‟s
motion, as it concerned the merits of the case, and dismissed Harrison‟s petition.
Harrison appeals. He contends the district court erred in holding he could
not recover on a claim for breach of contract as a matter of law.
II. Scope and Standards of Review.
We review the district court‟s summary judgment rulings for the correction
of errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4; Alliant Energy-Interstate Power & Light Co.
v. Duckett, 732 N.W.2d 869, 873 (Iowa 2007). Summary judgment is appropriate
when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file,
and affidavits show there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3);
Walderbach v. Archdiocese of Dubuque, Inc., 730 N.W.2d 198, 199 (Iowa 2007).
A fact question arises if reasonable minds can differ on how the issue should be
resolved. Walderbach, 730 N.W.2d at 199. No fact question arises if, as here,
the only conflict concerns legal consequences flowing from undisputed facts.
McNertney v. Kahler, 710 N.W.2d 209, 210 (Iowa 2006).
III. Discussion.
Harrison contends the district court erred in holding that he could not
recover on a claim for breach of contract as a matter of law.
Specifically,
Harrison argues that he is only required to attempt to exhaust the contractual
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remedies set forth in the CBA, and that he in fact did everything he could do to
exhaust the contractual remedies. Harrison further argues that his claim against
his employer should not hinge on whether the union breached its duty of fair
representation. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
In order to promote „harmonious and cooperative
relationships between government[s] and [their] employees,‟ the
Public Employment Relations Act (“the Act”) authorizes collective
bargaining between public employers and their employees,
establishes procedures for the processing of employee grievances,
and authorizes binding arbitration of disputes arising from claimed
violations of collective bargaining agreements.
Kucera v. Baldazo, 745 N.W.2d 481, 483 (Iowa 2008) (citing Iowa
Code §§ 20.1, .18 (2005)). To that end, the legislature created the PERB “to
implement the provisions of this chapter and adjudicate and conciliate
employment-related cases involving the state of Iowa and other public employers
and employee organizations.”
Iowa Code § 20.1.
Among other things, the
PERB‟s powers and duties include “[a]djudicating prohibited practice complaints
including the exercise of exclusive original jurisdiction over all claims alleging the
breach of the duty of fair representation imposed by section 20.17.”
Id.
(emphasis added).
Pursuant to the Act, if a public employee is covered by a CBA and the
CBA sets forth grievance procedures, the employee is required to follow said
procedures. Id. § 20.18. Nevertheless, Iowa Code section 20.17(5) provides
that the “[t]erms of any collective bargaining agreement may be enforced by a
civil action in the district court of the county in which the agreement was made
upon the initiative of either party.”
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Here, the parties agree Harrison, prior to his termination, was a covered
employee under the CBA between the State and the Union. The CBA at issue
here sets forth a specific grievance procedure for complaints “alleging a violation
involving the application and interpretation of the provisions of [CBA].” The CBA
also provides that its grievance procedure shall be “exclusive” and “shall replace
any other grievance procedure for adjustment of any disputes arising from the
application and interpretation of this Agreement.”
It is undisputed that the fourth step of the CBA‟s grievance procedure,
“Grievance Arbitration,” was not completed in the present case because the
Union, against Harrison‟s wishes, did not approve of proceeding to arbitration.
Harrison contends he did everything he could do to exhaust the CBA‟s remedies
and should not be precluded from pursuing his contractual claim. Conversely,
the State contends Harrison was required to exhaust his contractual remedies,
and that if he did not, he was required to establish the Union breached its duty of
fair representation, known as a “hybrid” claim. Both parties cite O‟Hara v. State,
642 N.W.2d 303 (Iowa 2002), in support of their arguments.
In O‟Hara, a factually similar case, the Iowa Supreme Court was faced
with the question of whether the PERB has exclusive, original jurisdiction over
public employee claims against (1) the union for breach of the duty of fair
representation and (2) the public employer for breach of the collective bargaining
agreement, based upon amendments to chapter 20 in 1990.
O‟Hara, 642
N.W.2d at 305, 311. There, an employee of the Iowa Department of General
Services (IDGS), whose position fell within the collective bargaining unit
governed by a CBA between the State and the Union, was terminated from his
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employment. Id. The employee grieved the termination through the third step, at
which time the employee‟s termination was upheld. Id. at 305-06. The employee
asked for the Union‟s assistance to appeal the decision and to take the grievance
to arbitration pursuant to the CBA. Id. at 306. Although the Union appealed the
decision, the Union ultimately withdrew the employee‟s grievance from
arbitration. Id. The employee appealed the Union‟s decision to withdraw his
grievance, and the Union advised him it would take no further action on his
grievance. Id.
Thereafter, the employee filed a prohibited practice complaint against the
Union with the PERB alleging that the Union engaged in prohibited practices
within the meaning of Iowa Code section 20.17(1) (1995).
Id.
While his
prohibited practice complaint was still pending before the PERB, the employee
filed an action in the district court against the State of Iowa and the IDGS
(hereinafter referred to collectively as the State). Id. He alleged, among other
things, that the State breached the collective bargaining agreement between the
State and the Union by terminating his employment without just cause. Id. The
State moved to dismiss the employee‟s action, contending that the district court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction, based on amendments to Iowa Code chapter
20. Id. at 306-07. The employee then joined the Union as a defendant, and
Union filed a motion to dismiss on the same grounds as the State. Id. at 307.
