CYNTHIA MARTINEK , Plaintiff - Appell ee , vs. BELMOND - KLEMME COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT , Defendant - Appell ant .
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-107 / 07-0729
Filed May 14, 2008
CYNTHIA MARTINEK,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
BELMOND-KLEMME COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Wright County, Paul W. Riffel,
Judge.
A school district appeals from the ruling on judicial review, which
reversed its decision to terminate an elementary school principal. AFFIRMED.
Brian Gruhn of Gruhn Law Firm, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
Charles E. Gribble of Parrish, Kruidenier, Dunn, Boles, Gribble, Cook,
Parrish, Gentry & Fisher, L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellee.
Heard by Vogel, P.J., and Zimmer and Baker, JJ.
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VOGEL, P.J.
The facts of this case are essentially undisputed. Dr. Cynthia Martinek
began her employment with the Belmond-Klemme School District (District) in
1993 as an elementary principal. On July 25, 2005, Martinek and the District
entered into a contract “for a two (2) year period,” which provided the following
language with regard to termination of the contract:
IT IS AGREED that throughout the term of this contract, the
Principal shall be subject to discharge or demotion for good and
just causes, provided however that the Board does not arbitrarily
or capriciously call for his/her dismissal or demotion. The Principal
shall have the right to service of written charges, notice at hearing,
and be afforded a private and fair hearing before the Board.
IT IS FURTHER AGREED that the Principal shall have the
right of renewal prior to the end of the contract year for additional
years, except that the renewal of this contract beyond the first year
is contingent upon any realignment of the type of school
organization.
On May 2, 2006, the District served Martinek with a notice it was
considering terminating her administrative contract effective at the end of the
current school year. The notice listed four reasons for the proposed termination:
(1) declining enrollment, (2) budgetary restrictions and problems, (3) reduction
of position(s), and (4) realignment of school organization.
On May 5, 2006, Martinek contested the termination under Iowa Code §
279.24(5)(c) (2005). The parties selected an administrative law judge (ALJ) and
a hearing was held. At the hearing, the superintendent presented evidence that
$500,000 needed to be cut from the District’s 2006-2007 budget due to
decreased state funding from rapidly declining enrollment. The superintendent
indicated he would assume elementary school principal duties under the
proposed plan without further pay.
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In a July 7, 2006 proposed ruling, the ALJ determined that because the
District sought to terminate Martinek’s contract mid-term, it had to establish fault
attributable to her under Iowa Code section 279.25 (allowing termination of
administrator’s contract at any time for just cause).
The ALJ determined
Martinek’s contract could not be terminated under the grounds alleged in the
notice. The District voted to review the ALJ decision and terminated Martinek
under the provisions of section 279.24 rather than section 279.25. The District
concluded her termination was justified due to financial constraints.
On August 22, 2006, Martinek filed a petition in equity/notice of appeal
from the District’s decision. The district court noted that had the termination
decision occurred at the end of the contract term, there is no question the
dismissal would have been legitimate. However, it determined that because the
contract was being terminated mid-term, the District had to prove the termination
was related to her job performance. The court then reviewed the contract and
found termination was improper because the District failed to show “good and
just cause” for the termination or that the District organization had been
realigned within the meaning of the contract at the time of the termination. The
district court therefore reversed the District’s decision, and the District appeals.
Scope of Review.
The Iowa Supreme Court set forth our standard of review in Briggs v.
Board of Directors of Hinton Community School District, 282 N.W.2d 740, 743
(Iowa 1979).
There, it stated that the statutory standards of review under
chapter 279 are “nearly identical” to those under the Iowa Administrative
Procedure Act. Briggs, 740 N.W.2d at 743. The
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reviewing court shall grant appropriate relief if substantial rights of
the petitioner or administrator have been prejudiced because the
agency or board action is unsupported by substantial evidence in
the record made before the agency or board when that record is
reviewed as a whole.
Id. We determine whether this court’s conclusions are the same as those of the
district court. If the conclusions are the same, affirmance is in order. If they are
not, reversal may be required. Jackson County Pub. Hosp. v. Pub. Employment
Relations Bd., 280 N.W.2d 426, 429-30 (Iowa 1979). Evidence is substantial
when a reasonable mind would accept it as adequate to reach a conclusion.
City of Davenport v. Pub. Employment Relations Bd., 264 N.W.2d 307, 311
(Iowa 1978).
Discussion.
