IN THE INTEREST OF R.M., Minor Child, M .M., Father, Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-1001 / 08-1728
Filed December 31, 2008
IN THE INTEREST OF R.M.,
Minor Child,
M.M., Father,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, Thomas J.
Straka, District Associate Judge.
A father appeals from the order terminating his parental rights.
AFFIRMED.
Steven J. Drahozal of Drahozal & Schilling, Dubuque, for appellant father.
Sarah Stork Meyer, Dubuque, for mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine S. Miller-Todd, Assistant
Attorney General, Ralph R. Potter, County Attorney, and Jean A. Becker,
Assistant County Attorney, for appellee State.
Mary Kelley, Assistant Public Defender, Dubuque, for minor child.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Eisenhauer and Doyle, JJ.
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DOYLE, J.
A father appeals from the juvenile court order terminating his parental
rights to his child. Upon our de novo review, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
M.M. is the father and K.M. is the mother of R.M., born prematurely in
January 2008.1 At that time, both M.M. and K.M. lived in M.M.’s parents’ fourbedroom house, along with M.M.’s parents and four of M.M.’s siblings.2
Due to R.M.’s premature birth, R.M. has exhibited some special needs.
While hospitalized, R.M. came to the attention of the Iowa Department of Human
Services (Department) based upon concerns that the parents could not safely
care for R.M. Following R.M.’s release from the hospital, the State filed a petition
on January 25, 2008, asserting R.M. was a child in need of assistance (CINA).
Following a prehearing conference, the juvenile court entered an order providing
that R.M. remain in R.M.’s parents’ custody, with the parents to continue residing
with M.M.’s parents. The order further directed that services be provided to the
parents.
From January 2008 until March 2008, services were provided to the
parents in the home.
During this time, service providers noted concerns
regarding the parents’ sleeping during the day and not attending to the needs of
R.M. It appeared to the service providers that M.M.’s mother was providing the
majority of care to R.M.
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K.M. consented to the termination of her parental rights and has not appealed.
The dining room had been converted into a makeshift fourth bedroom.
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On March 13, 2008, an adjudication/disposition hearing was held. Based
upon the evidence received and the agreement of the parties, the juvenile court
adjudicated R.M. a CINA.
Due to various concerns, including M.M.’s anger
issues and limitations in his intellectual functioning, the court continued R.M.’s
placement with the parents, provided they continued to reside with M.M.’s
parents.
The court also ordered that services be provided to the parents,
including family, safety, risk, and permanency services, and that the parents
follow through with mental health evaluations and any recommended treatment.
Additionally, the court ordered that until the next review hearing, the parents work
on bonding with R.M. through increased interaction with her, continue their efforts
to obtain and/or maintain employment, make all appointments, maintain their
room in a clean and appropriate manner appropriate for an infant, and accept
parenting suggestions from service providers without becoming defensive or
hostile.
Following the adjudication/disposition hearing, M.M. and K.M. separated,
and K.M. moved out of M.M.’s parents’ home. On March 18, 2008, a service
provider conducted a drop-in visit to M.M.’s parents’ home, and again found M.M.
sleeping. The only adult present was M.M.’s handicapped sister, who was not an
appropriate sole caregiver. M.M.’s sister attempted to wake M.M. up, but was
not able to do so. Due to concerns for R.M.’s safety, an ex parte temporary
removal order was entered thereafter, placing R.M. in foster care. At the removal
hearing, M.M. stipulated to removal with services to continue.
A review hearing was held on June 13, 2008, and the juvenile court was
advised by the Department that the parents had made little to no progress
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regarding issues of establishing a residence, obtaining employment, and overall
organization and stability. The Department recommended continuing removal,
and the juvenile court agreed, continuing R.M.’s custody in foster care. The court
further ordered that the parents continue to receive services.
