MARTHA ALANIZ, Petitioner-Appellant, vs. NABISCO/KRAFT, Respondent-Appellee.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-566 / 07-1755
Filed August 27, 2008
MARTHA ALANIZ,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
NABISCO/KRAFT,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Nancy S. Tabor,
Judge.
Employee appeals from a district court judicial review ruling affirming the
appeal decision of the workers’ compensation commissioner. AFFIRMED.
William J. Bribriesco of William J. Bribriesco & Associates, Bettendorf, for
appellant.
Nathan R. McConkey of Huber, Book, Cortese, Happe & Lanz, P.L.C.,
West Des Moines, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Miller and Potterfield, JJ.
2
MILLER, J.
Martha Alaniz appeals from a district court judicial review ruling affirming
the appeal decision of the workers’ compensation commissioner. We affirm the
judgment of the district court.
I.
BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS.
Alaniz was hired by Nabisco/Kraft (Kraft) in February 2000 to package
candy. Her job required her to stack bags of candy on a pallet, which she would
then move to different areas of the plant.
On February 19, 2001, she was
pushing a pallet loaded with bags of candy through a set of automatic doors
when the doors closed on her. Her left leg got caught between the doors.
Alaniz sought medical treatment from physician assistant, Blythe
Waltersdorf, on February 22, 2001, complaining of pain in her left hip.
Waltersdorf assessed her with left hip strain and imposed light-duty work
restrictions. By March 15, 2001, Alaniz’s symptoms had improved. She was
experiencing “very little hip discomfort” and was released to work without
restrictions.
Unfortunately, on March 21, 2001, Alaniz’s left hip pain returned while she
was stacking and pulling bags of candy on a pallet. Her symptoms worsened the
next day, causing her to return to Waltersdorf for additional medical treatment on
March 23, 2001. She complained of severe pain in her left hip along with some
pain in her left lower back.
restrictions.
Waltersdorf again imposed light-duty work
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Alaniz’s symptoms did not improve, and she began seeing Dr. Thomas
Young on April 13, 2001. Dr. Young noted that an MRI performed on April 6
revealed Alaniz suffered from degenerative disc disease with an annular tear at
the L4-5 level as well as mild central canal stenosis. He continued her work
restrictions and recommended that she receive an epidural steroid injection.
Alaniz’s symptoms improved after receiving the injection and participating in
physical therapy. Dr. Young accordingly released her to work without restrictions
on April 27, 2001.
Alaniz was evaluated by orthopedic surgeon Dr. Daniel McGuire on May
8, 2001. Dr. McGuire noted she was “slowly doing better” and there was little he
could do for her due to the good care she had already received from Dr. Young.
He advised her that “[m]oderation is the key,” and “if she works seven days a
week with a lot of hours, she is more likely to be symptomatic.”
In August 2001, Alaniz accepted a part-time job as a housewalker at
SunBest Foods, L.L.C. (SunBest). She typically worked eighteen hours every
weekend at SunBest in addition to working at least thirty-two hours during the
week at Kraft. Her job at SunBest required her to engage in “moderate to heavy”
manual labor sweeping floors, scooping manure, and pulling dead chickens from
cages. She was terminated from her employment at SunBest in March 2002.
Alaniz returned to Dr. Young in August 2002 complaining of low back pain.
She advised him that she had been experiencing pain since April 20011 and that
her work caused her additional discomfort. Dr. Young recommended physical
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Alaniz complained of pain in her left hip and back during appointments with her family
physician, Dr. Mydhili Cheerala, in December 2001 and February 2002.
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therapy and home exercises. He also “had a very frank discussion with her
husband suggesting that if his wife was having chronic pain for a year and a half,
she should strongly consider a different type of work.” He released her to work
with permanent restrictions, noting her work exacerbated her condition.
Due to Alaniz’s worsening condition, Dr. Young recommended that she
return to Dr. McGuire for further evaluation.
Dr. McGuire saw Alaniz in
November 2002 at which time she was complaining “bitterly of back and leg
pain.” He diagnosed her with chronic back problems and sciatica, opining that
these conditions “are probably related to work and the aggravation from repetitive
work.” He ordered a myelogram and CT scan, which were benign and did not
show any structural damage to her spine as a result of working. He suggested
that “she may want to cease working,” although he could give her no “objective
reason[ ]” to do so. Alaniz continued working at Kraft until she was terminated in
December 2003 following a dispute with several other employees. She has not
worked since then.
Alaniz filed a petition with the Iowa Workers’ Compensation Commissioner
in December 2002, seeking workers’ compensation benefits from Kraft.
She
alleged her left hip and low back were permanently injured on February 19, 2001.
Kraft disputed whether Alaniz’s February 19, 2001 injury resulted in any
permanent impairment or disability.
Alaniz was examined by Dr. Richard F. Neiman, a neurologist, in August
2003. Based on his examination, he opined that she suffered a sixteen percent
permanent partial impairment to her body as a whole as a result of “her work at
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Kraft pulling the pallet containing candy.” Her treating physicians disagreed. Dr.
