JOHN DEERE DUBUQUE WORKS OF DEERE AND COMPANY , Plaintiff - Appell ant , vs. DARYL A. HAUGEN , Defendant - Appell ee .
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-616 / 07-2093
Filed November 13, 2008
JOHN DEERE DUBUQUE WORKS OF
DEERE AND COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
DARYL A. HAUGEN,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, Alan L. Pearson,
Judge.
Employer appeals from the ruling on judicial review from its former
employee’s workers’ compensation action. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED
IN PART, AND REMANDED.
Dirk Hamel of Gilloon, Wright & Hamel, P.C., Dubuque, for appellant.
Paul J. McAndrew of Paul J. McAndrew Law Firm, Coralville, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Vogel and Eisenhauer, JJ.
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VOGEL, J.
Daryl Haugen began working for John Deere in 1972. Prior to 2003, he
had no permanent work restrictions.
In 2004, Haugen filed several workers’
compensation petitions alleging work-related injuries to his right long finger,
cervical spine, left shoulder, bilateral upper extremities, and a mental injury or
depression.
Following a hearing on the consolidated proceedings, a deputy
commissioner issued an arbitration decision concluding Haugen had shown that
his cervical and right long finger injuries arose out of and in the course of
employment, but that his alleged upper-extremity and mental injuries were not
work-related.
However, the deputy concluded Haugen failed to prove the
cervical and finger injuries entitled him to any permanent disability. On intraagency appeal, the commissioner largely affirmed, but additionally found that
Haugen had suffered a thirty-percent loss of earning capacity as a result of his
cervical spine and right long finger injuries, entitling him to permanent partial
disability payments. On judicial review, the district court affirmed.
John Deere appeals. Our review of an industrial commissioner’s decision
is for correction of errors at law. Simonson v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 588 N.W.2d
430, 434 (Iowa 1999). When we review the district court’s decision, “we apply
the standards of chapter 17A to determine whether the conclusions we reach are
the same as those of the district court. If they are the same, we affirm; otherwise
we reverse.” Mycogen Seeds v. Sands, 686 N.W.2d 457, 464 (Iowa 2004). Our
role is threefold: (1) determine if the commissioner applied the proper legal
standard or interpretation of the law; (2) determine if there was substantial
evidence to support the commissioner’s findings; and (3) determine if the
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commissioner’s application of the law to the facts was irrational, illogical, or
wholly unjustifiable. Clark v. Vicorp Rests., Inc., 696 N.W.2d 596, 603-04 (Iowa
2005).
Commissioner’s Deference to Deputy. John Deere first claims that the
commissioner, in his intra-agency appeal decision, “should have deferred to
Deputy Garrison’s neck claim assessment which was impacted by express or
implied credibility determinations.”
In particular, John Deere asserts the
commissioner should have deferred to a larger degree regarding the fact-findings
underlying the essential question of whether Haugen sustained any industrial
disability.
We first note that judicial review is from final agency action, not from the
deputy’s arbitration decision.
Iowa Code § 17A.19(1).
Moreover, the
commissioner is authorized to “reverse or modify any finding of fact if a
preponderance of the evidence will support a determination to reverse or modify
such a finding . . . .” Iowa Code § 17A.15(3). No statutory authority requires the
commissioner to provide any deference to the deputy’s fact-findings, and the
authority to find facts thus is directly vested by law in the commissioner.
Accordingly, we reject John Deere’s first claim.
Disability from Right Long Finger. We next address John Deere’s claim
that the commissioner erred in calculating Haugen’s loss of earning capacity, in
part, based on what it asserts is a faulty finding that permanent restrictions
remained from his right long finger injury.
John Deere maintains that the
restrictions, on which the commissioner based his industrial disability
determination, predated Haugen’s corrective surgery and that all of the evidence
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indicates his trigger finger condition had been fully resolved, leaving no postsurgical impairment.
First, we note that even the commissioner found that “Haugen had a
complete resolution of his symptoms related to the right long finger.
No
impairment has been issued with respect to this compensable injury.” However,
despite this explicit finding, the court found that a series of work restrictions
related to Haugen’s hand precluded him from working assembly-line type jobs
and thus hindered his ability to work in the competitive labor market. We believe
this latter finding is in error. Those restrictions were imposed in February of
2003, two years prior to Haugen’s finger surgery.
There is no evidence in the record that, following that surgery, Haugen
continued to suffer any lasting impairment or restriction. Haugen had a surgical
release from this injury on January 31, 2005.
His recovery was full and he
regained full function of that finger. Dr. David Field, who performed the trigger
finger surgery, released Haugen to work with no restrictions. Furthermore, Dr.
Richard Neiman, who performed an independent medical examination on
Haugen, noted no post-surgical restrictions to the finger.
We conclude substantial evidence does not support that Haugen
sustained any permanent injury to the right long finger. Accordingly, it was error
to consider presurgical restrictions contributed to a thirty-percent loss of earning
capacity. We therefore remand to the agency for a determination of industrial
disability without consideration of any work restrictions to the right long finger.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
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