STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff - Appellee, vs. DILLON MICHAEL KEIFER , Defendant - Appellant.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-715 / 07-1834
Filed December 17, 2008
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DILLON MICHAEL KEIFER,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Sac County, Gary L. McMinimee
(motion to suppress) and William C. Ostlund (judgment and sentence), Judges.
Defendant appeals his conviction of operating while intoxicated, second
offense. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Jason B. Shaw, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sharon K. Hall, Assistant Attorney
General, and Earl Hardisty, County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Vogel and Eisenhauer, JJ.
2
EISENHAUER, J.
Dillon Keifer appeals from his conviction for operating while intoxicated,
second offense. Keifer asserts the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress and raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Because we
find the stop of Keifer‟s vehicle was not supported by reasonable suspicion, we
reverse. Therefore, it is unnecessary to resolve Keifer‟s second claim.
At approximately 12:35 a.m. on April 7, 2007, Sac County Sheriff Kenneth
McClure was traveling on a highway when he observed a vehicle on a gravel
road with its headlights on and either stopped or moving very slowly. Sheriff
McClure turned onto the gravel road and, upon meeting the vehicle, noted it was
a small pickup truck carrying two people. The truck had out-of-county license
plates. Sheriff McClure radioed to check whether there were any warrants on the
vehicle and was told there were none. The sheriff testified he was curious as to
what an out-of-county vehicle was doing on the gravel road. Sheriff McClure
then turned around and followed the truck for the next mile and one-half while the
truck went twenty miles per hour and was “somewhat weaving,” but was not
driving erratically. The sheriff did not observe any equipment deficiencies. The
sheriff did not observe anything unusual when the truck stopped at a stop sign
and continued forward. The sheriff had a good view into the back of the truck
and did not observe the occupants doing anything unusual, making any quick
movements, or attempting to hide anything.
While not aware of a posted speed on the gravel road, Sheriff McClure
testified that the normal speed on this road was fifty miles per hour and the
truck‟s slow speed was “very odd.” He stated that generally, when a slower-
3
moving vehicle is approached from behind, it will either speed up or pull over to
allow a faster-moving vehicle to pass; however, this truck did neither. When
asked to describe the weather conditions, the sheriff stated: “When we were
over there it was blowing snow and . . . the wind was blowing hard and the snow
was coming down relatively hard and you had to use your wipers at some
points.”
Additionally, Sheriff McClure testified there had been thefts at hog
confinement facilities within the county in recent months, there was a hog lot in
the vicinity, and a hog lot to the north had experienced a theft.
Sheriff McClure decided to stop Keifer‟s vehicle. Subsequently, Sheriff
McClure asked Keifer, the driver, to perform sobriety tests. Keifer failed several
preliminary tests. The sheriff testified: “When we were out in the field, it was
cold and snow was starting to blow. It was actually snowing a little bit and it was
windy, so I did not do the one leg stand test.” Keifer was transported to the
sheriff‟s office where he refused some further testing.
The State charged Keifer with operating while intoxicated, second offense
in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2 (2005). Keifer moved to suppress the
evidence resulting from the stop asserting the warrantless stop of his vehicle was
not supported by reasonable suspicion. Following a hearing, the district court
denied Kiefer‟s motion and eventually found him guilty as charged. On appeal,
Keifer argues the district court erroneously denied his motion to suppress.
Because this case concerns the constitutional right to be free of
unreasonable searches and seizures; our review of the district court‟s
suppression ruling is de novo. State v. Kreps, 650 N.W.2d 636, 640 (Iowa 2002).
4
We independently evaluate the totality of the circumstances shown by the entire
record. Id. The stop of an automobile for investigatory purposes is upheld if
supported by reasonable suspicion that criminal activity has occurred or is
occurring. State v. Kinkead, 570 N.W.2d 97, 100 (Iowa 1997).
When a person challenges a stop on the basis that reasonable
suspicion did not exist, the State must show by a preponderance of
the evidence that the stopping officer had specific and articulable
facts, which taken together with rational inferences from those
facts, to reasonably believe criminal activity may have occurred.
Mere suspicion, curiosity, or hunch of criminal activity is not
enough.
