GEORGE P. LYSENKO and REBECCA LYSENKO , Plaintiff s - Appell ants , vs. CARROLL JENSEN and JOYCE JENSEN , Defendant s - Appell ees .
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-163 / 07-1282
Filed July 16, 2008
GEORGE P. LYSENKO and
REBECCA LYSENKO,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
CARROLL JENSEN and
JOYCE JENSEN,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Bruce E.
Zager, Judge.
The Lysenkos appeal the district court’s denial of their request for
injunctive relief. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Timothy Luce of Anfinson & Luce, Waterloo, for appellant.
Henry J. Bevel III and Gene Yagla of Yagla, McCoy and Riley, Waterloo,
for appellee.
Heard by Vogel, P.J., and Zimmer, J. and Nelson, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2007).
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VOGEL, P.J.
George and Rebecca Lysenko appeal from the district court’s denial of
their request for injunctive relief to require neighboring landowners, Carroll and
Joyce Jensen, to stop their blockage of the natural flow of surface water. On
appeal, they contend the district court’s ruling was inequitable as it was their only
available remedy. We agree and reverse and remand.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
The Lysenkos and the Jensens are neighboring property owners. In 2002,
Jim Sands Construction [Sands] began developing a twenty-six lot subdivision
named Elk Run Heights. That same year, the Lysenkos purchased one of these
lots and utilizing Sands, were the first to build a home on Gray Street. Shortly
after the Lysenkos moved into their new home, other homes on Gray Street were
completed. In July 2005, the Jensens purchased the property directly east of the
Lysenkos’ property, upon which Sands built their home. In September 2005, the
Jensens added significant landscaping, including bringing in approximately
thirteen to sixteen truckloads of dirt and constructing a four-inch to eight-inch
berm located between the Lysenko and Jensen properties.
After this
landscaping was completed, the Lysenkos began having water problems on their
property.
In June 2006, the Lysenkos filed a petition requesting the Jensens be
enjoined from obstructing the natural water flow between the properties. The
Lysenkos alleged that the raised elevation of the Jensen property and the
building of the berm substantially increased the volume of water on their
property.
In June 2007, after a trial, the district court denied the Lysenkos’
3
request for injunctive relief. The district court found that the natural water flow
was “across the Lysenko property onto the Jensen property” and this natural
water flow “was present even before the construction of the Jensen property.”
Additionally, the raised elevation of the Jensens’ property and the berm the
Jensens constructed between the properties “may result in some additional
pooling of water in the Lysenko back yard.” However, the district court concluded
this was not such a significant alteration to the natural water flow such that the
extraordinary remedy of injunctive relief should be granted.
The Lysenkos
appeal from this ruling.
II. Scope of Review
An action for injunctive relief is in equity. Therefore, our review is de novo.
Iowa R. App. P. 6.4.
III. Analysis
The common law rule “recognizes a servitude of natural drainage as
between adjoining lands.
Under this concept a servient estate must accept
surface waters which drain thereon from a dominant estate.”
Braverman v.
Eicher, 238 N.W.2d 331, 334 (Iowa 1976). A party may petition for injunctive
relief if the natural flow of water is wrongfully altered. Blink v. McNabb, 287
N.W.2d 596, 601 (Iowa 1980). However,
the grant or denial of injunctive relief, of any nature, unquestionably
rests in the sound judicial discretion of the court . . . . In
determining whether to exercise its discretion to grant or refuse an
injunction, the court should balance all of the equities, which
include not only the relative hardships to the parties, but their
conduct with reference to the transaction, the nature of the interests
affected, and the relative proportion of the interests of each that will
be lost by whichever course of action is taken.
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Braverman, 238 N.W.2d at 335.
“Equity usually invokes its extraordinary
injunctive power only when necessary to prevent irreparable harm or when the
complaining party is otherwise without an effective remedy.”
Johnson v.
Pattison, 185 N.W.2d 790, 797 (Iowa 1971).
The Lysenkos argue that the district court erred in not granting their
request for injunctive relief as the Jensens have obstructed the water flow
between their properties and an injunction is the only remedy available to them.
