DAWN ARISPE, Plaintiff - Appellant, vs. WALGREENS CO., RON FRANK, and ERIC RODE, Individually and in their Corporate Capacities, Defendants - Appellees.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-462 / 07-1695
Filed October 29, 2008
DAWN ARISPE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
WALGREENS CO., RON FRANK, and
ERIC RODE, Individually and in their
Corporate Capacities,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County, Stephen P.
Carroll, Judge.
Plaintiff appeals from a district court ruling granting summary judgment in
favor of defendants in her wrongful discharge action. AFFIRMED.
Andrew L. LeGrant and Mark D. Sherinian of Sherinian & Walker Law
Firm, West Des Moines, for appellant.
Mark McCormick, Michael R. Reck, and Margaret C. Callahan of Belin
Lamson McCormick Zumbach Flynn, P.C., Des Moines, for appellees.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Eisenhauer and Doyle, JJ.
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DOYLE, J.
Dawn Arispe appeals from a district court ruling granting summary
judgment in favor of Walgreens Co., Ron Frank, and Eric Rode in her wrongful
discharge action. We affirm the judgment of the district court.
I.
Background Facts and Proceedings.
The summary judgment record reveals the following undisputed facts:
Arispe began working for Walgreens in 1998.
She became an executive
assistant manager of a Walgreens store in Mason City in 2002 and continued in
that position until September 29, 2005, when she was terminated.
On May 14, 2005, Jessica Mathre, one of the employees Arispe
supervised, processed photographs for an adult female customer that contained
images of a girl between the ages of ten and twelve years old. In some of the
photographs, the girl was nude from the waist up. In other photographs, she was
wearing lingerie. The girl was posed in a suggestive fashion with provocative
facial expressions. Mathre felt the photographs were “questionable” due to the
young girl‟s nudity and “sexual facial expression.” She accordingly informed her
immediate supervisor working that day, assistant store manager Danielle Zeien,
about the photographs. Zeien likewise felt the photographs were “questionable,
poor taste content.”
Pursuant to Walgreens‟ “Photo Content/Suspected Pornography Policy,”1
Zeien confiscated the troubling photographs, returned the negatives to the
1
This policy provides in part that in situations involving suspected child pornography:
Mere nudity of children may be unlawful, particularly when such factors as
the setting and even facial expressions suggest sexual conduct. Store
3
customer, and contacted the store‟s loss prevention supervisor, Eric Rode.
Because it was a Saturday, she was unable to speak directly to Rode and had to
leave him a message. She also contacted Arispe and the store‟s manager, Ron
Frank.
Arispe viewed the photographs the next day.
Like Mathre and Zeien,
Arispe was concerned by the content of the photographs, which she felt depicted
a minor engaged in a sex act. She stated that in one of the photographs, the girl
was “holding her breasts and leaning down towards the nipple.”
Arispe
discussed the photographs with Frank when he came into work that Monday.
After viewing the photographs, Frank called Rode. He told Rode “my employees
noticed some pictures over the weekend that they showed me on Monday, and it
was a topless girl.” Due to a misunderstanding between Rode and Frank, the
only copies of the photographs were destroyed before Rode was able to view
them.
Believing the photographs, which had been ripped into pieces, “needed to
be looked at,” Zeien and another employee retrieved them from the garbage later
that day. Zeien gave the pieces of the photographs that she salvaged to Arispe,
Management must contact the District Loss Prevention Supervisor
and District Manager regarding this type of film order.
....
Procedure:
Contact your Store Manager or EXA [executive assistant
manager].
If the Store Manager or EXA views the photos and determines that
they may contain child pornography, Loss Prevention is to be
contacted immediately.
....
Loss Prevention will make the final determination whether or not
to contact local police. Under no circumstances should anyone
other than Loss Prevention contact the police.
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who Zeien felt was “extremely upset at the situation” and “concerned for the
welfare of the girl” depicted in them. Arispe reported the incident to a police
officer after her work shift at Walgreens ended on May 16, 2005. She gave the
officer the destroyed photographs and the name and address of the customer
who had brought them to the store.
The police investigated the incident based on their belief that the
photographs constituted child pornography and violated Iowa Code section
728.12 (2005), sexual exploitation of a minor. Arispe was instructed to contact
the police should the same customer return to the store. An investigator with the
police department also contacted Rode because she was concerned with his
decision to not report the photographs to law enforcement.
Several months later, in early September 2005, the same customer
returned to the store to develop the same set of photographs.
Arispe was
notified, and she immediately contacted the police, who then confiscated the
photographs. Shortly after the second incident, Rode instructed Frank to review
Walgreens‟ photo content policy with his store‟s employees. Arispe expressed
disagreement with the policy and refused to sign it as requested.
