BONIFACE LOU SCHULZ, P etitioner - Appellee, vs. IOWA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION , Respondent - Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-727 / 08-0301
Filed November 13, 2008
BONIFACE LOU SCHULZ,
Petitioner-Appellee,
vs.
IOWA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION,
Respondent-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Kellyann M.
Lekar, Judge.
The Iowa Department of Transportation appeals from the ruling on judicial
review reversing Boniface Schulz’s license revocation. REVERSED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Christine Blome, Assistant
Attorney General, Ames, for appellant.
John W. Hofmeyer III, Oelwein, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Vogel and Eisenhauer, JJ.
2
VOGEL, J.
The Iowa Department of Transportation (DOT) appeals from the ruling on
judicial review reversing Boniface Schulz’s license revocation. We reverse.
Background Facts and Proceedings.
After refusing a preliminary breath test on January 27, 2007, Boniface
Schulz was arrested on suspicion of operating while intoxicated. Upon arriving at
police headquarters, Officer Jason Chopard read Schulz the implied consent
advisory and made a written request for a chemical test of Schulz’s breath.
Schulz signed the form authorizing the test.
After instructing Schulz on the
procedure, Officer Chopard twice attempted to administer the test using a
DataMaster. During both tests, the machine indicated that Schulz was providing
an insufficient breath sample.1 After the second test, Chopard marked her efforts
as a refusal.
The DOT then revoked Schulz’s driver’s license for an implied consent
test refusal pursuant to Iowa Code section 321J.9 (2007). Schulz requested and
received a DOT hearing, contesting the allegation that she refused the test. An
administrative law judge (ALJ) affirmed the revocation based on implied consent
refusal and this decision was affirmed on intra-agency appeal. However, on
judicial review, the district court reversed, concluding substantial evidence did not
support that Schulz had refused the test. The DOT appeals.
1
While the tests ultimately were deemed insufficient, the first test initially provided a
.106 blood-alcohol-concentration reading and the second a .120 reading.
3
Scope of Review.
On judicial review, the district court was empowered to grant relief from
the DOT’s decision if its decision “is not supported by substantial evidence in the
record before the court when that record is viewed as a whole.” Iowa Code
§ 17A.19(10)(f). Just because the interpretation of the evidence is open to a fair
difference of opinion does not mean the commissioner’s decision is not
supported by substantial evidence. ABC Disposal Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Natural
Res., 681 N.W.2d 596, 603 (Iowa 2004). An appellate court should not consider
evidence insubstantial merely because the court may draw different conclusions
from the record.
Fischer v. City of Sioux City, 695 N.W.2d 31, 33-34 (Iowa
2005). Moreover,
[m]aking a determination as to whether evidence “trumps”
other evidence or whether one piece of evidence is “qualitatively
weaker” than another piece of evidence is not an assessment for
the district court or the court of appeals to make when it conducts a
substantial evidence review of an agency decision. It is the
[agency’s] duty as the trier of fact to determine the credibility of the
witnesses, weigh the evidence, and decide the facts in issue. The
reviewing court only determines whether substantial evidence
supports a finding according to those witnesses whom the [agency]
believed.
Arndt v. City of Le Claire, 728 N.W.2d 389, 394-95 (Iowa 2007) (citations and
quotations removed).
Test Refusal.
The statements and conduct of the arrestee and police officer, as well as
the surrounding circumstances, are considered in determining if a chemical test
has been refused. Ferguson v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 424 N.W.2d 464, 466
(Iowa 1988). Anything less than unqualified, unequivocal consent is a refusal.
4
Id. We thus review this case to determine whether substantial evidence supports
the agency’s conclusion that Schulz refused the test.2
Initially, Schulz refused the preliminary breath test. Later, after arriving at
the police station, Officer Chopard, along with Sergeant Thangman, explained
the breath test process. Schulz reportedly equivocated as to whether she would
submit to the test and “kept changing her mind.” After further discussion with the
officers, and consulting with her attorney, she finally consented in writing to take
the DataMaster breath test. However, on the two occasions that the officers
attempted to administer the test, Schulz did not provide a sufficient breath and
the machine registered an insufficient sample. According to Officer Chopard,
Schulz “didn’t even try [to blow] at all” and “it didn’t even look like she was
blowing.” It seemed to him as though “she was blowing for a little bit and then
stopping” despite his clear instructions of the necessity for a constant, full breath.
After the two attempts and repeated instructions, Officer Chopard regarded
Schulz’s poor compliance as a refusal and so noted on the implied consent
advisory form.
Schulz reportedly told officers something about a breathing problem and
she later entered into evidence a pulmonary test performed more than two weeks
prior to her arrest. However, the report noted that “normal spirometric values
indicate the absence of any significant degree of obstructive pulmonary
impairment and/or restrictive ventilator defect.”
2
Furthermore, the post-test
We agree with the district court’s conclusion that Iowa Code section 321J.13(6)(b)(2)
does not apply to this situation.
5
comments stated Schulz had put forth “fair effort at best [and] did not follow
instructions/coaching.”
In light of the appropriate scope of our substantial-evidence review, we
conclude the district court improperly weighed the evidence to overrule the
agency’s findings.
Here, substantial evidence clearly supports the agency’s
determination that Schulz refused the breath test.
Officer Chopard’s
observations about her repeated, minimal effort in providing a breath sample
coupled with the readings provided by the DataMaster support the agency’s
determination on this issue. We therefore reverse the district court’s ruling on
judicial review.
REVERSED.
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