Iowa Code chapter 279 requires that school boards and school
administrators enter into written contracts of employment for a specific term, up
to two years. Martin v. Waterloo Cmty. Sch. Dist., 518 N.W.2d 381, 383 (Iowa
1994). Section 279.24(1) provides:
An administrator’s contract shall remain in force and in effect for
the period stated in the contract.
The contract shall be
automatically continued in force and effect for additional one-year
periods beyond the end of its original term, except and until the
contract is modified or terminated by mutual agreement of the
board of directors and the administrator, or until terminated as
provided by this section.
Pursuant to chapter 279, an administrator’s employment contract may be
terminated in one of two ways. First, section 279.24(5)(b) provides as follows:
5. The school board may, by majority vote of the membership of
the school board, cause the contract of an administrator to be
terminated. If the school board determines that it should consider
the termination of a nonprobationary administrator’s contract, the
following procedure shall apply:
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....
b. The notice shall state the specific reasons to be used by the
school board for considering termination which for all
administrators except superintendents shall be for just cause.
Second, section 279.25, in pertinent part, provides that an “administrator may be
discharged at any time during the contract year for just cause.”
Section 279.24 contemplates a termination at the end of the
administrator’s original contract term in order to avoid the automatic one-year
renewal of contracts provided for in sections 279.24(2)-(5). Conversely, section
279.25 provides school boards the means to terminate administrators “at any
time during the contract year . . . .” A preliminary question presented here is
whether the Board’s attempted termination of Martinek occurred “during the
contract year.”
The relevance of this question is that while both of these
provisions qualify terminations upon a finding of “just cause,” Iowa case law
appears to have interpreted this identical phrase in differing fashions.
In Wedergren v. Board of Directors, 307 N.W.2d 12 (Iowa 1981), an
administrator was discharged during the first year of his three-year contract.
Because that termination occurred during the original term of the contract, the
supreme court analyzed that case under section 279.25.
In doing so, it
reasoned “[s]ince the discharge was during the term of the contract,
[Wedergren] could be discharged only for just cause.” Wedergren, 307 N.W.2d
at 15. While the District asserts factual differences between Wedergren and
Martinek’s employment and termination, we do not find them persuasive.
According to the guidance of Wedergren, we conclude Martinek’s termination,
which occurred after the first year of a “two-year period,” was indeed attempted
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“during the contract year.” Thus, section 279.25 applies, as does the case law
defining the nature of the “just cause” standard under it.
A number of cases have recognized that “just cause” under section
279.24 may also include legitimate reasons relating to the District’s personnel
and budgetary requirements.
See Matter of Waterloo Cmty. Sch. Dist., 338
N.W.2d 153, 155 (Iowa 1983).
Thus, a just cause termination under
279.24(5)(b) is supportable without any fault attributable to the administrator,
and can include reasons wholly unrelated to the administrator. Conversely, as
interpreted by our supreme court, the just cause standard under section 279.25
is one which directly or indirectly significantly and adversely affects
what must be the ultimate goal of every school system: high
quality education for the district’s students. It relates to job
performance including leadership and role model effectiveness. It
must include the concept that a school district is not married to
mediocrity but may dismiss personnel who are neither performing
high quality work nor improving in performance. On the other
hand, “just cause” cannot include reasons which are arbitrary,
unfair, or generated out of some petty vendetta.
Briggs, 282 N.W.2d at 743. Accordingly, a termination during the contract term
pursuant to section 279.25 is dependent on some showing of poor quality job
performance.
In this case, the District concedes the only reason for the termination of
Martinek’s employment was the declining enrollment and consequent decrease
in state funding to the District. There are no allegations of any sort that her job
performance was in any way deficient or adversely affected the education of the
District’s students.
The termination of Martinek’s contract is controlled by the ruling in
Wedergren, 307 N.W.2d at 16.
There, the terminated administrator was
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discharged during the term of the contract, and was therefore reviewable under
the standards set forth in section 279.25.
That case defined just cause as
encompassing issues of professional competence. Accordingly, because there
was no allegation of Martinek’s professional shortfalls, we conclude the district
court correctly ruled that the District improperly terminated Martinek’s
employment under Iowa Code chapter 279.
Conclusion.
We recognize that a school board “is an elective body free to exercise its
own discretion in deciding which of the three positions to terminate.” Waterloo,
338 N.W.2d at 156. However, that discretion is tempered by certain statutory
constraints to termination. Because termination based on budgetary concerns is
not supportable under case law interpreting Iowa Code section 279.25, we
affirm the district court’s decision to reverse the District’s termination of
Martinek’s contract.
AFFIRMED.
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