The district court granted the both the State and the Union‟s motions, concluding
amendments to chapter 20 gave the PERB exclusive original jurisdiction over fair
representation claims, and consequently, it was without jurisdiction to entertain
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the employee‟s claims against the State and the Union.
Id.
The employee
appealed. Id.
On appeal, the Union and amicus argued that the amended language of
section 20.1(2), which granted the PERB exclusive original jurisdiction over “all
claims” alleging the breach of the duty of fair representation, included claims
against employers for breach of the CBA.
Id. at 310-11, 312.
The amicus
specifically argued that all “hybrid” claims against an employer necessarily
involve claims alleging the union‟s breach of its fair representation duty, because
in a hybrid claim an employee is required to allege and prove the union breached
its duty of fair representation as a prerequisite to recovering for a claimed breach
of the CBA against the employer. Id. at 310.
The Iowa Supreme Court acknowledged the amicus‟s discussion of hybrid
claims, explaining:
[W]e agree that a “hybrid” claim and a claim for a breach of a fair
representation duty are related. However, we do not agree that
they are interchangeable. The United States Supreme Court has
made this clear:
[A hybrid] suit, as a formal matter, comprises two causes of
action. The suit against the employer rests on § 301 [of the federal
Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185], since the
employee is alleging breach of the collective-bargaining
agreement.1 The suit against the union is one for breach of the
union‟s duty of fair representation, which is implied under the
scheme of the National Labor Relations Act. “Yet the two claims
are inextricably interdependent. „To prevail against either the
company or the Union, . . . [employee-plaintiffs] must not only show
that their discharge was contrary to the contract but must also carry
the burden of demonstrating a breach of duty by the Union.‟” The
employee may, if he chooses, sue one defendant and not the other;
but the case he must prove is the same whether he sues one, the
other, or both. The suit is thus not a straightforward breach of
1
Harrison, as an employee of a subdivision of this state, is not covered by the Labor
Management Relations Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2007).
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contract suit under § 301 . . . but a hybrid § 301/fair representation
claim, amounting to “a direct challenge to „the private settlement of
disputes under [the collective-bargaining agreement].‟”
Id. at 312-13 (quoting DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S.
151, 164-65, 103 S. Ct. 2281, 2290-91, 76 L. Ed. 2d 476, 489 (1983)) (other
citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
Although our supreme court ultimately rejected the Union and the
amicus‟s arguments that the language “all claims” included claims against
employers for alleged breaches of CBAs, the court concluded that under the
plain language of Iowa Code chapter 20, “[a] public employee must raise claims
against the union for breach of the fair representation duty before the PERB,
while at the same time such an employee may raise a claim for breach of a
collective bargaining agreement in the district court.” Id. at 313. In so holding,
the court stated:
The amendments are silent . . . when it comes to a public
employee‟s claims against a public employer for breach of a [CBA].
The amendments did not add language to address claims for
breach of a [CBA]. Nowhere in chapter 20 is there any mention
about jurisdiction over such claims and the proof required to
establish those claims. Moreover, the amendments made no
change to section 20.17(5), which permits “either party” to a
collective bargaining agreement to enforce the terms of such
agreements in a civil action in the district court. And, as mentioned,
we held in [Norton v. Adair County, 441 N.W.2d 347 (Iowa 1989)]
that the language of section 20.17(5) was “broad enough to
include . . . a third-party beneficiary [such as] the employee.”
Therefore, a reading of the plain language of chapter 20, as
amended, leads to the conclusion that (1) the PERB has exclusive
original jurisdiction over a public employee‟s claim for breach of the
fair representation duty against the union, and (2) a public
employee may raise a claim for breach of a collective bargaining
agreement against the public employer in the district court.
The district court therefore correctly held that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over [the employee‟s] claim for breach of
the Union‟s duty of fair representation. However, the court erred in
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holding that it lacked such jurisdiction over [the employee‟s] claim
against the State for breach of the collective bargaining agreement.
Id. at 312 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). The court acknowledged
that “[t]his could lead to several practical problems,” but noted it is bound by what
the legislature said, not by what it should or might have said, and consequently
could not read into chapter 20 language that simply is not there. Id. at 313-14.
The facts of O‟Hara make that case distinguishable from the instant case.
Because Harrison did not exhaust the contractual remedies in the CBA, he was
required to assert a claim against the Union for breach of its duty of fair
representation. In O‟Hara, the employee‟s claim against the Union for breach of
its duty of fair representation was pending before the PERB at the same time as
his breach of CBA lawsuit was pending against the State in district court. Unlike
the employee in O‟Hara, Harrison dismissed his complaint filed with the PERB
against the Union prior to filing his breach of CBA lawsuit against the State in
district court. Consequently, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
hear Harrison‟s breach of CBA claim against the employer. Accordingly, we
conclude the district court did not err in concluding that Harrison failed to exhaust
his contractual remedies outlined in the applicable collective bargaining
agreement and thus could not bring a separate, contractually based claim
against the State.
IV. Conclusion.
Because we conclude the district court did not err in concluding that
Harrison failed to exhaust his contractual remedies outlined in the applicable
collective bargaining agreement and thus could not bring a separate,
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contractually based claim against the State, we affirm the judgment of the district
court.
AFFIRMED.
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