IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF CORALLEE CURPHY, MICHAEL WATTS, Father - Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-680 / 08-0185
Filed December 17, 2008
IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP
OF CORALLEE CURPHY,
MICHAEL WATTS,
Father-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Ruth B. Klotz,
Associate Probate Judge.
A father appeals a district court ruling appointing another relative as
permanent guardian and conservator of the child. AFFIRMED.
Melissa Nine of Kaplan & Frese, L.L.P., Marshalltown, for appellant.
Elizabeth Kellner-Nelson of Pendleton Law Firm, P.C., West Des Moines,
for intervenor appellee.
Dawn Bowman of DeMichelis Law Firm, P.C., Chariton, for minor child.
Heard by Huitink, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and Potterfield, JJ.
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VAITHESWARAN, J.
A father appeals a district court order appointing another relative as
permanent guardian and conservator of the child. We affirm.
I.
Background Facts and Proceedings
Corallee was born in 1995 to Michael Watts and Valinda Curphy. Corallee
always lived with her mother. She also lived with or was in close proximity to her
mother’s twin sister, Maranda. When Corallee was twelve, her mother died in a
car accident.
Maranda petitioned to have herself appointed Corallee’s guardian and
conservator. The district court appointed her temporary guardian for medical and
school purposes. Michael filed a cross-application for guardianship. Following
trial, the district court granted Maranda’s petition. Michael appealed.
II.
Analysis
Guardianship petitions such as this one are tried in equity and, therefore,
our review is de novo. In re Guardianship of Knell, 537 N.W.2d 778, 780 (Iowa
1995). The statutory provision governing this action provides:
The parents of a minor, or either of them, if qualified and
suitable, shall be preferred over all others for appointment as
guardian. Preference shall then be given to any person, if qualified
and suitable, nominated as guardian for a minor child by a will
executed by the parent having custody of a minor child, and any
qualified and suitable person requested by a minor fourteen years
of age or older, or by standby petition executed by a person having
physical and legal custody of a minor.
Subject to these
preferences, the court shall appoint as guardian a qualified and
suitable person who is willing to serve in that capacity.
Iowa Code § 633.559 (2007). Section 633.559 does not give a biological parent
an absolute right to be appointed guardian of his or her child, but instead creates
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a rebuttable presumption, which may be overcome. Carrere v. Prunty, 257 Iowa
525, 531–32, 133 N.W.2d 692, 696 (1965). The presumptive right gives way
when that right has been relinquished or where the welfare and best interests of
the child mandate a different result. Id. Ultimately, if the return of custody to a
child’s natural parent ―is likely to have a seriously disrupting and disturbing effect
upon the child’s development,‖ alternate custody arrangements should be made.
Knell, 537 N.W.2d at 782.
On our de novo review, we agree with the district court that alternate
custody arrangements were warranted. Corallee was twelve years old at the
time of trial and had always lived with her mother or aunt. When the child was
young, Maranda acted as a second mother, living with Valinda, adjusting her
work schedule to care for Corallee, and assisting with finances. As Corallee
grew older, Maranda worked with Valinda to discipline the girl. She stated, ―if
[Corallee] would do something naughty, we would always kind of consult together
because we kind of raised her together like a mother and a father.‖ She attended
all of Corallee’s softball games over a two-and-a-half year period, as well as
school activities. She testified, ―I have been there since she was born. I have
helped raise her. She feels like she can confide in me about things. I know her
friends, I know her school, I know all of her medical history.‖ She continued,
Corallee just lost her mother three months ago and I think
that’s a huge part here. Her mother was her most important thing
to her and she has lost that most important thing, and to put her
into a new environment where she doesn’t know anybody, she has
one friend that’s a cousin down there, she has never been to that
school, she doesn’t know anybody at that school, I think it would be
very detrimental to her future.
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She is just now start—she has great grades, she is in
cheerleading, she is doing good in school. She likes going to
school.
Corallee’s school counselor confirmed Maranda’s views about a possible
move. She testified that Corallee had a ―strong group of friends‖ at the middle
school, most of whom she had known since elementary school. She opined that
it would not be in Corallee’s best interests to transfer custody to her father,
stating:
She’s just lost her mom, school is starting. To change
schools, to change parentship, to change who she is surrounded
with I think would be really hard for Corallee to adjust to at this point
and I think a longer period of time to be able to adjust to those
changes and build that relationship would be more appropriate.
The counselor continued,
Corallee is very bonded to Maranda and to her family there, that’s
who she’s grown up with, her friends, her school. She is just really
good where she is. She is just real—she is in her niche. She
knows where she needs to be and she’s got a good support
system.
We also consider a custodial parent’s wishes. Thompson v. Collins, 391
N.W.2d 267, 268 (Iowa 1986) (stating it was ―appropriate to take into account the
desires of the deceased custodial parent‖); Painter v. Bannister, 258 Iowa 1390,
1396, 140 N.W.2d 152, 156 (1966) (same).
Maranda testified that Valinda
wished to have her daughter placed in Maranda’s care if anything happened to
her. While Valinda’s desire is not dispositive, it is another factor supporting
affirmance.
We turn to Michael’s history with Corallee. That history is significant and
we will summarize it in detail. As the district court found, Michael was a fit and
suitable parent. See Knell, 537 N.W.2d at 780 (noting district court’s finding that
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father was ―qualified and suitable parent under the statute‖).
But see In re
Marriage of Reschly, 334 N.W.2d 720, 721 (Iowa 1983) (in dissolution case,
holding that court would only consider alternative to presumptive preference for
parental custody where neither parent was suitable custodian).