On September 29, 2005, Rode met with Arispe. He asked Arispe to sign
the photo content policy, which she again refused to do. She stated Rode told
her “that if I did not sign this statement, that I would be terminated.” Rode‟s
written notes regarding the meeting indicated he advised her “that she was
expected to abide by the company‟s policies as a condition of her employment.”
Rode also questioned Arispe about money Walgreens had given her in March
2005 to renew her pharmacy technician registration. He had discovered before
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the meeting that her registration had not been renewed.
After the meeting
ended, Arispe was informed that she was being fired for misappropriating
company funds.
Arispe sued Walgreens, Frank, and Rode for wrongful discharge, alleging
she was terminated from her employment at Walgreens for reporting suspected
child pornography to the police and for refusing to refrain from doing so in the
future in violation of public policy. The defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment, which the district court granted. The court found that Arispe had not
established the existence of a well recognized and clearly defined public policy
protecting her conduct that was jeopardized by her dismissal. The court further
found she had not established a causal connection between her alleged
protected conduct and discharge.
Arispe appeals. She claims Iowa Code chapter 232 and section 728.14
articulate well recognized and clearly defined public policies protecting her
activity in this case.
She additionally claims those public policies were
undermined by her discharge. Finally, she claims there are genuine issues of
material fact as to whether her conduct in reporting the photographs and refusing
to refrain from doing so in the future was causally connected to her discharge.
II.
Scope and Standards of Review.
We review the district court‟s summary judgment rulings for the correction
of errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4; Fitzgerald v. Salsbury Chem., Inc., 613
N.W.2d 275, 280 (Iowa 2000).
Summary judgment is appropriate when the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and
affidavits show there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is
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entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3); Walderbach
v. Archdiocese of Dubuque, Inc., 730 N.W.2d 198, 199 (Iowa 2007). We review
the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Lloyd v.
Drake Univ., 686 N.W.2d 225, 228 (Iowa 2004).
A fact question arises if
reasonable minds can differ on how the issue should be resolved. Walderbach,
730 N.W.2d at 199. No fact question arises if the only conflict concerns legal
consequences flowing from undisputed facts. McNertney v. Kahler, 710 N.W.2d
209, 210 (Iowa 2006).
III.
Discussion.
The parties agree that Arispe was an employee-at-will. Therefore, she
could be fired “for any lawful reason or for no reason at all.” Lloyd, 686 N.W.2d
at 228. However, a discharge is not lawful when it violates public policy. Id.
When a protected activity has been recognized through the implementation of an
underlying public policy that would be undermined if an employee were
discharged from employment for engaging in that activity, an action for the tort of
wrongful discharge exists. Davis v. Horton, 661 N.W.2d 533, 535 (Iowa 2003).
An employee asserting a wrongful-discharge claim based on a violation of public
policy must establish:
(1)
The existence of a clearly defined public policy that protects
an activity.
(2)
This policy would be undermined by a discharge from
employment.
(3)
The challenged discharge was the result of participating in
the protected activity.
(4)
There was lack of other justification for the termination.
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Id.; see also Lloyd, 686 N.W.2d at 228.2 To withstand summary judgment, a
plaintiff must not only satisfy the court on the public policy and jeopardy
elements, but also offer adequate evidence from which a lack of justification for
termination can be inferred. Fitzgerald, 613 N.W.2d at 282.
A.
Iowa Code section 728.14.
Arispe initially claims Iowa Code section 728.14 articulates a clearly
defined public policy in favor of reporting child pornography. She argues the
“affirmative duties imposed on citizens [by that statute]—coupled with significant
criminal penalties for non-compliance—reflect a clearly-articulated and welldefined public policy of preventing, reporting, and punishing child pornography.”
We conclude otherwise.
“Whether a public policy against discharge exists is a question of law
appropriately decided on a motion for summary judgment.” Lloyd, 686 N.W.2d at
228.
In determining the existence of a public policy, we must “proceed
cautiously” and “only extend such recognition to those policies that are well
recognized and clearly defined.”
2
Davis, 661 N.W.2d at 536.
