MARCY ANN SMITH , Plaintiff - Appell ant , vs. STATE OF IOWA, KEVIN W. CONCANNON, in his official capacity only as the Director of the Iowa Department of Human Services, and MO L LIE ANDERSON, in her official capacity only as the Director of the Iowa Department of Administrative Services, Defendant s - Appell ees .
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-460 / 07-1689
Filed October 29, 2008
MARCY ANN SMITH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA, KEVIN W. CONCANNON,
in his official capacity only as the
Director of the Iowa Department of
Human Services, and MOLLIE ANDERSON,
in her official capacity only as the
Director of the Iowa Department of
Administrative Services,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Carla T. Schemmel,
Judge.
Marcy Smith appeals from the district court’s granting of the State’s motion
to dismiss. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.
J. Campbell Helton of Whitfield & Eddy, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Barbara Galloway, Human
Services Division, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and Potterfield, JJ.
2
POTTERFIELD, J.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Plaintiff Marcy Ann Smith was hired in 1996 as a state employee within
the HIPP unit of the Department of Human Services. She always met her work
requirements and received favorable reviews from her supervisor. Smith suffers
from clinical depression, and sometimes took leave for self-care in accordance
with the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). Smith’s supervisors cooperated
with her and allowed her to take medical leaves of absence as directed by her
physician.
Mollie Anderson and Kevin Concannon are supervisors in the Iowa
Department of Human Services (DHS) and have authority over Smith’s position.1
In August of 2005, Smith’s physician provided written notice to DHS that she
would remain off work under the FMLA until September 7, 2005. Near the end of
that period, Smith experienced a family crisis that exacerbated her mental health
condition. She was excused from work by her physician on September 8, 2005.
However, Smith went to her workplace that day and submitted a handwritten
letter of resignation to her supervisor. Smith’s supervisor was concerned by
Smith’s apparent emotional state and took steps to ensure Smith’s safety. DHS
nevertheless accepted her resignation that very day.
Later that week and again in October, Smith requested that her
resignation be withdrawn and that she be reinstated. Her employer responded
that Smith was not eligible to return to her job, but that she could request to be
1
Uses of “State” and “DHS” in this opinion refer to defendants.
3
considered for other positions.
Her subsequent applications for employment
have been declined.2
Smith filed a petition alleging that the acceptance of her resignation and
refusal to reinstate her constitute: (1) interference with FMLA rights, (2) retaliation
for exercising FMLA rights, (3) disability discrimination under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), (4) disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, and (5) disability discrimination under the Iowa Civil Rights Act of 1965.
The district court granted the State’s pre-answer motion to dismiss all claims,
finding Smith failed to state any claim for which relief could be granted. Smith
appeals arguing that the district court erred in granting the motion to dismiss.
II. Standard of Review
We review a ruling on a motion to dismiss for correction of errors at law.
Iowa R. App. P. 6.4; Southard v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., 734 N.W.2d 192, 194 (Iowa
2007).
A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the
challenged pleading. Thus, the motion must stand or fall on the
contents of the petition and matters of which the court can take
judicial notice. Well-pled facts in the pleading assailed are deemed
admitted. In addition, the petition is assessed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiffs, and all doubts and ambiguities are
resolved in the plaintiffs’ favor.
If the viability of a claim is at all debatable, courts should not
sustain a motion to dismiss.
Southard, 734 N.W.2d at 194 (citations omitted). “A motion to dismiss a petition
should only be granted if there is no state of facts conceivable under which a
2
Smith does not base any claims on the subsequent refusals to hire, apparently
conceding that she failed to exhaust administrative remedies as to any claims related to
those actions.
4
plaintiff might show a right of recovery.” Kingsway Cathedral v. Iowa Dep’t of
Transp., 711 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Iowa 2006).
III. Family Medical Leave Act
Smith first contends that the district court erred in granting the State’s
motion to dismiss her FMLA claims. The FMLA allows employees to miss a total
of twelve work weeks within a twelve-month period and provides job security for
employees who must miss work because of a serious health condition.
29
U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). The FMLA prohibits an employer from interfering with an
employee’s rights to take medical leave and also prohibits an employer from
retaliating against an employee for exercising rights given by the FMLA. 3 29
U.S.C. §§ 2615(a)(1), (2).
A. Interference
An employer is prohibited from interfering with, restraining, or denying an
employee’s exercise of or attempted exercise of any right provided by the FMLA.
29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1).
[E]very discharge of an employee while [he] is taking FMLA leave
interferes with an employee’s FMLA rights. However, the mere fact
of discharge during FMLA leave by no means demands an
employer be held strictly liable for violating the FMLA’s prohibition
of interfering with an employee’s FMLA rights. Thus, where an
employer’s reason for dismissal is insufficiently related to FMLA
leave, the reason will not support the employee’s recovery.
