IN THE INTEREST OF D.P., Minor Child, S.A.L., Mother, Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-204 / 08-0303
Filed April 9, 2008
IN THE INTEREST OF D.P.,
Minor Child,
S.A.L., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Louise Jacobs,
District Associate Judge.
A mother appeals from the order terminating her parental rights.
AFFIRMED.
Yvonne Naanep, Des Moines, for appellant mother.
Eric Anderson, West Des Moines, for father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine Miller-Todd, Assistant
Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Chris Gonzales,
Assistant County Attorney, for appellee State.
Charles Fuson of the Youth Law Center, Des Moines, for minor child.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Zimmer and Miller, JJ.
2
ZIMMER, J.
A mother appeals from the juvenile court order terminating her parental
rights to her son. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Sara is the mother and William is the father of DeShawn, 1 born in July
2004.
DeShawn came to the attention of the Iowa Department of Human
Services (Department) in August 2005 when DeShawn, who was not being
adequately supervised, dialed 911 while playing with the phone. When the police
arrived at Sara’s residence, they found Sara present with DeShawn and some of
her friends. There was a strong odor of marijuana in the home. The police
arrested Sara after they discovered marijuana and a large amount of cash at her
residence. A temporary removal order was issued on August 30, 2005, and
DeShawn was placed in the care of a maternal relative, Shannon.
DeShawn was adjudicated a child in need of assistance (CINA) on
October 31, 2005, primarily based on Sara’s and William’s substance abuse
issues and their inability to adequately care for their son. Following adjudication,
both parents received a variety of services, including drug treatment, designed to
transition DeShawn back to their care. Sara successfully completed the drug
treatment program, 2 and DeShawn was returned to her care on April 4, 2006,
subject to the Department’s supervision.
1
The child in need of assistance and termination actions refer to the child as
“DeShawn.” However, at the pretrial conference for the termination the mother stated
the child’s name is spelled “DaShawn.”
2
William did not successfully complete the drug treatment program.
3
After DeShawn was returned to his mother’s care, Sara continued to
participate in services. However, Sara continued to struggle with mental health
issues, and it became apparent that she could not parent DeShawn in a way that
supported his healthy development. DeShawn was removed from his mother’s
care for a second time on December 13, 2006. In January 2007 the child was
again placed in Shannon’s care. Sara made some progress following removal,
and she was granted an additional six months to attempt reunification in July
2007. Unfortunately, Sara did not sustain her progress, and the State filed a
petition to terminate Sara’s and William’s parental rights on December 10, 2007.
The juvenile court held a termination hearing on January 23, 2008. At the
hearing, William consented to the termination of his parental rights; however,
Sara contested termination. An in-home service provider testified that Sara had
been inconsistent in following through with the therapy recommended to address
her mental health issues. She also testified that Sara becomes overwhelmed
during visitations and that DeShawn has tantrums and acting out behaviors.
DeShawn’s therapist diagnosed DeShawn with “adjustment disorder with mixed
disturbance of emotions and conduct” as a result of inconsistent care and
caregivers. She stated that after DeShawn’s daily contact with his mother was
eliminated his behavior improved. The therapist recommended that DeShawn
remain with Shannon, but did not object to DeShawn maintaining a relationship
with Sara. The family’s social worker stated she was concerned that Sara is only
externally motivated, and she does not believe that Sara could assume the care
and custody of DeShawn.
The court appointed special advocate (CASA)
submitted a report indicating that termination of Sara’s parental rights was in
4
DeShawn’s best interest. The child’s guardian ad litem agreed that it was in the
child’s best interests to terminate Sara’s parental rights.
In an order filed February 1, 2008, the juvenile court terminated Sara’s
parental rights to DeShawn pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(d) (2007)
(child CINA for physical abuse or neglect, circumstances continue despite receipt
of services), and William’s parental rights to DeShawn pursuant to sections
232.116(1)(a), (d), and (e). Only Sara has appealed.