Our supreme
Arispe urges our court to “clarify the analytical framework for wrongful discharge
cases.” She asserts that the correct framework to be applied is articulated in Teachout
v. Forest City Community School District, 584 N.W.2d 296, 299 (Iowa 1998), in which
our supreme court identified the following three elements of a wrongful-discharge claim:
“(1) engagement in a protected activity; (2) adverse employment action; and (3) a causal
connection between the two.” However, the court in Fitzgerald expounded on this threeelement approach and identified the four elements detailed above as a “helpful guide . . .
parallel[ing] the approach we have followed in addressing the tort on a case-by-case
method.” 613 N.W.2d at 282 n.2. Contrary to Arispe‟s assertions, the court did not
merely reference these four elements in Fitzgerald; it actually applied them to the facts
of that case. See id. at 284, 287, 289 (analyzing the jeopardy and absence-ofjustification elements). Furthermore, our supreme court specifically adopted the fourelement framework in Davis, 661 N.W.2d at 535, and Lloyd, 686 N.W.2d at 228. We
thus find no need for clarification is needed, especially in light of the court‟s recognition
in Fitzgerald that the four-element approach is harmonious with our courts‟ treatment of
the tort in prior cases.
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court‟s insistence on using only clear and well recognized public policies to serve
as a basis for wrongful discharge actions “emphasizes our continuing general
adherence to the at-will employment doctrine and the need to carefully balance
the competing interests of the employee, employer, and society.” Fitzgerald, 613
N.W.2d at 283.
Only such policies are weighty enough to overcome the
employer‟s interest in operating its business in the manner it sees fit, which our
courts have long and vigorously protected. Lloyd, 686 N.W.2d at 229. We are
thus reluctant to search too far beyond our legislative pronouncements and
constitution “in order to find public policy to support an action.” Fitzgerald, 613
N.W.2d at 283 (stating our courts have primarily looked only to our statutes and
state constitution as sources of public policy).
Some statutes articulate public policy by specifically prohibiting employers
from discharging employees engaging in certain conduct or other circumstances,
while others define a clear public policy and imply a prohibition against
termination from employment to avoid undermining that policy.
Id.; see also
Borschel v. City of Perry, 512 N.W.2d 565, 567-68 (Iowa 1994). Chapter 232, for
example, both defines a clear public policy and prohibits an employer from
interfering with an employee that is engaging in conduct furthering that policy.
See Iowa Code §§ 232.67; .70; see also Teachout, 584 N.W.2d at 300-01
(recognizing chapter 232 articulates a clearly defined public policy in favor of
reporting suspected child abuse).
neither.
Pursuant to section 728.14(1),
Section 728.14, on the other hand, does
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[a] commercial film and photographic print processor who has
knowledge of or observes, within the scope of the processor‟s
professional capacity or employment, a . . . photograph . . . which
depicts a minor whom the processor knows or reasonably should
know to be under the age of eighteen, engaged in a prohibited
sexual act or in the simulation of a prohibited sexual act, shall
report the depiction to the county attorney immediately or as soon
as possible . . . .
There is no statement in that section, or elsewhere in chapter 728, expressing a
clear public policy in favor of reporting suspected child pornography. Cf. Iowa
Code § 96.2; Lara v. Thomas, 512 N.W.2d 777, 782 (Iowa 1994) (determining
section 96.2 defines a clear and well recognized public policy in favor of
permitting employees to seek unemployment benefits). Nor is there any specific
or implied prohibition in section 728.14 against terminating employees who report
depictions of child pornography. Cf. Iowa Code § 85.18; Springer v. Weeks &
Leo Co., 429 N.W.2d 558, 560-61 (Iowa 1988) (finding the protection afforded to
employees in section 85.18 expresses a clearly defined public policy in favor of
permitting employees to seek workers‟ compensation benefits).
Indeed, as Walgreens notes, section 728.14(1) provides that a processor
shall not report photographs in certain instances. See Iowa Code § 728.14(1)
(stating a processor shall not report depictions involving “mere nudity” of a
minor). That section further provides that a processor is not required to review all
photographs delivered to the processor in the course of his or her employment to
search for prohibited depictions of minors. Id. Moreover, unlike chapter 232,
section 728.14 contains no language encouraging reporting by individuals other
than commercial film and photographic print processors.
Cf. Iowa Code
§ 232.69(2) (“Any other person who believes that a child has been abused may
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make a report . . . .”). It also does not provide any civil or criminal immunity for
good faith reports, which is a feature of chapter 232 that the court in Teachout,
584 N.W.2d at 300-01, found significant in determining the existence of a well
recognized and defined public policy. See Iowa Code § 232.73.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude section 728.14 does not articulate
a well recognized and clearly defined public policy in favor of reporting suspected
child pornography, as laudable and socially desirable as that activity may be.
See Harvey v. Care Initiatives, Inc., 634 N.W.2d 681, 686 (Iowa 2001) (stating
we must avoid declaring public policy with generalized concepts of fairness and
justice). We must next determine whether, as Arispe alternatively claims, the
clearly defined public policy expressed in chapter 232 and recognized in
Teachout applies to protect her conduct in this case.