McGuire determined there was no “objective evidence of structural damage to
Ms. Alaniz’s spine as related to her work incident on February 19, 2001.” He
believed her injury on that date was a temporary aggravation of normal
degenerative changes associated with the aging process. Dr. Young agreed,
stating her February 19, 2001 “injury was due to a temporary aggravation of a
pre-existing condition.”
He also did not believe she suffered any permanent
impairment as a result of that injury, noting “[w]hen engaging in conservative
treatment, under my care, she did do well and did obtain a pain-free state.”
Following an arbitration hearing, the deputy workers’ compensation
commissioner denied Alaniz’s claim for permanent partial disability benefits,
finding her February 19, 2001 injury did not result in permanent impairment or
work restrictions.
The deputy rejected Dr. Neiman’s report in favor of the
opinions of Drs. Young and McGuire, stating Dr. Neiman “did not render an
opinion as to the cause of claimant’s impairment or restrictions.”
Alaniz
appealed, and the workers’ compensation commissioner affirmed and adopted
the deputy’s decision with one exception: the commissioner determined the
deputy “incorrectly stated that Richard F. Neiman, M.D., had not expressed an
opinion on the issue of causation.” Nevertheless, the commissioner found the
deputy’s decision reached the correct result because the “record shows [Alaniz]
recovered from the February 19, 2001 injury.”
Alaniz filed a petition for judicial review. Following a hearing, the district
court affirmed the agency decision. She now appeals the district court’s judicial
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review ruling, claiming the agency erred in finding she did not suffer a permanent
disability as a result of her February 19, 2001 work injury.
II.
SCOPE AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW.
The Iowa Administrative Procedure Act, Iowa Code chapter 17A (2005),
governs the scope of our review in workers’ compensation cases. Iowa Code §
86.26; Meyer v. IBP, Inc., 710 N.W.2d 213, 218 (Iowa 2006). “Under the Act, we
may only interfere with the commissioner’s decision if it is erroneous under one
of the grounds enumerated in the statute, and a party’s substantial rights have
been prejudiced.”
Meyer, 710 N.W.2d at 218.
The district court acts in an
appellate capacity to correct errors of law on the part of the agency. Grundmeyer
v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 649 N.W.2d 744, 748 (Iowa 2002). In reviewing the district
court’s decision, we apply the standards of chapter 17A to determine whether our
conclusions are the same as those reached by the district court. Clark v. Vicorp
Rests., Inc., 696 N.W.2d 596, 603 (Iowa 2005).
III.
MERITS.
Alaniz claims the agency’s finding that she did not suffer a permanent
impairment or disability from her February 19, 2001 injury is not supported by
substantial evidence in the record.2
We are bound by the commissioner’s
2
Alaniz also claims the agency’s decision should be reversed under Iowa Code section
17A.19(10)(j). This section provides that an agency’s action may be reversed where it is
the
product of a decision-making process in which the agency did not
consider a relevant and important matter relating to the propriety or
desirability of the action in question that a rational decision maker in
similar circumstances would have considered prior to taking that action.
Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(j). However, she does not cite any authority or appear to
assert any arguments in support of this claim. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(1)(c). Nor does
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findings of fact if they are supported by substantial evidence. Mycogen Seeds v.
Sands, 686 N.W.2d 457, 464-65 (Iowa 2004). Substantial evidence is defined as
evidence of the quality and quantity “that would be deemed sufficient by a
neutral, detached, and reasonable person, to establish the fact at issue when the
consequences resulting from the establishment of that fact are understood to be
serious and of great importance.”
Iowa Code § 17A.19(f)(1); Mycogen, 686
N.W.2d at 464. Thus, evidence is substantial when a reasonable person could
accept it as adequate to reach the same finding. Asmus v. Waterloo Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 722 N.W2d 653, 657 (Iowa 2006). “Because the commissioner is charged
with weighing the evidence, we liberally and broadly construe the findings to
uphold his decision.” Finch v. Schneider Specialized Carriers, Inc., 700 N.W.2d
328, 331 (Iowa 2005).
With these principles in mind, we reject Alaniz’s claim that the agency’s
decision denying her permanent partial disability benefits is not supported by
substantial evidence. She first argues that the agency’s decision “inordinately
emphasizes evidence adverse to [her] case and minimizes or completely ignores
evidence that establishes [her] work injury and related impairment, restrictions,
and disability.” However, “[t]he fact that two inconsistent conclusions may be
she explain what “relevant and important matter relating to the propriety or desirability of
the action” the agency failed to consider. The mere mention of this issue, without
elaboration or supportive authority, is insufficient to raise the issue for our consideration.
See id.; Soo Line R.R. Co. v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 521 N.W.2d 685, 691 (Iowa 1994).
Further, and more importantly, the district court did not address the issue of whether the
agency’s decision should be reversed under section 17A.19(10)(j). See Meier v.
Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate
review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before
we will decide them on appeal.”). Because Alaniz did not preserve error on this issue,
we need not and do not address it any further.
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drawn from the same evidence does not prevent the agency’s findings from
being supported by substantial evidence.” Asmus, 722 N.W.2d at 657.
