TRACI L. WOOMERT, Plaintiff - Appellant, vs. IOWA CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION, Defendant - Appellee.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-248 / 07-1352
Filed June 25, 2008
TRACI L. WOOMERT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
IOWA CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION,
Defendant-Appellee.
_______________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Washington County, Dan F.
Morrison, Judge.
Appeal from the district court order affirming dismissal of an employment
discrimination complaint as untimely. AFFIRMED.
Steven E. Ballard of Leff Law Firm, L.L.P., Iowa City, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Teresa Baustian, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Huitink and Mahan, JJ.
2
SACKETT, C.J.
Traci Woomert appeals from the district court‟s decision on judicial
review that affirmed the Iowa Civil Rights Commission‟s dismissal of her
employment discrimination complaint as untimely.
She contends the court
erred in concluding the discriminatory act was the notice her contract would not
be renewed, not the date of her discharge. She also contends her complaint
was timely because the date after her contract expired marked (1) either a
continuing or discrete act of discrimination or (2) a discriminatory failure to hire.
We affirm the district court.
I.
Background Facts and Proceedings.
Appellant began working for the Washington Golf and Country Club in
1999 and continued under a series of one-year employment contracts. On
February 8, 2006, the club‟s board of directors unanimously decided not to
renew her contract when it expired on March 31, 2006.
On February 9 a
representative of the board notified appellant of the board‟s decision not to
renew her contract.
contract.
Appellant continued to work through the end of her
Based on her discussions with coworkers and others, appellant
believed the reason her contract was not renewed was because of her sex.
On September 27, 2006 appellant filed an employment discrimination
complaint with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission. She alleged her employment
contract was not renewed because of her sex. She asserted a former board
member told her “a lot of people weren‟t happy there was a girl working out
there.” On October 11, the commission notified appellant her complaint was
3
closed as “not timely” because it was filed fifty days past the 180-day filing
limitation in the statute. Her subsequent application for reopening was denied
on November 15.
Appellant sought judicial review of the commission‟s action closing her
complaint.
She alleged the commission‟s conclusion the unfair or
discriminatory employment practice occurred on February 9, “is beyond the
authority delegated to respondent; is based on an erroneous interpretation of
Iowa Code § 216.15(12) [2005]; and is otherwise unreasonable, arbitrary,
capricious, or constituting an abuse of discretion.”
See Iowa Code §§
17A.19(10)(b), (c), and (n) (2005). Following a telephonic hearing on July 20,
2007, the court issued its ruling on August 3. The court ruled:
Traci contends the computation of the 180 days begins with
the date she left employment. The Commission contends the
date is computed from the day she received notice of her
termination, February 9, 2006. The base issue becomes the date
the alleged discriminatory or unfair practice occurred. Traci
alleges she was terminated because of her gender. The court
finds that the alleged discriminatory act occurred at the time she
was notified of her termination on February 9, 2006, rather than
March 31 / April 1, 2006, her last date of actual work and the
expiration of her contract. It is the termination based on her
gender that is the discriminatory act, not her last day of work or
the expiration of her contract. . . .
Upon a consideration of the entire record, the court finds
there is substantial evidence to support the Commission‟s
decision.
Traci failed to file her complaint timely pursuant to section
216.15(12) Code of Iowa.
The court found the complaint was filed within 180 days of April 1, but not within
180 days of February 9. The court affirmed the commission‟s determination
and dismissed the petition for judicial review.
II.
Scope of Review.
4
Our review is governed by Iowa Code chapter 17A (2005). Acuity Ins. v.
Foreman, 684 N.W.2d 212, 216 (Iowa 2004).
The district court acts in an
appellate capacity to correct errors of law on the part of the agency.
Grundmeyer v. Weyerhauser Co., 649 N.W.2d 744, 748 (Iowa 2002).
We
review the district court‟s decision by applying the standards of section 17A.19
to the agency action to determine if our conclusions are the same as those
reached by the district court. University of Iowa Hosps. & Clinics v. Waters, 674
N.W.2d 92, 95 (Iowa 2004).
III.
Analysis.
The language of Iowa‟s civil rights act concerning the trigger for the 180
day limitation period is nearly identical to the federal statute. The federal civil
rights act requires that a charge be filed within 180 days “after the alleged
unlawful employment practice occurred.” 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e)(1) (2000). Iowa
Code section 216.15(12) requires that a complaint be filed within 180 days
“after the alleged discriminatory or unfair practice occurred.” Iowa Code section
216.6(1)(a) (2005), relating to employment, provides it is “an unfair or
discriminatory practice” for any person:
to refuse to hire, accept, register, classify, or refer for
employment, to discharge any employee, or to otherwise
discriminate in employment against any applicant for employment
or any employee because of the age, race, creed, color, sex,
national origin, religion or disability of such applicant or employee,
....
(Emphasis added.)
The time a “discharge” occurs is not specified.
Our civil rights act is patterned after the federal civil rights act.
