STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff - Appellee, vs. BRADLEY ALLEN REYNOLDS, Defendant - Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-560 / 07-1617
Filed August 27, 2008
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
BRADLEY ALLEN REYNOLDS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Lyon County, Robert J. Dull,
District Associate Judge.
Appeal from conviction of assault causing bodily injury. REVERSED AND
REMANDED.
Martha McGinn, Sioux City, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sheryl Soich, Assistant Attorney
General, and Carl Peterson, County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Miller and Potterfield, JJ.
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SACKETT, C.J.
The defendant-appellant, Brad Reynolds, appeals from his conviction of
assault causing bodily injury, following a jury trial. He contends the court erred in
allowing prior-bad-acts evidence, in giving a modified jury instruction, and in
refusing to give a requested instruction. We reverse appellant’s conviction and
remand.
I.
Background
The appellant was arrested following an altercation with the man who
married his ex-wife. Before trial, the State requested an evidentiary ruling that
would allow it to present evidence appellant had “harassed, threatened,
assaulted, and intimidated the victim” on several occasions in the past. The
appellant unsuccessfully resisted the motion. At trial, the victim testified to a
number of past incidents involving appellant including spitting, verbal threats and
taunts, aggressive gestures, and one incident that resulted in a no-contact order.
Trial counsel objected on relevance and hearsay grounds. The appellant offered
testimony of several witnesses concerning his peaceful character. The appellant
testified he struck the victim in self-defense, after the victim hit him in the back of
the head.
Before submission of the case to the jury, appellant requested that the
court include Iowa Criminal Jury Instructions 200.34, concerning prior bad acts
evidence, and 200.38, concerning character and reputation evidence. The court
denied the request for the instruction on character and reputation and gave a
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modified version of the prior-bad-acts instruction. The jury found the appellant
guilty of assault causing bodily injury.
II.
Scope and Standards of Review
We review each issue presented according to its appropriate standard.
Concerning the admission of the prior crimes evidence, review of evidentiary
rulings generally is for an abuse of discretion. State v. Parker, 747 N.W.2d 196,
203 (Iowa 2008). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court exercises its
discretion on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly
unreasonable. State v. Rodriquez, 636 N.W.2d 234, 239 (Iowa 2001).
Challenges to jury instructions are reviewed for correction of errors at law.
State v. Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d 549, 553 (Iowa 2006). Review of a district court's
failure to give a jury instruction is for an abuse of discretion. State v. Piper, 663
N.W.2d 894, 914 (Iowa 2003). Error in instructing a jury does not merit reversal
unless it results in prejudice. State v. Fintel, 689 N.W.2d 95, 99 (Iowa 2004).
III.
Analysis
Jury Instructions. The appellant contends the court erred in refusing to
give the uniform Iowa Criminal Jury Instruction 200.34 on similar crimes. The
stock instruction language provides:
Evidence has been received concerning other wrongful acts alleged
to have been committed by the defendant. The defendant is not on
trial for those acts.
This evidence must be shown by clear proof, and can only be used
to show [motive] [intent] [absence of mistake or accident] [common
scheme] [identity of person charged].
If you find other wrongful acts (1) occurred; (2) were so closely
connected in time; and (3) were committed in the same or similar
manner as the crime charged, so as to form a reasonable
connection between them, then and only then may such other
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wrongful acts be considered for the purpose of establishing [motive]
[intent] [absence of mistake or accident] [common scheme] [identity
of person charged].
Iowa Criminal Jury Instruction 200.34 (2006).
The appellant requested the
uniform instruction. The court gave the following modified instruction:
Evidence has been received concerning other wrongful acts alleged
to have been committed by the defendant. The defendant is not on
trial for those acts.
This evidence must be shown by clear proof, and can only be used
to show intent.
If you find other wrongful acts occurred, then and only then may
such other wrongful acts be considered for the purpose of
establishing intent.