The evidence introduced at trial clearly demonstrated, and neither party disputed,
that their properties were originally graded so that the surface water would flow
from the Lysenkos’ property across the Jensens’ property. James Sands, the
developer of the subdivision, described the natural water flow of the subdivision
and individual lots. Sands testified that he graded the lots on Gray Street so that
water flowed from the west to the east, with each lot designed to drain to the front
and rear of the lot and downhill. Several properties drain onto the Lysenkos’
property, which then drains onto the Jensens’ property and then towards the
Jensen’s back easement. Sands also testified that while completing the grading
of the Jensens’ property, the Jensens accused him of taking an extra two feet of
dirt out of the backyard. He then brought in another foot of dirt and graded the
backyard, but would not bring in any additional dirt.
After Sands’ final grading of the Jensens’ property, the Jensens undertook
significant landscaping to their property.
They added thirteen to sixteen
truckloads of dirt to their yard, which undisputedly raised the surface of their
property. They also built a berm that ran along the fence line between their
property and the Lysenko property, which stopped approximately twenty feet
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before the drainage easement in the back of the property.
George Lysenko
testified that they had no water problems prior to the Jensens’ landscaping, but
began having water pool in their back yard after the landscaping was completed.
George also testified their sump pump began to run much more frequently.1
Additionally, after even a light rain, water pools in the backyard and the Lysenkos
are unable to mow or walk in certain areas. George described how the Jensens’
landscaping had altered the water flow and stated: “water flows in the backyard
like it always has, but when it reaches the Jensen property there’s a barricade
there. It slows down, and it’s a swampy area.” Supporting these observations,
Sands testified that the Jensen berm acted as a dam and prevented the natural
water flow and drainage.
Contrary to George’s testimony, Steve Wirtz, the contractor who
completed the landscaping on the Jensens’ property, testified that although the
landscaping did alter the natural flow of water between the properties, it should
not have caused water to pool on the Lysenko property.2 However, he also
testified that the berm prevented water from flowing onto the Jensens’ property
and directed water down the fence line of the Lysenkos’ property.
1
Although
There was evidence that prior to the Jensens purchasing their property, the Lysenkos’
sump pump drained onto it. See Braverman, 238 N.W.2d at 335 (“[N]o right exists to
alter the natural system of drainage from a dominant estate in such manner as to
substantially increase the servient estate burden.”). However, it did not appear that this
was an ongoing problem. The sump pump is currently located on the northeast corner
of the home. George’s testimony indicated that the front of the home is graded to the
northeast, which is toward the street and not the back yard. Contrary to this, Wertz
testified that when be began landscaping the Jensens’ property, there were some muddy
areas in their yard. He claimed that this was caused by the Lysenkos’ sump pump water
and the increased watering of their yard in an attempt to grow grass. He then testified
that after the Lysenkos stopped watering their lawn as much, the muddy spots dried up.
2
Part of Wirtz’s testimony is obscured by apparent references to an exhibit 17, which
would have been clear visually but was not well verbalized for the written record.
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Sands testified there was no pooling of water on the Lysenkos’ property before
the Jensens’ landscaping was completed, Wirtz claimed there was. When asked
about the current water flow, he stated: “Before the berm, was coming on the
Jensens’; after the berm, it was going down [the Lysenkos].” From the evidence
and testimony presented,3 we conclude that the Lysenkos have demonstrated
that the Jensens altered the natural flow of water as originally graded and caused
pooling of water in the Lysenkos’ backyard.
However, we must also balance the equities to determine whether
injunctive relief should have been granted in the present case. Braverman, 238
N.W.2d at 335. We compare the Lysenkos’ harm with the “hardship or loss” to
the Jensens from the issuance of an injunction. See Johnson, 185 N.W.2d at
797-98 (discussing the comparative injury doctrine). As discussed above, the
damage to the Lysenkos’ property is an increase in volume and pooling of water
in their backyard, causing increased demand on their sump pump and decreased
use of their back yard. However, to remedy the situation, the Jensens would only
be required to alter their landscaping by removing some fill dirt from their
property and eliminating the berm. Additionally, the record did not contain any
testimony indicating that if the Jensens were required to regrade and remove the
berm, their property would be harmed in any manner. Returning the back yard to
the intended grade and allowing proper water drainage is the only effective
remedy available to the Lysenkos. Therefore, we conclude that the Lysenkos are
entitled to injunctive relief.
3
The record on appeal does not contain most of the exhibits entered into evidence.
Moreover, the few photographs that are included are not the original photographs, but
are black and white copies.
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We reverse the district court’s order and remand for entry of an order
granting the injunctive relief requested.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
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