TERESA L. FOGLE , P etitioner - Appell ee , vs. PELLA CORPORATION , Respondent - Appell ant .
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-143 / 06-1746
Filed May 14, 2008
TERESA L. FOGLE,
Petitioner-Appellee,
vs.
PELLA CORPORATION,
Respondent-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Carla T. Schemmel,
Judge.
Pella Corporation appeals from the ruling on judicial review that remanded
Teresa Fogle’s workers’ compensation case to the agency for further hearing.
REVERSED.
David Jenkins of Bradshaw, Fowler, Proctor & Fairgrave, P.C., Des
Moines, for appellant.
Richard Schmidt of Berg, Rouse, Spaulding & Schmidt, P.L.C., Des
Moines, for appellee.
Heard by Vogel, P.J., and Zimmer and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
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VOGEL, P.J.
Pella Corporation appeals from the ruling on judicial review that remanded
Teresa Fogle’s workers’ compensation case to the agency for further hearing.
We reverse.
Background Facts and Proceedings.
On August 7, 2000, Teresa Fogle sustained an injury at work that resulted
in lower back pain and leg pain. See Pella Corp. v. Fogle, No. 02-1481 (Iowa Ct.
App. Nov. 17, 2003).
After considerable treatment, Dr. Douglas Koontz
performed a decompression laminectomy, removed certain disks, and performed
an interbody fusion on December 12, 2001.
Initially, it appeared that Fogle
received some benefit from the surgery; however, her condition quickly returned
to pre-surgery status and Fogle, in fact, claimed that her situation had worsened.
None of the experts, including the surgeon, Dr. Koontz, could offer an
explanation of her post-surgical complaints of pain. She has since been treated
with injections, physical therapy, and medications to manage her pain.
On October 13, 2004, a hearing was held on Fogle’s workers’
compensation petition. The deputy later issued an arbitration decision in which
he determined Fogle was permanently and totally disabled and that she was
entitled to be compensated for certain expenses. On February 7, 2006, Deputy
Workers’
Compensation
Commissioner
Helenjean
Walleser,
acting
by
designation of the then current commissioner (hereafter, “the commissioner”),
issued the appeal decision, which modified the arbitration decision by reducing
Fogle’s disability from total permanent to forty percent permanent partial
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disability.
This decision also deemed numerous medical bills and mileage
expenses to be not work related and thus not compensable.
Fogle filed a petition seeking judicial review of the appeal decision,
arguing that the decision to reduce her level of disability and medical
reimbursement was not supported by substantial evidence, was illogical,
unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion.
Following a
hearing, the district court entered a ruling remanding the case to the
“Commissioner for further hearing, to further clarify Mrs. Fogle’s disability level
and, if necessary, make any changes to the liability findings.” Pella Corporation
appeals from this order.
Standards of Review.
A party challenging agency action bears the burden of demonstrating the
action’s invalidity and resulting prejudice.
Iowa Code § 17A.19(8)(a) (2007).
This can be shown in a number of ways, including proof the action was ultra
vires; legally erroneous; unsupported by substantial evidence in the record when
that record is viewed as a whole; or otherwise unreasonable, arbitrary,
capricious, or an abuse of discretion. See id. § 17A.19(10).
Analysis.
On appeal, Pella claims generally the district court improperly remanded
for clarification of an issue that “was clearly evaluated and discussed in the
appeal decision, and on which the agency made appropriate findings and
conclusions.” In analyzing this question, we believe the district court improperly
reviewed this case as a matter of why Fogle’s disability was reduced from total
and permanent as found by the deputy, to a forty percent permanent partial
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disability as found by the commissioner.
This analysis by the district court
necessarily included and was dependent upon a review of the deputy’s
arbitration decision.
Rather, the district court should have been analyzing
whether the commissioner’s appeal decision and its award of forty percent
industrial disability was supported by substantial evidence. See Myers v. F.C.A.
Services, Inc., 592 N.W.2d 354, 358 (Iowa 1999) (holding that because the
“deputy commissioner’s proposed findings are not a consideration on judicial
review” the court should not review in light of why the commissioner reduced the
deputy’s disability finding); Iowa Code § 17A.19(1) (noting review is from “final
agency action.”).
The appropriate question regarding the award of disability is not whether
the commissioner’s appeal decision properly “reduced” the award set forth in the
arbitration decision, but rather whether the final award in the commissioner’s
appeal decision, as the final agency action, is supported by substantial evidence.
Therefore, rather than reviewing this case as a comparison between the
arbitration decision and the final agency decision, the court’s sole task should
have been to determine whether the commissioner’s forty percent determination
was supported by the law and by substantial evidence. See IBP v. Al-Gharib,
604 N.W.2d 621, 632 (Iowa 2000) (reviewing disability determination under a
substantial evidence standard).
When analyzed in that fashion, we conclude the commissioner’s appeal
decision contained appropriate and sufficient explanation as to the bases of the
award of forty percent permanent partial disability, including why Fogle’s
unexplained worsening of symptoms during the time frame following surgery
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could not be causally connected to the injury or resulting disability. As the appeal
decision notes: “Highly intricate diagnostic studies performed after her surgery
offer no clue as to why she continues to report such severe and varied physical
problems . . . . The many medical specialists who have treated or evaluated
claimant cannot explain her ongoing symptoms.”
Furthermore, the appeal decision properly set forth and considered the
factors to be considered in the assessment of industrial disability. In this regard,
it stated:
Claimant is not an older worker. She has four years of post high
school education. That fact also suggests that she is intellectually
capable of retraining into more sedentary work. While she
perceives herself as highly disabled, the objective medical findings
do not suggest she would be physically incapable of retraining or
physically incapable of light work category employment. It is
expressly found that claimant has a 40 percent permanent partial
disability under Iowa Code section 85.34(2)(u) as a result of her
August 7, 2000 work injury.
Nor do we believe the appeal decision was unclear as to whether the effect of the
surgery was taken into consideration in its conclusion that Fogle sustained a forty
percent permanent partial disability. The agency addressed the effect of the
surgery.
Conclusion.
The judicial review was explicitly and improperly influenced by the district
court’s concern about what it perceived as a reduction in Fogle’s disability from
the arbitration decision to the final agency appeal decision. Because substantial
evidence supports the final agency determination of a forty percent permanent
partial disability, the district court should have affirmed on judicial review. We
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therefore reverse.
REVERSED.
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