At issue on appeal is the court’s omission of much of the third paragraph. In
particular, appellant challenges the omission of “were so closely connected in
time” because more than half of the acts introduced occurred at least three years
prior to the fight at issue. The State argues none of the cases listed as authority
for the instruction have any requirement the prior bad acts be “closely connected
in time.”
Although we do not find “closely connected in time” in any of the cases
listed as authority for the instruction, the length of time between the prior acts
and the incident at issue is a factor that courts have considered. See, e.g., State
v. Sullivan, 679 N.W.2d 19, 29 (Iowa 2004) (noting “temporal separation was
three years, further casting doubt on the weight of this evidence”); State v.
Casady, 491 N.W.2d 782, 785 (Iowa 1992) (holding remoteness of evidence
affects its weight).
We think it was error for the court not to include some
reference in an instruction to the effect a jury should give to the temporal
separation of the prior events from the incident at issue.
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Of more concern to us, however, is the omission of any requirement that
the prior events be “the same or similar” in manner to the current incident or that
there be a “reasonable connection” between them.
The instruction as given
leaves the jury free to consider any prior acts for the purpose of showing intent.
Although district courts have “rather broad discretion” in how jury instructions are
worded, if “the choice of words results in an incorrect statement of law or omits a
matter essential for the jury's consideration,” error results. Stringer v. State, 522
N.W.2d 797, 800 (Iowa 1994). “Error in giving a jury instruction does not merit
reversal unless it results in prejudice to the defendant.” State v. Fintel, 689
N.W.2d 95, 99 (Iowa 2004). In the case before us, we conclude the omission of
essential elements from the instruction, coupled with the blanket admission of all
the proffered prior-bad-acts evidence prejudiced appellant.
Accordingly, we
reverse appellant’s conviction and remand this matter to the district court. We do
not address appellant’s other jury instruction claim concerning uniform instruction
200.38 because the court in any new trial would have to examine the evidence
introduced to determine whether an instruction on appellant’s character is
appropriate.
Prior Bad Acts. The appellant also challenges the district court’s blanket
admission of evidence of prior incidents between appellant and the victim. Prior
to trial, the State sought an evidentiary ruling permitting introduction of evidence
appellant had “harassed, threatened, assaulted, and intimidated the victim” on
several occasions in the past. The court ruled “the evidence set out in the notice
or additional minutes of evidence is deemed admissible.” At trial, the victim
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testified to a number of past incidents involving appellant including spitting,
verbal threats and taunts, aggressive gestures, and one incident that resulted in
a no-contact order. The evidence was allowed over defense counsel’s objections
at trial. On appeal, the appellant argues the evidence was improperly admitted
and he suffered prejudice. Although we have reversed the appellant’s conviction
based on prejudicial error in instructing the jury, we address this claim to provide
some guidance in any new trial.
A number of recent Iowa cases have addressed prior-bad-acts evidence,
both in the context of Iowa Rules of Evidence 5.404(b) and 5.403, but some also
including an analysis under rule 5.103(a). See, e.g., State v. Parker, 747 N.W.2d
196, 209-10 (Iowa 2008); State v. Taylor, 689 N.W.2d 116, 125-26 (Iowa 2004);
State v. Sullivan, 679 N.W.2d 19, 25, 30 (Iowa 2004); State v. White, 668 N.W.2d
850, 853-55 (Iowa 2003); State v. Rodriguez, 636 N.W.2d 234, 239-40 (Iowa
2001).
The obvious danger in admitting prior-bad-acts evidence is that:
despite instructions, the jury might misuse the evidence and give
more heed to the past convictions as evidence that the accused is
the kind of man who would commit the crime charged, or even that
he ought to be imprisoned without too much concern for present
guilt or innocence, than they will to the legitimate bearing of the
past [actions on intent or motive].
Parker, 747 N.W.2d at 210 (quoting 1 John W. Strong, et al., McCormick on
Evidence § 42, at 168-69 (5th ed. 1999)). The jury may “base its decision on
something other than the established propositions in the case.”
