IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF JOAN DIANE SADLER AND GEORGE SADLER Upon the Petition of JOAN DIANE SADLER, Petitioner - Appellee, And Concerning GEORGE P . SADLER, Respondent - Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-433 / 07-1228
Filed June 25, 2008
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF JOAN DIANE SADLER AND GEORGE SADLER
Upon the Petition of
JOAN DIANE SADLER,
Petitioner-Appellee,
And Concerning
GEORGE P. SADLER,
Respondent-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, George L.
Stigler, Judge.
Respondent appeals the court‟s denial of his motion to set aside a default
order and vacate the judgment finding him in contempt of court contending there
was good cause to set aside the default given he did not receive notice of the
contempt hearing. AFFIRMED.
Christy R. Liss of Clark, Butler, Walsh & Hamann Law Firm, Waterloo, for
appellant.
Linda A. Hall of Gallagher, Langlas & Gallagher, P.C., Waterloo, for
appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Huitink and Mahan, JJ.
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SACKETT, C.J.
George P. Sadler and Joan Diane Sadler each sought to have the other
found in contempt of court for violating provisions of their May 2004 dissolution
decree. When George did not appear at the hearing, the district court found him
in default and in contempt in Joan‟s action and dismissed his action against
Joan. George contends here that the district court erred in refusing to set aside
the default and vacate the judgment. We affirm.
BACKGROUND.
George filed an application and affidavit seeking to
have Joan found in contempt on September 30, 2005. A rule to show cause
hearing was set for October 19, 2005.
Several continuances were granted
before the matter was set for June 28, 2006. On March 17, 2006, Joan filed an
application seeking to have George found in contempt and a rule to show cause
hearing was set for June 28, 2006.
There followed a number of additional
continuances. Finally a trial scheduling conference was set for February 1, 2007.
George participated in the conference and testified at the hearing on the motion
to set aside the default that he believed during the scheduling conference the
matter was set for April 13, 2007. A notice dated February 2, 2007 stated trial
was scheduled for April 3, 2007.
George testified at the hearing he did not
receive the notice though the clerk‟s records noted it was mailed to him.
The hearing was held on April 3, 2007. The district court found George
failed to appear either in person or by counsel and his action was dismissed for
failure to litigate. The court found three of the five allegations of contempt made
by Joan had been settled and she failed to prove a fourth. The court found
George in contempt for failing to pay $1750 for the post-secondary education
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expense ordered in the decree and determined he had the ability to pay that
amount. The court also entered judgment in favor of Joan in the amount of
$3796.19 for her attorney fees.
George filed a motion to set aside the default and vacate the judgment on
May 23, 2007. The district court, in ruling on the motion, found there was no
good cause to warrant setting aside the default. The court said it was reluctant to
accept George‟s testimony he failed to receive the February 2, 2007, scheduling
order in that he had received all other orders and that his action in not
participating in the hearing on April 3, 2007, was intentional and not an error of
the Court Administrator‟s Office. George filed an Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure
1.904(2) motion which was denied by the district court on a finding that George‟s
failure to appear was intentional.
SCOPE OF REVIEW. We look to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.977
which provides:
On motion and for good cause shown, and upon such terms
as the court prescribes, but not ex parte, the court may set aside a
default or the judgment thereon, for mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, excusable neglect or unavoidable casualty. Such motion
must be filed promptly after the discovery of the grounds thereof,
but not more than 60 days after entry of the judgment. Its filing
shall not affect the finality of the judgment or impair its operation.
The district court is vested with “„broad discretion in ruling on a motion to
set aside a default.‟” Brandenburg v. Feterl Mfg. Co., 603 N.W.2d 580, 584 (Iowa
1999) (quoting Central Nat’l Ins. Co. of Omaha v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 513
N.W.2d 750, 753 (Iowa 1994)).
We reverse such a ruling only if this discretion is abused.
Generally, we find such an abuse only when there is a lack of
substantial evidence to support the district court‟s ruling. We are
bound by the district court‟s findings of fact if supported by
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substantial evidence, and we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the district court‟s ruling.
Id.
Given our scope of review we affirm the district court.
AFFIRMED.
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