ALLISA DOCK, Plaintiff - Appellant, vs. PATRICK NICOLETTO, Defendant - Appellee . and John Nicoletto, Defendant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-429 / 07-1190
Filed June 25, 2008
ALLISA DOCK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
PATRICK NICOLETTO,
Defendant-Appellee.
and
John Nicoletto,
Defendant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert B. Hanson,
Judge.
Plaintiff appeals from a district court ruling denying her motion for new trial
and alternative motion for additur following a jury verdict and judgment entry in
her personal injury action. AFFIRMED.
Scott L. Bandstra, Des Moines, for appellant.
Scott Wormsley of Bradshaw, Fowler, Proctor & Fairgrave, P.C., Des
Moines, for appellee.
Considered by Miller, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and Eisenhauer, JJ.
2
MILLER, J.
Allisa Dock appeals from a district court ruling denying her motion for new trial
and alternative motion for additur following a jury verdict and judgment entry in
her personal injury action against Patrick Nicoletto. We affirm the judgment of
the district court.
I.
BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS.
On March 15, 2004, Dock’s vehicle was rear-ended by a vehicle driven by
Nicoletto at an intersection in Des Moines, Iowa.
Nicoletto’s vehicle was
traveling at about five to ten miles per hour when it struck Dock’s vehicle. The
collision broke the left tail light of Dock’s vehicle and left a small dent in the trunk.
The only damage to Nicoletto’s vehicle was a cracked license plate.
Dock was taken to the emergency room complaining of pain in her neck
and lower left back. She was treated and released that day after diagnostic
studies failed to reveal any damage to her neck or back. Four days later, Dock
sought further medical treatment from her family physician, Dr. Kevin Moore, who
had been treating her for chronic neck and back pain since 1998. He directed
her to refill her previously prescribed medications and to follow-up with him as
needed.
Dock filed a personal injury lawsuit against Nicoletto1 on March 7, 2006,
alleging Nicoletto’s negligence caused the accident and her resulting neck and
back injuries. She sought damages for past and future medical expenses, loss of
earnings and earning capacity, and pain and suffering. Nicoletto admitted he
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Dock also named Nicoletto’s father, John Nicoletto, as a defendant, claiming he owned
the vehicle Nicoletto was driving the day of the accident. She later dismissed John
Nicoletto from the lawsuit.
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was negligent, but denied his negligence was the proximate cause of damages
claimed by Dock.
The case proceeded to trial. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Dock
and awarded her $1840.27 in past medical expenses. Dock filed a motion for
new trial and alternative motion for additur, arguing the damages awarded by the
jury were inadequate, not sustained by sufficient evidence, and contrary to law.
The district court denied the motions.
Dock appeals, claiming the district court abused its discretion in denying
her motion for new trial and alternative motion for additur.
II.
SCOPE AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW.
The district court may grant an aggrieved party a new trial when the jury
awards excessive or inadequate damages, or when the verdict is not sustained
by sufficient evidence, or is contrary to law. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1004(4), (6). The
court has considerable discretion in ruling upon a motion for new trial based upon
the ground that the verdict was inadequate. Fisher v. Davis, 601 N.W.2d 54, 57
(Iowa 1999). Whether damages are so inadequate as to warrant a new trial is for
the district court to decide, and we will ordinarily not disturb its discretion to grant
or deny the motion unless an abuse of discretion is shown. Id.
III.
MERITS.
Dock claims the jury’s verdict awarding $1840.27 for past medical
expenses was inadequate, not sustained by sufficient evidence, and contrary to
law, because the jury did not award her the full amount of her past medical
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expenses2 and it did not award her anything for pain and suffering. In support of
her argument, Dock cites a number of cases in which our supreme court
determined new trials were warranted where the jury awarded the plaintiff
medical expenses but little or no damages for pain and suffering. See, e.g.,
Cowan v. Flannery, 461 N.W.2d 155, 160 (Iowa 1990) (finding jury’s award of
past and future medical expenses with no corresponding award for pain and
suffering resulted in an inconsistent verdict unsupported by the evidence);
Shewry v. Heuer, 255 Iowa 147, 152, 121 N.W.2d 529, 532 (1963) (granting
plaintiff new trial where jury awarded him the total “cost of medical services made
necessary by his pain and suffering and yet allow[ed] him nothing for the pain
and suffering”). We do not believe these cases control the outcome here given
the facts of this case.
In Cowan, our supreme court recognized it has “not adopted an inflexible
rule that every verdict awarding only damages for medical expenses in a
personal injury action is inadequate as a matter of law.” 461 N.W.2d at 159.
Instead, “[w]hether damages in a given case are adequate depends on the
particular facts of the case.” Fisher, 601 N.W.2d at 57; see also Moore v. Bailey,
163 N.W.2d 435, 436 (Iowa 1968) (“[P]recedents in this field are of little value.
Each case must be decided by . . . its own unique circumstances. . . .”). In this
case, although Nicoletto admitted liability, the cause, nature, and extent of Dock’s
alleged injuries from the accident were disputed.
2
Dock asserted she had incurred $13,000 in past medical expenses at the time of trial.
Although she claims on appeal that Nicoletto stipulated to that amount of past medical
expenses, our review of the record reveals he simply stipulated to the admission of an
exhibit detailing her past medical expenses.
