DENNIS A. SCHNEIDER, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. DEBRA RODGERS, n/k/a DEBRA RODGERS KNIGHT, Defendant-Appellee.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-066 / 07-0471
Filed February 27, 2008
DENNIS A. SCHNEIDER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
DEBRA RODGERS,
n/k/a DEBRA RODGERS KNIGHT,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Palo Alto County, Patrick M. Carr,
Judge.
Dennis Schneider appeals the district court’s ruling dismissing his action
against his former wife, Debra Rodgers, for malicious prosecution and fraud.
AFFIRMED.
T.J. Braunschweig, Algona, for appellant.
Ned Stockdale, Estherville, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Zimmer and Miller, JJ.
2
HUITINK, P.J.
Dennis Schneider appeals the district court’s ruling dismissing his action
against his former wife, Debra Rodgers, for malicious prosecution and fraud. We
affirm.
I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings
Debra and Dennis’s son, Doug, was born in January 1983.
Doug
struggled in school, so Dennis and Debra decided to have him repeat
kindergarten.
Even though Doug attended speech-language therapy, he still
continued to have difficulties at school. Doug was eventually referred to the
University of Iowa Child Development Clinic.
Doug was diagnosed with
developmental reading disorder (dyslexia), expressive language problems, and
uneven cognitive development with low average verbal intellectual abilities and
average performance intellectual abilities.
treatment for his learning disabilities.
This diagnosis led to specialized
With daily assistance in the school
resource room, Doug was able to progress through school in a traditional
classroom.
In 1998 Debra and Dennis dissolved their marriage. A written stipulation
awarded both parents joint legal custody, while Dennis was awarded physical
care of Doug and his other sibling. The stipulation also stated that Debra would
not pay child support because “Debra is relinquishing her claim for any spousal
support and has made certain concessions in the property division part of this
settlement to more than compensate Dennis for the child support he would be
entitled to under the Iowa Child Support Guidelines.”
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In September 2000 Doug and Dennis got into an argument, and Doug
moved out to live with Debra. Doug was a seventeen-year-old junior in high
school when he moved in with his mother. Dennis agreed to the new living
arrangement, but did not provide any financial assistance to Debra or Doug.
On March 16, 2001, Debra filed a petition to modify the dissolution decree.
Debra requested physical care of Doug to mirror the current living arrangement
and also requested temporary and permanent child support. Doug was eighteenyears-old when Debra filed the petition.
The matter did not proceed to a hearing until August 20, 2001. Dennis
came to this hearing without an attorney. After it received brief testimony from
Debra and Dennis, the court entered an order granting Debra temporary physical
care and $640 of monthly support pursuant to the Iowa child support guidelines.
In doing so, the court made several factual findings: (1) Doug was eighteen years
old and a senior in high school, (2) Debra earned approximately $18,500 per
year, and (3) Dennis’s annual adjusted gross income was approximately
$60,500.
Shortly thereafter, Dennis acquired an attorney and filed an “Application
for Hearing.” In this application, Dennis argued the court erred in issuing an
order regarding Doug’s physical care because Doug was eighteen years old at
the time the order was issued and therefore not subject to the jurisdiction of the
court. Dennis also argued that the court erred in requiring him to pay temporary
child support to Debra because it violated Iowa Code section 598.1(9) (2001). 1
1
Section 598.1(9) identifies two specific exceptions where a parent’s obligation to
provide support may continue beyond the age of eighteen. The first exception is
4
While this application was pending, Dennis filed a motion for summary judgment
asking the court to declare the modification “moot.” Debra responded with a
cross-motion for summary judgment asking the court to conclude that Doug was
eligible for child support.
The fighting issue in these motions was whether
Doug’s learning disability qualified as a “mental disability” under Iowa Code
section 598.1(9) so as to make him dependent on his parents.
On January 23, 2002, a second district court judge entered an order on
the pending “Application for Rehearing.”
This judge determined that the
aforementioned learning disability made Doug dependent on Debra and Dennis
and made them legally responsible to provide him support until he graduated
from high school. However, the judge went on to conclude that the previous
judge erred when he utilized the child support guidelines to determine the
amount of monthly support.
Because there was insufficient information to
determine Doug’s monthly living expenses, the judge was “unable to determine
whether the guideline support amount determined by the court in its August 20,
2001 order was proper” and therefore “canceled and rescinded” the August 20,
2001 order.