He had no
criminal history or substance abuse history and the record showed that he rarely
consumed alcohol. Cf. Reschly, 334 N.W.2d at 721–22 (concluding maternal
grandparents should have custody of child where parent had extensive history of
criminal activity, drug use, and unemployment that was also present around the
time of the custody hearing).
The record also does not suggest that Michael abandoned Corallee. See
Doan Thi Hoang Anh v. Nelson, 245 N.W.2d 511, 516 (Iowa 1976) (stating
abandonment ―includes both the intention to abandon and the external act by
which the intention is carried into effect‖) (citation omitted). Michael lived with
Valinda and Corallee for most of the first year of the child’s life.
Shortly
thereafter, he enrolled in a job training program in western Iowa. During the twoyear training period, he lacked transportation or much vacation time and was
unable to visit the child in central Iowa more than a couple of times. However,
after the training ended, he began seeing Corallee about two times a month. He
even took her to Arizona on a family trip. Although his relationship with the child
became strained after this trip, there was evidence that Michael’s former spouse
was the cause of the strain.
Michael testified that approximately two years
before Valinda’s death, he began seeing his daughter every other weekend at his
mother’s house. While Maranda and Corallee’s stepfather disputed the extent of
the contacts during this period, there is no question Michael maintained a
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relationship with his daughter.
After Valinda’s death, Maranda and Michael
informally agreed to an every-other-weekend visitation schedule as well as daily
phone contact. Michael saw his daughter over two weekends in the two months
preceding the guardianship hearing and was scheduled to spend Thanksgiving
with her. In the end, he abided by Corallee’s wishes to spend Thanksgiving with
her aunt.
Michael also paid child support for approximately nine years. Although he
began the payments only after being ordered to do so, it is undisputed that, once
ordered to pay, he fulfilled his obligation. See Northland v. Starr, 581 N.W.2d
210, 213 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998) (recognizing ―past immaturity and lack of financial
responsibility‖ do not overcome presumption in favor of parental custody if
indiscretions are not ―present risks‖). Finally, Michael covered Corallee under his
employer health insurance plan. Cf. Carrere, 257 Iowa at 527, 133 N.W.2d at
693 (denying father custody when his interest in his daughter had been minimal,
he did not provide for his daughter financially, and it did not appear that he ever
sought any visitation rights with the child).
We recognize Michael could have asserted his parental rights more
forcefully throughout Corallee’s life. See Thompson, 391 N.W.2d at 268 (―[A]
parent who acquiesces in or capitulates to his ex-spouse’s desire that he have no
contact with his child establishes a base order of priority under which his child’s
well being is of little or no importance.‖). He did not contact her school or attend
curricular or extra-curricular activities, did not fully exercise visitation under the
informal arrangement with Corallee’s mother and aunt, and did not insist on
being included in special events such as birthday parties. However, his external
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acts did not reflect an intent to abandon Corallee. Nelson, 245 N.W.2d at 515–
16.
Despite this conclusion, we are not convinced Michael was in a position to
become the full-time custodian of a twelve-year-old child who had just
experienced the sudden loss of her mother. See Knell, 537 N.W.2d at 782 (citing
testimony that it would be ―very traumatic‖ to separate child from custodians so
shortly after her mother’s death); In re Guardianship of Stodden, 569 N.W.2d
621, 624–25 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997) (concluding return of child to biological mother
would have been ―seriously detrimental‖ to child’s well-being). The child had not
stayed with Michael for more than two weeks in one stretch.
Maranda, in
contrast, was the single constant in the twelve-year-old child’s life. Cf. Northland,
581 N.W.2d at 213 (concluding parental preference not rebutted where father
maintained contact with four-year-old child).
Unlike Michael, she was
consistently involved in Corallee’s physical, emotional, and educational
development. Following the death of her twin sister, she worked with school
authorities to monitor and comfort Corallee. She provided a stable and secure
environment for Corallee at a time of extreme trauma in the child’s life. See
Painter, 258 Iowa 1397, 140 N.W.2d at 156 (concluding seven-year-old child
should remain with grandparents despite lack of evidence that father was morally
unfit, where child was ―well disciplined, happy, relatively secure and popular with
his classmates, although still subject to more than normal anxiety‖).
Based on this record, we agree with the district court that a transfer of this
pre-teen child from the custody of her ―second mother‖ to the custody of her
father would have proved destabilizing. As the court noted in Knell, a child ―puts
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down roots‖ with the passage of time and ―[c]ourts must carefully deal with those
roots in determining the child’s best interest.‖ 537 N.W.2d at 783. We conclude
Maranda rebutted the presumption in favor of Michael.
This conclusion should not be read to diminish Michael’s right to liberal
visitation with his daughter. Commendably, Maranda facilitated that contact after
she was appointed temporary guardian.
Corallee ―should be encouraged in
every way possible‖ to continue that contact because there are many ways
Michael can enrich her life. See Painter, 258 Iowa at 1400, 140 N.W.2d at 158.
III.
Appellate Attorney Fees
Maranda requests appellate attorney fees.
She cites no statutory
authority that would allow us to order Michael to pay all or a portion of her
attorney fees. See Iowa Code §§ 633.200 (allowing court to fix compensation for
fiduciaries and their attorneys), 633.673 (charging guardian’s costs, including
fees of guardian’s attorney, to ward or ward’s estate). Accordingly, we decline
the request.
We affirm the district court’s appointment of Maranda as permanent
guardian and custodian of Corallee.
AFFIRMED.
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