B.
Iowa Code chapter 232.
As we intimated in the preceding discussion, our supreme court in
Teachout determined chapter 232 articulates a well recognized and clearly
defined public policy of Iowa mandating protection for an employee who in good
faith makes a report of suspected child abuse. 584 N.W.2d at 300-01. The
district court in this case determined that public policy did not apply to protect
Arispe‟s conduct because she did not engage in conduct covered by the policy.
We agree.
“Once a clear public policy is identified, the employee must further show
the dismissal for engaging in the conduct jeopardizes or undermines the public
policy.” Fitzgerald, 613 N.W.2d at 283-84. This element, which is capable of
resolution on summary judgment, requires the employee to show the conduct
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engaged in not only furthered the public policy, but dismissal would have a
chilling effect on the public policy by discouraging the conduct. Id. at 282, 284.
The conduct of the employee must be tied to the public policy, so that the
dismissal will undermine that policy. Id. Thus, an “essential element of proof to
establish the discharge undermines or jeopardizes the public policy necessarily
involves a showing the dismissed employee engaged in conduct covered by the
public policy.”
Id. at 287.
This element ensures an employer‟s personnel
management decisions will not be challenged unless the public policy is
genuinely threatened. Id. at 283-84 (emphasizing the need to carefully balance
the competing interests of the employee, employer, and society).
We do not believe Arispe‟s reports of suspected child pornography and
refusal to sign Walgreens‟ photo content policy is conduct covered by the public
policy in chapter 232 in favor of reporting suspected cases of child abuse.
According to Arispe, the photographs that she reported to the police on two
separate occasions depicted a young girl between the ages of ten and twelve
posing by herself in various states of undress.
When Arispe reported these
photographs to the police, she did not express her concern with the photographs
as one of child abuse; instead, she repeatedly stated she was troubled by the
photographs because she believed they depicted a “young girl engaged in a sex
act.”
The police investigated the incident based on their belief that the
photographs constituted child pornography and violated Iowa Code section
728.12, which prohibits the sexual exploitation of a minor. Neither Arispe nor the
police made a report of suspected child abuse to the Iowa Department of Human
Services pursuant to chapter 232.
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We reject Arispe‟s assertion that “since sexual exploitation of a minor
constitutes „child abuse‟ under Iowa law, an employee engages in protected
conduct by reporting, or intending to report, sexual exploitation of a minor.”
Section 728.12(1) prohibits any individual from engaging in the sexual
exploitation of a minor by causing the minor to engage in a prohibited sexual act
intending the act to be photographed, filmed, or otherwise preserved. Section
232.68(2)(c), on the other hand, provides that the sexual exploitation of a minor
as defined in section 728.12(1) constitutes child abuse only when the exploitation
occurs “as a result of the acts or omissions of the person responsible for the care
of the child.” There is no indication from the record presented here that the
woman who brought the photographs into Walgreens to be developed was the
caretaker of the young girl depicted in them.
As the district court noted, the child abuse reporting provisions of chapter
232 are “aimed at the detection of child abuse in various forms suffered by a
child as a result of the acts or omissions of a person responsible for the care of
that child.” To that end, section 232.67 provides that
[i]t is the purpose and policy of [this statute] to provide the greatest
possible protection to victims or potential victims of abuse through
encouraging the increased reporting of suspected cases of abuse,
ensuring the thorough and prompt assessment of these reports,
and providing rehabilitative services, where appropriate and
whenever possible to abused children and their families which will
stabilize the home environment so that the family can remain intact
without further danger to the child.
(Emphasis added.) See also Iowa Code § 232.68(2) (defining child abuse in all
its forms to require acts or omissions by “a person responsible for the care of the
child”). At no time before her dismissal from Walgreens did Arispe allege or
13
express a concern that the young girl in the photographs was being sexually
exploited or abused by a caretaker.
Instead, her conduct in reporting the
photographs to the police and refusal to abide by Walgreens‟ photo content
policy related solely to her concern that the photographs constituted child
pornography.
We therefore reject Arispe‟s claim that she was engaging in
conduct protected by the public policy set forth in chapter 232. Based on our
holding in this regard, we need not and do not address her final claim that the
district court erred in determining her conduct was not causally connected to her
discharge.
IV.
Conclusion.
We conclude section 728.14 does not articulate a well recognized and
clearly defined public policy in favor of reporting suspected child pornography.
We further conclude the public policy expressed in chapter 232 encouraging the
reporting of suspected child abuse was not undermined by Arispe‟s dismissal.
The judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of the
defendants is accordingly affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
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