State v. Tague, 676 N.W.2d 197, 204 (Iowa 2004) (emphasis added).
An
objective standard is used to judge whether the facts known to the officer at the
time of the stop would lead a reasonable person to believe the stop was
appropriate. Kinkead, 570 N.W.2d at 100. If the State fails to carry its burden,
any evidence obtained through the investigatory stop is inadmissible. Id.
Applying an objective standard to the facts available to the sheriff when he
stopped Keifer would not lead a reasonable person to believe the stop was
appropriate. Even the State‟s brief merely suggests an “ambiguity surrounding
the vehicle‟s presence in the area.” An out-of-county truck travelling slowly at
night for a short distance on a gravel road during “terribly windy” conditions with
blowing snow does not provide sufficient grounds for a stop. “In general, slow
driving in the absence of erratic driving, interference with traffic, or a posted
minimum speed limit, does not alone constitute reasonable cause” for a stop.
State v. Wiese, 525 N.W.2d 412, 416 (Iowa 1994), overruled on other grounds by
State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277, 281 (Iowa 2000). The sheriff observed the
vehicle for a very short time and 12:32 a.m. on a Friday night/Saturday morning
5
is not an unreasonable time to be out and about. See State v. Haviland, 532
N.W.2d 767, 769 (Iowa 1995). Keifer‟s driving did not amount to the significant
weaving or the erratic speeds observed by the officers in cases where
reasonable suspicion was found to exist. See State v. Otto, 566 N.W.2d 509,
510-11 (Iowa 1997); State v. Tompkins, 507 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Iowa Ct. App.
1993). Keifer was not driving in an illegal manner. See Haviland, 532 N.W.2d at
769. Further, the sheriff “was not investigating a crime or responding to an „inprocess‟ crime,” and “the area was not a particularly „high crime‟ spot.”
Id.
Therefore, the combination of facts observed by the sheriff can, at most,
objectively support a generalized “mere suspicion, curiosity, or hunch of criminal
activity.” This was insufficient justification for a stop under Iowa law. The totality
of the circumstances did not support a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity
had occurred or was occurring.
An objective view of the facts requires us to find the stop violated Keifer‟s
right to be free of arbitrary intrusion by the police. See Tague, 676 N.W.2d at
206. Because the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop Keifer‟s
vehicle, all evidence flowing from the stop is inadmissible. We reverse the trial
court‟s denial of Keifer‟s motion to suppress and remand the case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Huitink, P.J., concurs; Vogel, J., dissents.
6
VOGEL, J. (dissents)
I respectfully dissent and would affirm the district court.
It was after
midnight when Sheriff McClure observed Keifer driving well below the normal
speed, and yet Keifer was having difficulty maneuvering his vehicle.
Once
Sheriff McClure positioned his vehicle behind Keifer‟s vehicle, Keifer continued at
his very slow speed for more than one mile, rather than accelerating to a normal
speed or pulling over.
Aware of recent thefts in the area, Sheriff McClure
became increasingly suspicious of this slow-moving pickup truck bearing out-ofcounty license plates, traveling with some noticeable difficulty on a gravel road in
the middle of the night.
While the majority emphasizes the weather conditions, the testimony did
not indicate that this would necessarily cause Keifer‟s slow speed.
Sheriff
McClure testified that “it was cold and snow was starting to blow. It was actually
snowing a little bit and it was windy.” However, there was nothing peculiar about
the road conditions.
While each of the facts viewed in isolation may have
innocent explanations, “[t]he principal function of an investigatory stop is to
resolve the ambiguity as to whether criminal activity is afoot.” State v. Kreps, 650
N.W.2d 636, 642 (Iowa 2002). I would conclude that under the totality of the
circumstances confronting Sheriff McClure at the time the decision to stop Keifer
was made, Sheriff McClure had reasonable suspicion to stop Keifer‟s vehicle and
briefly investigate the circumstances. State v. Teague, 676 N.W.2d 197, 204
(Iowa 2004) (stating that we determine whether reasonable suspicion exists in
the “light of the totality of the circumstances confronting the officer, including all
information available to the officer at the time the officer makes the decision to
7
stop the vehicle”). Thus, I would affirm the district court‟s ruling denying Keifer‟s
motion to suppress.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.