Stallings v. Hussmann Corp., 447 F.3d 1041, 1050-51 (8th Cir. 2006) (citations
omitted). Thus, in order to prevail on a theory of interference, Smith’s petition
3
The State claims on appeal that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the
State has not consented to suit under the self-care provisions of the FMLA, and
therefore Smith’s claims are barred by sovereign immunity. The State failed to raise the
issue in the district court.
5
must allege facts that could result in a finding that the State interfered with her
FMLA rights by accepting her resignation and/or not reinstating her for a reason
related to FMLA leave.
Presuming all of the facts in Smith’s petition as true, no allegation
indicates that the acceptance of Smith’s resignation was related to FMLA leave
or that Smith was denied FMLA rights, except for the coincidence of timing. DHS
previously had granted all of the FMLA leave requested by Smith, establishing a
history of tolerance of FMLA rights. Smith’s loss of her job directly resulted from
her resignation. Smith’s petition alleges that she was incapable of voluntarily
terminating her employment because she was unable to form an intent to resign.
However, those allegations do not implicate any right under the FMLA.
Therefore, Smith’s petition does not state any facts that could lead to a finding
that her employer interfered with any rights granted by the FMLA.
Considering all of the facts alleged in the amended petition in the light
most favorable to Smith, we find, as did the district court, that the State’s
acceptance of her resignation was motivated by her letter of resignation, not by
Smith’s use of FMLA leave. The State’s acceptance of her resignation, even a
quick acceptance, is not an adverse employment action. See Curby v. Solutia,
Inc., 351 F.3d 868, 872 (8th Cir. 2003). Smith has failed to allege facts that
conceivably could result in a finding that her employer’s acceptance of her
resignation constituted an adverse employment action or interfered with her
rights under the FMLA.
6
B. Retaliation
The FMLA also prohibits an employer from retaliating against an
employee for exercising rights given under the FMLA. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2). A
claim of retaliation requires proof of retaliatory intent.
Stallings, 447 F.3d at
1051. In order for Smith to present a prima facie case of retaliation under the
FMLA, she must present evidence that: (1) she exercised rights protected under
the FMLA, (2) she was qualified for her position, (3) she suffered an adverse
employment action, and (4) the adverse employment action occurred under
circumstances giving rise to an inference of retaliatory intent. Hamilton v. Sirius
Satellite Radio Inc., 375 F. Supp. 2d 269, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
The State’s refusal to reinstate Smith occurred in a context raising an
inference of retaliatory intent based on the factual allegations of the petition.
Smith alleges she had performed her job duties well until her resignation, she
had just completed a period of FMLA leave, and she was beginning another
stretch of leave. The petition sufficiently states her claim of retaliation, whether it
is evaluated as a prima facie case, using the burden-shifting framework of
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 1824, 36
L. Ed. 2d 668, 678 (1973), or as circumstantial evidence of retaliatory intent
under Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 123 S. Ct. 2148, 156 L. Ed. 2d 84
(2003).
The State has not yet had an opportunity to show a non-discriminatory
explanation.
7
IV. Americans with Disabilities Act
Smith also contends that her dismissal was a violation of the ADA. The
ADA prohibits discrimination against an individual with a disability because of the
disability in the hiring or discharge of employees.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
Discrimination is defined to include “not making reasonable accommodations to
the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with
a disability who is an applicant or employee.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). In
order to establish a prima facie case under the ADA, Smith must show: (1) she is
a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA, (2) she is qualified to perform
the essential functions of the job, with or without a reasonable accommodation,
and (3) she suffered an adverse employment decision because of her disability.
Christensen v. Titan Distribution, Inc., 481 F.3d 1085, 1093 (8th Cir. 2007).
Failure to make a reasonable accommodation is considered to be an adverse
employment action. Casey’s Gen. Stores, Inc. v. Blackford, 661 N.W.2d 515,
521 (Iowa 2003).
The ADA defines “reasonable accommodation” to include:
(a) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible
to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and
(b) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules,
reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of
equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modification of
examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of
qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations
for individuals with disabilities.
42
U.S.C.
§
12111(9).
Looking
to
subsection
(b),
the
applicable
accommodations for Smith’s mental disability might be job restructuring, parttime or modified work schedules, or reassignment to a vacant position.
42
8
U.S.C. § 12111(9)(b).
Reassignment contemplates something similar to a
change of jobs or positions, but something less than a change in the employment
relationship, such as reinstatement.