“A claimant has the burden of proving his work-related injury was a
proximate cause of his disability.” Ayers v. D & N Fence Co., Inc., 731 N.W.2d
11, 17 (Iowa 2007).
“In order for a cause to be proximate, it must be a
‘substantial factor.’” Id. (citation omitted). We conclude substantial evidence
supports the agency’s finding that Alaniz did not show her February 19, 2001
injury resulted in permanent impairment or disability.
Alaniz’s treating physicians opined that her February 19, 2001 injury was a
temporary aggravation of a pre-existing degenerative condition.
Dr. Young
explained that Alaniz’s diagnostic studies did not reveal any structural damage to
her spine. He further noted she had experienced “a fairly extensive pain-free
interval following conservative treatment of her initial low back pain” and obtained
a “full range of motion of her lumbar spine and left hip region.” He discharged
her from his care and returned her to work without restrictions on April 27, 2001.
Dr. McGuire likewise declined to assign any “permanent lifelong
impairment and/or restrictions pertaining to the work incident of February 19,
2001” based on her “history, the physical examination, and the diagnostic
studies, combined with [his] years of clinical experience.” He noted that her
symptoms “resolved relatively quickly” following her February 19, 2001 injury,
although he did not “doubt[ ] that she had other incidences that again aggravated
her symptoms for a period of time.” He critiqued Dr. Neiman’s assessment of
Alaniz’s condition, noting Dr. Neiman saw her nearly two and a half years after
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her work incident and did not review her diagnostic studies before issuing an
impairment rating.
It is the role of the agency to determine the credibility of the witnesses and
the weight to be given to any evidence, and it may accept or reject an expert
opinion in whole or in part. Sherman v. Pella Corp., 576 N.W.2d 312, 321 (Iowa
1998). Thus, the agency was free to accept the opinions of Drs. Young and
McGuire over the opinion of Dr. Neiman.3
Alaniz nevertheless argues the
agency erred in relying on the opinions of Drs. Young and McGuire because their
conclusion that she did not suffer structural damage to her spine as a result of
her February 19, 2001 injury ignores the April 6, 2001 MRI, which revealed
degenerative disc disease and an annular tear at the L4-5 level. However, both
physicians reviewed that MRI and other diagnostic studies on multiple occasions
before issuing their reports on Alaniz’s condition, while Dr. Neiman did not. In
addition, as Kraft correctly observes, the MRI was performed after Alaniz began
experiencing pain in her back upon her initial return to work without restrictions in
March 2001.
When Alaniz first sought medical treatment for her February 19, 2001
injury, her complaints focused on pain in her left hip. By March 15, 2001, her left
hip pain was minimal, and she was released to work without restrictions.
However, on March 23, she returned to Waltersdorf complaining of renewed pain
in her left hip in addition to a new symptom of pain in her left lower back, which
she experienced while stacking and pulling bags of candy on a pallet on March
3
We reject Alaniz’s argument that the deputy erred in stating that Dr. Neiman did not
render an opinion as to the cause of her permanent impairment and restrictions as this
error was corrected by the commissioner on appeal.
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21 and 22. She told Waltersdorf that “she had been getting along well” up until
that time. These symptoms were again resolved by the end of April 2001, and
she was able to resume working at Kraft without restrictions. She was also able
to work at SunBest for eighteen hours every weekend from August 2001 through
March 2002.
Alaniz did not seek further medical treatment from either Dr. Young or Dr.
McGuire until August 2002. Her primary complaint upon returning to see these
physicians was low back pain. Both of them believed that her condition at that
time was “probably related to work and the aggravation from repetitive work.”
However, neither physician suggested that her low back pain was related to her
February 19, 2001 work injury, which primarily manifested itself with left hip pain.
Finally, we reject Alaniz’s argument that the agency “[e]mphasiz[ed] only
the negative aspects of the” functional capacity examination (FCE) performed on
her in February 2004 and ignored “the fact that the FCE was, in a majority of
factors, probative of [her] permanent restrictions and impairments.” Although the
FCE demonstrated Alaniz’s functional abilities were limited in several different
areas due to her low back pain, the evaluator stated her “overall performance
was a combination of self-limited and functionally limited.” The agency properly
noted the results of the FCE and the inconsistencies observed by the evaluator in
Alaniz’s performance.
Alaniz’s arguments on appeal essentially request us to reweigh the
evidence. It is not the role of the district court on judicial review, nor this court on
appeal, to reassess the weight and credibility of any of this evidence. See Arndt
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v. City of Le Claire, 728 N.W.2d 389, 394-95 (Iowa 2007).
In light of the
foregoing, we conclude, as did the district court, that substantial evidence
supports the agency’s finding that Alaniz did not suffer a permanent impairment
or disability as a result of her February 19, 2001 work injury.
IV.
CONCLUSION.
The district court did not err in affirming the agency’s decision denying
Alaniz’s claim for permanent partial disability benefits.
There is substantial
evidence in the record supporting the agency’s finding that her February 19,
2001 injury did not result in permanent impairment or disability. We therefore
affirm the judgment of the district court.
AFFIRMED.
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