On February 5, 2002, the first district court judge entered a ruling on the
pending motions for summary judgment. This judge concluded, as did the judge
for a child who is between the ages of eighteen and nineteen years who
is engaged full-time in completing high school graduation or equivalency
requirements in a manner which is reasonably expected to result in
completion of the requirements prior to the person reaching nineteen
years of age.
Iowa Code § 598.1(9). The second exception is “for a child of any age who is dependent
on the parties to the dissolution proceedings because of physical or mental disability.”
Id. Dennis argued that Doug did not satisfy either exception.
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ruling on the “Application for Rehearing,” that Doug’s learning disability made him
“dependent” for purposes of section 598.1(9).
On March 27, 2003, more than two years after the petition for modification
had been filed, the case came before a third judge for trial. By this time, Doug
had already graduated from high school, moved back into his father’s house, and
started attending classes at a local community college. The judge ultimately
dismissed the petition for modification, noting Doug “does not and never has had
a mental disability.” The judge also denied all requests for attorney fees.
On July 14, 2003, Dennis filed the present action alleging Debra had
perpetrated fraud when filing the petition for modification. He also alleged abuse
of process and malicious prosecution.
Debra counterclaimed for abuse of
process and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Through various pretrial
rulings, the court dismissed most of these claims and only preserved Dennis’s
claims against Debra for malicious prosecution and fraud.
The matter was tried to the court on August 15, 2006. The main thrust of
Dennis’s claims was that Debra intentionally misled the court and tried to prolong
the proceedings by claiming Doug had a mental disability, even though she really
did not believe he was mentally disabled.
After a full trial, the district court
dismissed Dennis’s petition. In doing so, the court stated
The position taken by Debra in seeking temporary child support and
in resisting Dennis’s motion to vacate the temporary child support
order, and in resisting Dennis’s motion for summary judgment and
seeking her own, all appear to the Court to be well within the range
of zealous advocacy.
The court determined Dennis did not prove his malicious prosecution claim
because Debra had refuted his claim that there was no probable cause for her
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pursuit of these claims. The court also determined Dennis did not prove his fraud
claim because he failed to prove Debra knowingly made a material
misrepresentation.
On appeal, Dennis claims the court erred in not finding that Debra
committed fraud and malicious prosecution. He claims the court should have
awarded him $3200 for the temporary child support he paid to Debra, $7393.56
for his attorney fees in defending Debra’s modification action, and punitive
damages.
Debra refutes the claims, and also contends the appeal must be
dismissed because Dennis did not file an application to certify the appeal.
II. Standard of Review
Our review in this case is for correction of errors at law. See Royce v.
Hoening, 423 N.W.2d 198, 200 (Iowa 1988) (“In actions for malicious prosecution
. . . our review is limited to correction of errors at law.”); Cornell v. Wunschel, 408
N.W.2d 369, 374 (Iowa 1987) (reviewing a fraudulent misrepresentation claim for
errors at law).
III. Merits
We will assume, arguendo, that Dennis was not required to file an
application to certify this appeal.
A. Malicious Prosecution
The basis of an action for malicious prosecution consists of the wrongful
initiation of an unsuccessful civil or criminal proceeding with malice and without
probable cause. 2 Sarvold v. Dodson, 237 N.W.2d 447, 448 (Iowa 1976). “The
2
Specifically, the elements of malicious prosecution are: (1) a previous prosecution;
(2) instigation of that prosecution by the defendant; (3) termination of that prosecution by
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remedy’s primary purpose is to provide relief in those cases in which a plaintiff
brings a meritless suit and has an improper motive for bringing it.” Wilson, 464
N.W.2d at 259. Dennis claims the court erred when it determined Debra had
probable cause for pursuing her modification claim. We disagree.
Probable cause for a civil action is defined as “knowledge of a state of
facts which would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence, acting
conscientiously, impartially, reasonably, and without prejudice, to believe that the
suit is justified.” Brown v. Monticello Bank, 360 N.W.2d 81, 87 (Iowa 1984).
Debra instituted the present modification action because she believed that
Doug’s decision to move out of Dennis’s home prior to the completion of high
school constituted a substantial change in circumstances not contemplated in the
original decree. These circumstances were not fleeting; Doug lived with Debra
for six months before she filed the petition. Dennis had paid nothing for Doug’s
support during the preceding six months.