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The jury should ordinarily be allowed to settle disputed fact questions.
Cowan, 461 N.W.2d at 157. Thus, “[a] verdict should not be set aside as either
too large or too small simply because the reviewing court would have reached a
different conclusion.”
Id. at 158.
Though the evidence may justify a higher
award, the determinative question is “whether under the record, giving the jury its
right to accept or reject whatever portions of the conflicting evidence it chose, the
verdict effects substantial justice between the parties.” Id. We conclude the
district court could reasonably decide that the jury’s verdict in this case fairly and
reasonably compensates Dock for any injuries she sustained as a result of her
relatively minor automobile accident with Nicoletto. See Fisher, 601 N.W.2d at
57 (“The test is whether the verdict fairly and reasonably compensates the party
for the injury sustained.”).
Dock’s symptoms following the accident mimicked the medical problems
she experienced prior to that time. Her medical records reveal that she has
suffered from chronic neck and back pain since 1998. She was also diagnosed
with fibromyalgia and chronic pain syndrome several years before the accident.
These conditions caused her substantial pain and affected her ability to work and
engage in routine daily activities prior to the accident at issue in this case.
Dr. Moore, who treated Dock for these conditions from their onset,
acknowledged at trial that Dock was having difficulty working before the accident.
Yet, he opined that the March 2004 accident caused a permanent exacerbation
of her pre-existing lower back pain and rendered her unable to work. Nicoletto’s
expert witness, on the other hand, testified that the MRIs performed on Dock
after the accident were normal and “healthy. By that I mean there is no evidence
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of a fracture, no damage to the disk. So that points away from . . . a neurological
deficit” or injury. He further testified it would “be very hard to say she sustained
an injury to the soft tissues” as a result of the accident.
Dock, however, testified that her pain following the accident was different
and worse than the pain she experienced before the accident. She attempted to
deny that she suffered from back pain before the accident even when confronted
with her medical records and deposition testimony to the contrary, which casts
doubt as to her overall credibility. See Kaiser v. Stathas, 263 N.W.2d 522, 526
(Iowa 1978) (stating the jury is not required to accept and give effect to testimony
which it finds to be unreliable). In addition, although a vocational rehabilitation
expert testified that “[a]s a result of [the] accident, she can no longer work for the
rest of her life,” Dock admitted she was able to continue to work for two years
after the accident.
In light of the foregoing, we do not believe it was illogical for the jury to
award Dock some of her past medical expenses but nothing for pain and
suffering. Unlike a case such as Shewry, 255 Iowa at 152, 121 N.W.2d at 532,
where the evidence material to the damage award was undisputed and the jury
awarded the plaintiff all of his past medical expenses, the jury here was
confronted with conflicting evidence regarding whether the accident exacerbated
Dock’s pre-existing neck and back pain and “was required to choose which was
correct.” Moore, 163 N.W.2d at 437. It is quite possible the jury concluded the
only damages Dock suffered as a result of Nicoletto’s negligence were the
medical expenses she incurred to determine whether she was injured in the
accident. See, e,g., Valinzo v. Cem-Kam, Inc., 698 So. 2d 359, 360 (Fla. Dist.
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Ct. App. 1997) (concluding jury verdict awarding plaintiff a small fraction of her
medical expenses but no damages for pain and suffering was not inadequate
because the jury could have concluded she was only entitled to reimbursement
for diagnostic testing).
We additionally note there is no indication in the record, aside from Dock’s
contention that the award was inadequate, that the jury’s verdict was influenced
by passion or prejudice. Waddell v. Peet’s Feeds, Inc., 266 N.W.2d 29, 32 (Iowa
1978). Nor does Dock allege any error in the jury instructions or any misconduct
on the part of the jury. Id.
We therefore conclude the district court could reasonably decide that the
jury’s verdict awarding Dock only a portion of her past medical expenses and
nothing for pain and suffering was not inadequate. See, e.g., Moore, 163 N.W.2d
at 436-37 (finding jury’s minimal award for medical expenses and pain and
suffering was not inadequate where the evidence regarding the cause and extent
of plaintiff’s injuries, some of which were pre-existing, was disputed). But see
Fisher, 601 N.W.2d at 58 (finding jury’s verdict awarding plaintiff all claimed
medical expenses but nothing for pain and suffering was inadequate). The court
thus did not abuse its discretion in denying Dock’s motion for new trial and
alternative motion for additur.
Kautman v. Mar-Mac Comm. Sch. Dist., 255
N.W.2d 146, 148 (Iowa 1977) (stating because plaintiff was not entitled to new
trial due to the alleged inadequacy of the verdict, any right to additur is
concomitantly foreclosed).
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IV.
CONCLUSION.
Because the cause, nature, and extent of Dock’s injuries were disputed,
we conclude the district court could reasonably decide that the jury’s verdict
awarding Dock only a part of her past medical expenses and nothing for pain and
suffering was not inadequate.
See Cowan, 461 N.W.2d at 159 (“We have
affirmed the trial court’s denial of a new trial where the evidence of the cause or
the extent of injury was disputed.”). Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Dock’s motion for new trial and alternative motion for additur.
therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.
AFFIRMED.
We
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