White, 668
N.W.2d at 855 (quoting 1 Jack B. Weinstein et al., Weinstein’s Evidence ¶
403[03], at 403-33 to 403-40 (1986) (now found at 2 Joseph M. McLaughlin,
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Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 403.04[1][c], at 403-40 to 403-44 (2d ed. 2001)).
The State’s desire in this case that the jury use the evidence of prior, similar acts
as proof of appellant’s propensity to act as he has in the past is clear from this
exchange between the prosecutor and the victim:
Q. So is his behavior that you've testified to on [the day of
the current incident] consistent or not consistent with his past
behavior? A. Very consistent.
This goes directly against the prohibition in rule 5.404(b): “Evidence of other . . .
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the
person acted in conformity therewith.” Iowa R. Evid. 5.404(b). We believe the
court abused its discretion in granting the State’s pretrial request for a
determination the evidence of appellant’s prior interactions with the victim was
admissible. This is not to say the evidence was inadmissible, but we conclude
the blanket determination without analyzing each instance under our rules of
evidence was not proper.
As noted above, our supreme court has set forth the analysis under rules
5.404(b), 5.403, and 5.103(a) in recent cases.
Rule 5.404(b) requires
consideration of the purpose for which the prior bad acts evidence is offered and
“seeks to exclude evidence that serves no purpose except to show the defendant
is a bad person, from which the jury is likely to infer he or she committed the
crime in question.” Rodriguez, 636 N.W.2d at 239. Two of the more common
non-propensity purposes the State claims for prior bad acts evidence are to show
motive or intent. See, e.g., Taylor, 689 N.W.2d at 125; White, 668 N.W.2d at
854. The prior acts must be demonstrated by “clear proof.” State v. Brown, 569
N.W.2d 113, 117 (Iowa 1997).
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Once a court determines the proffered evidence is relevant for a legitimate
not-propensity purpose under rule 5.404(b), the court must then assess whether
the evidence’s “probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice.” Iowa R. Evid. 5.403. Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it
appeals to the jury’s sympathies, arouses its sense of horror,
provokes its instinct to punish, or triggers other mainsprings of
human action [that] may cause a jury to base its decision on
something other than the established propositions in the case.
Rodriguez, 636 N.W.2d at 240 (citations omitted). The outcome of this balancing
test determines the admissibility of the evidence. Sullivan, 679 N.W.2d at 30.
From our review of the record, we are unable to determine the district court
evaluated each prior bad act offered under rules 5.404(b) and 5.403.
Our analysis does not end here, however, because error may not be
based on a ruling that admits or excludes evidence “unless a substantial right of
the party is affected.” Iowa R. Evid. 5.103(a). A court may improperly admit
evidence without requiring reversal. Id. The “harmless-error” analysis under this
rule, however, is a broader test than the rule 5.403 balancing, and we “presume
prejudice under this approach unless the contrary is affirmatively established.”
Parker, 747 N.W.2d at 209.
One consideration in our analysis under rule
5.103(a) is the strength of the other evidence, that is, if there is overwhelming
evidence of a defendant’s guilty, the improper admission of prior-bad-acts
evidence is less likely to be found prejudicial. See id. at 210; State v. Martin, 704
N.W.2d 665, 673 (Iowa 2005); State v. Holland, 485 N.W.2d 652, 656 (Iowa
1992). In the case before us, we cannot say the evidence is overwhelming. The
only eyewitness evidence is from the defendant and the victim, who obviously
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give divergent accounts of what occurred. When the prior-bad-acts evidence is
included and the jury is not properly instructed on how it may be considered, we
conclude the defendant was prejudiced.
IV.
Conclusion
The district court abused its discretion in modifying uniform criminal jury
instruction number 200.34 to the extent that it allowed the jury to consider the
prior-bad-acts evidence improperly.
The blanket determination that the prior-
bad-acts evidence was admissible failed to apply the considerations of our
evidentiary rules 5.404(b) and 5.403.
The court abused its discretion in not
considering each separate prior incident.
We conclude the errors were
prejudicial to the appellant. Consequently, we reverse his conviction of assault
causing bodily injury and remand.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
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