Smith argues that her employer failed
to
make a
reasonable
accommodation both when she resigned and when she requested reinstatement
a few days later and the following month. In a factually similar case, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found that reinstatement is
not a reasonable accommodation under the ADA.4 Wooten v. Acme Steel Co.,
986 F. Supp. 524, 528 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
In Wooten, the plaintiff asked his
employer for a one-time reinstatement after he submitted a resignation which he
claimed was caused by his uncontrollable manic depressive condition. Id. The
employer’s reason for refusal of reinstatement in Wooten was based on a labor
agreement between the employer and employee’s union that prohibited
reinstating employees who resigned. The district court in the present case ruled,
in reliance on the decision in Wooten, that a request for reinstatement by
definition is not a request for accommodation.
The court found that
reinstatement is a change in employment status, not a change in working
conditions. The district court also ruled that reasonable accommodations are not
owed to a former employee.
However, whether or not she was a former
employee, Smith was an “applicant” for reinstatement and so within the scope of
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
4
The decision of the federal district court from another circuit is not binding on this court;
however, the opinion can be used as persuasive authority on the issue.
9
Smith argues that her employer failed to initiate an informal, interactive
process in order to determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation as
required by the Code of Federal Regulations to implement the ADA. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(o)(3). To show that her employer failed to participate in this interactive
process, Smith must show: (1) her employer knew about her disability, (2) she
requested accommodations or assistance for her disability, (3) her employer did
not make a good faith effort to assist in seeking accommodations, and (4) she
could have been reasonably accommodated but for her employer’s lack of good
faith. Ballard v. Rubin, 284 F.3d 957, 960 (8th Cir. 2002). The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals has held that for the purposes of summary judgment “the failure
of an employer to engage in an interactive process to determine whether
reasonable accommodations are possible is prima facie evidence that the
employer may be acting in bad faith.” Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc.,
188 F.3d 944, 951-52 (8th Cir. 1999).
Taking Smith’s amended petition as true and considering the facts in the
light most favorable to Smith, it appears that her claim is that the State should
have initiated an interactive process at the time she resigned and on the two
occasions, a few days later and a month later, when she requested
reinstatement. The amended petition states that the employer’s response to the
requests for reinstatement was contained in a letter dated October 19, 2005,
telling her that she was not eligible for reinstatement and that she would have to
request consideration for an open position. This letter is not in the record before
us, nor is the content of Smith’s verbal or written requests. We are required to
give Smith the benefit of any doubt that arises from this lack of information.
10
The requirement of the initiation of an interactive process applies to a
request for “assistance or accommodation”. Ballard, 284 F.3d at 960. Although
the amended petition does not reflect an explicit request for accommodation by
Smith, the absence of such language in her requests for reinstatement is not
“fatal” to her claim. Walsted v. Woodbury County, IA, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1318,
1335 (N.D. Iowa, 2000). This is particularly true when the employee suffers from
a mental illness. Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Schs., 100 F.3d 1281, 1285
(7th Cir. 1996). In Bultemeyer, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that:
[P]roperly participating in the interactive process means that an
employer cannot expect an employee to read its mind and know
that he or she must specifically say “I want a reasonable
accommodation,” particularly when the employee has a mental
illness. The employer has to meet the employee half-way, and if it
appears that the employee may need an accommodation but
doesn’t know how to ask for it, the employer should do what it can
to help.
Bultemeyer, 100 F.3d at 1285.
It is possible that, once discovery has been completed, no issue of fact will
exist that would entitle Smith to go forward with her claims under the ADA.
However, our standard of review at this pre-answer stage of the proceedings
requires us to conclude from the amended petition that there is no factual
scenario that could result in a verdict favorable to Plaintiff. That standard has not
been met here.
V. Rehabilitation Act of 1973
Smith also argues the district court erroneously dismissed her claim under
the Rehabilitation Act. To establish a claim under the Rehabilitation Act, Smith
must demonstrate: (1) she is a qualified individual with a disability, (2) she was
11
denied the benefits of a program or activity of a public entity which receives
federal funds, and (3) she was discriminated against based on her disability.
Wojewski v. Rapid City Reg’l Hosp., Inc., 450 F.3d 338, 344 (8th Cir. 2006).
Because the ADA and Rehabilitation Act use the same basic standards and
definitions, “cases interpreting the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act are
interchangeable.”
Ballard, 284 F.3d at 960 n.3.
Thus, this claim can be
analyzed in the same manner as the claim under the ADA above.
VI. Conclusion
Though Smith failed to cite authority or argue in favor of her claim on
appeal that her employer’s action constituted a violation of her rights under the
Iowa Civil Rights Act, we have considered all of the arguments presented. We
find that the district court correctly dismissed Smith’s interference claim under
the FMLA and the Iowa Civil Rights Act of 1965, and erred in dismissing Smith’s
claim of FMLA retaliation and her claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.
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