While Doug was of “legal age”
because he was eighteen years old, his learning disability had hampered his
education so that he was only a junior in high school. Because he was in school
during the day, he did not have a full-time job and relied on his parents for food,
clothing, and shelter. For that reason, Debra claimed this learning disability was
a mental disability that made him dependent on his parents for care. Specifically,
she argued that this learning disability qualified for the statutory mental disability
exception to the general rule that parents are no longer financially responsible for
a child that has reached “legal” age. See Iowa Code §§ 598.1(6), (9).
acquittal or discharge of the plaintiff; (4) want of probable cause; (5) malice on the part of
the defendant for bringing the prosecution; and (6) damage to the plaintiff. Wilson v.
Hayes, 464 N.W.2d 250, 259 (Iowa 1990).
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Because section 598.1(9) does not define a “mental disability” for
purposes of making someone dependent on their parents for support, we find it
was not unreasonable for Debra to make this argument in district court. 3 Indeed,
the rationale behind this argument was so persuasive that two separate judges
agreed with Debra’s position and found that Doug’s learning disability made him
dependent pursuant to section 598.1(9).
The mere fact that a third judge
ultimately rejected this argument and found Doug’s learning disability was not a
mental disability does not mean she did not have probable cause to resort to a
court to settle this dispute. 4 See Royce, 423 N.W.2d at 201 (noting there was
probable cause for a claim that survived summary judgment but was ultimately
dismissed after a full trial). Because we find Debra had probable cause to seek a
modification of the controlling decree, we conclude the district court properly
dismissed Dennis’s claim for malicious prosecution.
B. Fraud
Dennis also claims Debra committed fraud because she misrepresented
facts to the court and tried to mislead the court.
The elements for recovery in a fraud action are: (1) representation,
(2) falsity, (3) materiality, (4) scienter, (5) intent, (6) justifiable reliance, and
(7) resulting injury. Smidt v. Porter, 695 N.W.2d 9, 22 (Iowa 2005). The first,
second, and third elements (representation, falsity, and materiality) are usually
treated as one element and are referred to as fraudulent misrepresentation.
3
Our decision is limited to whether Debra had probable cause to file the petition for
modification. We do not review whether the district court’s decision on the petition for
modification was correct.
4
This same judge also denied Dennis’s request that Debra pay his attorney fees for
having to defend against the petition for modification.
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Arthur v. Brick, 565 N.W.2d 623, 625 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). Dennis was required
to prove these elements by a preponderance of the clear, satisfactory, and
convincing evidence. Smidt, 695 N.W.2d at 22.
Dennis first claims Debra attempted to mislead the court at the August 21,
2001 hearing for temporary support because she did not inform the court that
Doug was eighteen years of age. Dennis implies that Debra somehow tricked
the court into awarding her temporary support even though Doug was eighteen
years old.
We find this claim meritless. Debra listed Doug’s birth date in her petition
for modification and noted he was a junior in high school.
Also, the court
obviously knew that Doug was eighteen years old because it specifically included
this fact in its order granting her temporary custody and support.
Dennis also claims that Debra made material misrepresentations of fact
when she claimed that Doug’s “mental disabilities” made him dependent on
others for support, but refused to label her son as “mentally disabled.”
Our
review of the record reveals that Dennis’s attorney repeatedly tried to make
Debra label her child as mentally disabled. Debra refused to do so. Instead, she
steadfastly claimed that Doug’s learning disability constituted a mental disability
that made him dependent upon his parents because the learning disability put
him in a unique position where he would not finish high school until months after
he turned nineteen years old.
We find it reasonable that a mother would be willing to argue that her
child’s documented learning disability constitutes a form of mental disability, but
would not be willing to simultaneously label her child as “mentally disabled.” We
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find nothing to conclude that any of Debra’s statements or arguments throughout
these proceedings constitute a material misrepresentation of fact. Likewise, we
find no evidence to prove that she acted with the intent to deceive either Dennis
or the court. Accordingly, we find Dennis failed to provide clear, satisfactory, and
convincing evidence in support of his fraud claim.
IV. Conclusion
Having considered all issues raised on appeal, whether or not specifically
addressed herein, we affirm the district court’s conclusion that Dennis failed to
prove his claims of fraud and malicious prosecution.
AFFIRMED.
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