STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. CASEY DUWAIN DODD, a/k/a CASEY MITCHELL, Defendant-Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-131 / 07-1506
Filed February 27, 2008
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
CASEY DUWAIN DODD,
a/k/a CASEY MITCHELL,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dallas County, Virginia Cobb,
District Associate Judge.
Casey Dodd appeals from the sentence entered upon his guilty plea to
extortion. AFFIRMED.
Alfredo Parrish of Parrish, Kruidenier, Dunn, Boles, Gribble, Cook, Parrish,
Gentry & Fisher, L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Karen Doland, Assistant Attorney
General, and Wayne Reisetter, County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Mahan, P.J., and Eisenhauer and Baker, JJ.
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BAKER, J.
Following a guilty plea to extortion, in violation of Iowa Code section 711.4
(2005), Casey Dodd was sentenced to five years imprisonment.
The court
suspended the sentence and placed Dodd on supervised probation for two years.
On appeal from that conviction and sentence, Dodd claims the court erred in
considering improper factors at sentencing. He also claims it was an abuse of
discretion for the court to decline his request for a deferred judgment. Dodd
requests remand for resentencing.
Our scope of review of sentencing decisions is for correction of errors at
law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4; State v. Thomas, 547 N.W.2d 223, 225 (Iowa 1996).
Our standard of review is for an abuse of discretion or for defects in the
sentencing procedure.
State v. Cason, 532 N.W.2d 755, 756 (Iowa 1995).
Consideration of Improper Factors.
Dodd first lists a variety of allegedly improper factors, both factual and
legal, that the court relied on. In particular, he contends the court erroneously (1)
stated Dodd invaded the home of the victim, (2) relied on the unproven assertion
the victim and his family were under duress and experiencing financial difficulties,
(3) commented on how a friend reacted under stressful family conditions, and (4)
understood a deferred judgment would still show up on a background check.
We conclude the record demonstrates that the court appropriately
weighed a number of factors and made a sufficient statement of its reasons for
imposing the sentence.
The court considered the nature of the offense, the
attending circumstances, and the defendant’s age and character in sentencing
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him.
Moreover, while the court did make some personal observations in
pronouncing sentence, we do not find them improper.
Judicial discretion imparts the power to act within legal parameters
according to the dictates of a judge’s own conscience, uncontrolled
by the judgment of others. It is essential to judging because judicial
decisions frequently are not colored in black and white. Instead,
they deal in differing shades of gray, and discretion is needed to
give the necessary latitude to the decision-making process. This
inherent latitude in the process properly limits our review. Thus,
our task on appeal is not to second guess the decision made by the
district court, but to determine if it was unreasonable or based on
untenable grounds
State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724-25 (Iowa 2002).
Abuse of Discretion in Sentencing.
We reject Dodd’s next claim that the court abused its discretion in denying
his request for a deferred judgment. The sentencing option chosen by the court
was clearly a statutorily permissible one. By merely highlighting the factors he
believes entitled him to a deferred judgment, Dodd has failed to show the court
“exercise[d] its discretion on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an
extent clearly unreasonable.” See State v. Peters, 525 N.W.2d 854, 859 (Iowa
1994). As our supreme court has stated,
“[e]ach judge must grapple with the facts and circumstances in the
case before him and arrive at the sentence he regards as right.
The sentencing function of judges is an arduous and a lonely one,
but it is part of judging.”
State v. Jackson, 204 N.W.2d 915, 916 (Iowa 1973). We affirm the sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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