II. Scope and Standards of Review.
We review termination proceedings de novo. In re R.E.K.F., 698 N.W.2d
147, 149 (Iowa 2005). The grounds for termination must be supported by clear
and convincing evidence. In re T.B., 604 N.W.2d 660, 661 (Iowa 2000). We are
primarily concerned with the child’s best interests in termination proceedings. In
re J.L.W., 570 N.W.2d 778, 780 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). Even when the statutory
grounds for termination are met, the decision to terminate parental rights must
reflect the child’s best interests. In re M.S., 519 N.W.2d 398, 400 (Iowa 1994).
When we consider the child’s best interests, we look to his long-range as well as
immediate best interests. In re C.K., 558 N.W.2d 170, 172 (Iowa 1997).
III. Discussion.
In this appeal, Sara contends the statutory grounds for termination were
not supported by clear and convincing evidence. She also maintains termination
is not in the best interests of the child. 3 Upon our review of the record, we find
no merit in either of the mother’s arguments.
3
On appeal, Sara further contends the court erred in terminating her parental rights to
DeShawn because extenuating circumstances existed under section 232.116(3).
5
Sara contends the court erred in terminating her parental rights under
232.116(1)(d) because the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that DeShawn would be subjected to adjudicatory harm if he was returned to her
care. 4 For the following reasons, we disagree.
DeShawn was removed from his mother’s care for the first time in August
2005.
Despite receiving extensive services since that time, Sara is still not
capable of safely parenting DeShawn on her own.
While Sara is employed
delivering newspapers and is working on her GED, she remains almost totally
dependent on her mother and her fiancé.
Sara has often failed to attend
individual therapy sessions scheduled to address her mental health concerns,
and she has not followed up with medication management appointments. Sara
has not made much improvement in her ability to set limits for DeShawn. After
more than two years of services, Sara continues to struggle to meet her own
needs. It is clear that she is not capable of caring for DeShawn without the
Department’s supervision.
Upon our de novo review of the record, it is apparent that the issues that
led to DeShawn’s removal continue to exist.
Therefore, we find clear and
However, the juvenile court did not address this section in its termination order.
Therefore, we will not address this issue on appeal. See In re K.C., 660 N.W.2d 29, 38
(Iowa 2003) (holding an issue not presented to and passed on by the juvenile court may
not be raised for the first time on appeal).
4
The State contends that we may also affirm the termination of Sara’s parental rights
pursuant to section 232.116(1)(h) (child is three or younger, child CINA, removed from
home for six of last twelve months, and child cannot be returned home). They note that
the juvenile court mistakenly found DeShawn was not three years old or younger even
though he was born in July 2004. Although we may affirm the juvenile court’s ruling on
any ground that appears in the record, In re T.N.M., 542 N.W.2d 574, 575 (Iowa Ct. App.
1995), we chose to focus our attention on section 232.116(1)(d) as the basis for
termination in this case.
6
convincing evidence supports the juvenile court’s decision to terminate Sara’s
parental rights under section 232.116(1)(d).
Even when the statutory grounds for termination are met, the decision to
terminate parental rights must reflect the child’s best interests. M.S., 519 N.W.2d
at 400. DeShawn has twice been removed from his mother’s care. Following
each removal he was placed in the care of his maternal relative, Shannon.
DeShawn and Shannon have formed a bond, and Shannon is willing to adopt
DeShawn.
DeShawn deserves stability and permanency, which his mother
cannot provide. In re C.D., 509 N.W.2d 509, 513 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993). He
should not be forced to wait any longer for his mother to demonstrate that she
can become a responsible parent.
The evidence does not support the
conclusion that additional time should be allowed to see if DeShawn can be
returned to his mother’s care. We agree with the juvenile court’s finding that
termination of Sara’s parental rights is in the child's best interests.
IV. Conclusion.
We affirm the juvenile court’s decision to terminate Sara’s parental rights.
AFFIRMED.
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