Thus, we find federal interpretation of the federal act instructive.
5
However, our review of both federal and state cases reveals a
split of authority on when the limitations period begins. Generally,
courts find the period begins on the date the employee was
notified of the discharge or the date the employee left the
employment.
Ritz v. Wapello County Bd. of Sup’rs, 595 N.W.2d 786, 792 (Iowa 1999)
(citations omitted). In Ritz, the question of when the 180-day limitation period is
triggered was not properly before the court, so it “decline[d] to address the issue
of when „discharge‟ occurs for the purpose of triggering the 180-day limitations
period.” Id. at 793.
The United States Supreme Court has twice addressed the issue of what
“unlawful employment practice” triggers a filing limitation period. In Delaware
State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258, 101 S. Ct. 498, 504, 66 L. Ed. 2d
431, 439-40 (1980), the Court held the limitation period was triggered on the
date the college decided not to grant tenure to Ricks, not the date his contract
ended over a year later. A year later, in Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8,
102 S. Ct. 28, 29, 70 L. Ed. 2d 6, 8-9 (1981), the Court followed Ricks in holding
the period was triggered on the date the decision to terminate was made, not on
the date employment was terminated.
The State urges us to follow this
interpretation when examining the limitation in Iowa Code section 216.15(12)
(“within 180 days after the alleged discriminatory or unfair practice occurred”).
State courts are split over whether to follow the “Ricks/Chardon” rule
when interpreting their own state statutes. Appellant urges us to follow the
minority of states that have declined to follow the federal approach. See, e.g.,
Romano v. Rockwell Int’l, Inc., 926 P.2d 1114 (Cal. 1996); Ross v. Stouffer
Hotel Co., 879 P.2d 1037 (Haw. 1994); Collins v. Comerica Bank, 664 N.W.2d
6
713 (Mich. 2003); Vollemans v. Town of Wallingford, 928 A.2d 586 (N.J. 2007);
Alderiso v. Med. Ctr. of Ocean County, 770 A.2d 275 (N.J. 2001); Holmin v.
TRW, Inc., 748 A.2d 1141 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); Keelan v. Bell
Commc’ns Research, 674 A.2d 603 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996). She
contends the plain language of chapter 216 concerning when a discriminatory
or unfair practice has occurred should prevail over contrary federal
interpretations and it better comports with public policy and the liberal
interpretation we give to our civil rights statute. In the alternative, she contends
April 1, 2006, is the date marking “a continuing or discrete act of discrimination.”
For the reasons that follow, we conclude Iowa follows the federal interpretation
and affirm the decision of the district court and the agency.
Because Iowa‟s civil rights statute, Iowa Code chapter 216, is modeled
after the federal civil rights statute, “we have consistently employed federal
analysis when interpreting” Iowa‟s statute.
Estate of Harris v. Papa John’s
Pizza, 679 N.W.2d 673, 677-78 (Iowa 2004); see, e.g., Pecenka v. Fareway
Stores, Inc., 672 N.W.2d 800, 803 (Iowa 2003); Ritz v. Wapello County Bd. of
Sup’rs, 595 N.W.2d 786, 792 (Iowa 1999); Annear v. State, 419 N.W.2d 377,
378-79 (Iowa 1988). As noted above, the Supreme Court has held that the
“unlawful employment practice” that starts the running of the limitations period
for filing a claim is the decision by the employer and its communication to the
affected employee. See Ricks, 449 U.S. at 258-59, 101 S. Ct. at 504, 66 L. Ed.
2d at 439-40; Chardon, 454 U.S. at 7-8, 102 S. Ct. at 29, 70 L. Ed. 2d at 8-9.
7
We see no reason to depart from the federal analysis when applying Iowa law
to the circumstances before us.
In the case at bar, the board made the decision not to renew her
employment contract on February 8 and communicated it to appellant the next
day. “Mere continuity of employment, without more, is insufficient to prolong the
life of a cause of action for employment discrimination.” Ricks, 449 U.S. at 257,
101 S. Ct. at 504, 66 L. Ed. 2d at 439. Just as prior renewals of her contract
preceded the actual end of the contract term, this non-renewal preceded the
end of the contract term. There was no subsequent act of discrimination. The
expiration of appellant‟s employment contract was merely “the time at which the
consequences of the act[ ] became most painful.” Id. at 258, 101 S. Ct. at 504,
66 L. Ed. 2d at 440 (quoting Abramson v. Univ. of Hawaii, 594 F.2d 202, 209
(9th Cir. 1979)). We conclude the 180-day limitations period began to run when
appellant was notified of the board‟s discriminatory employment action. The
subsequent expiration of her employment contract was not a separate
discriminatory act or the end of continuing discrimination.
The only
discriminatory action by the board was the non-renewal of appellant‟s
employment contract. That act occurred more than 180 days before she filed
her claim. The agency was correct in dismissing her claim as untimely. We
affirm the decision of the district court that upheld the agency‟s dismissal of
appellant‟s claim.
AFFIRMED.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.