On September 3, 2008, the State filed a petition for termination of the
parents’ parental rights. Following a contested termination hearing, the juvenile
court entered an order on October 7, 2008, terminating M.M.’s parental rights to
R.M. pursuant to section Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h) (child is three or
younger, child CINA, removed from home for six of last twelve months, and child
cannot be returned to custody of parent) (2007).
M.M. appeals.
II. Scope and Standards of Review.
We review termination proceedings de novo. In re R.E.K.F., 698 N.W.2d
147, 149 (Iowa 2005). The grounds for termination must be supported by clear
and convincing evidence. In re T.B., 604 N.W.2d 660, 661 (Iowa 2000). If the
juvenile court terminates parental rights on more than one statutory ground, we
need only to find the evidence supports termination on one of the grounds cited
by the juvenile court to affirm. In re R.K., 649 N.W.2d 18, 19 (Iowa Ct. App.
2000). Our primary concern in termination proceedings is the best interests of
the child. In re J.L.W., 570 N.W.2d 778, 780 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). Even when
the statutory grounds for termination are met, the decision to terminate parental
rights must reflect the child’s best interests. In re M.S., 519 N.W.2d 398, 400
(Iowa 1994). When we consider the child’s best interests, we look to the child’s
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long-range as well as immediate best interests. In re C.K., 558 N.W.2d 170, 172
(Iowa 1997).
III. Discussion.
M.M. does not take issue with the juvenile court’s conclusion that R.M.
could not be returned to his custody. Instead, he contends the court should have
given him two additional months to demonstrate the adequacy of his parenting
abilities. Upon our de novo review, we agree with the juvenile court that granting
M.M. additional time would not have allowed R.M. to be safely returned to M.M.’s
care and that termination was in R.M.’s best interests.
Despite M.M.’s receipt of intensive services for eight months, R.M. still
cannot be placed in M.M.’s care. M.M.’s visitation with R.M. had not progressed
beyond supervised visits. Additionally, M.M. was not able to consistently apply
the parenting skills that he was being taught, and the provider still had to prompt
M.M. how to properly supervise and interact with R.M. Although it is true that
M.M. followed some of the recommendations set forth in the case permanency
plan, such as having a mental health evaluation and following the mental health
provider’s recommendations, M.M. failed to follow through on other important
recommendations.
Over the pendency of the case, M.M. did not obtain
employment until two weeks prior to the termination hearing. Additionally, M.M.’s
girlfriend and her son moved in with M.M. into M.M.’s parents’ home, and M.M.,
his girlfriend, and her child all shared a room and a single bed.
Home
cleanliness issues still remained; on a drop-in visit to the home just prior to the
termination, a Department worker found their room to be so cluttered and dirty
that she could not even open the door far enough to walk in. M.M. testified that
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his parents’ home would be appropriate for R.M., further demonstrating his lack
of insight into R.M.’s needs and appropriate care.
It is clear M.M. loves R.M. and would like to develop a relationship with
R.M.
However, upon our review of the record, it is apparent that serious
concerns still exist regarding M.M.’s stability and his ability to provide adequate
care for R.M., especially given R.M.’s special needs. R.M. is doing very well in
the foster home, and the foster parents are willing to adopt R.M. R.M. deserves
stability and permanency, which M.M. cannot provide.
See In re C.D., 509
N.W.2d 509, 513 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993).
We do not minimize the efforts M.M. made to recover R.M. Nevertheless,
the evidence does not support the conclusion that additional time would allow
R.M. to be returned to M.M.’s care. Consequently, we agree with the juvenile
court’s finding that termination of M.M.’s parental rights is in R.M.’s best interests
and no reasonable extension of time would alleviate the concerns noted.
Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court’s decision to terminate M.M.’s parental
rights.
IV. Conclusion.
Because we agree with the juvenile court’s finding that termination of
M.M.’s parental rights is in R.M.’s best interest and no reasonable extension of
time would alleviate the concerns noted, we affirm the juvenile court’s decision to
terminate M.M.’s parental rights.
AFFIRMED.
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