STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. DANIEL LAWRENCE MASON, Defendant-Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-053 / 06-1098
Filed February 27, 2008
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DANIEL LAWRENCE MASON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County, Bryan
McKinley, Judge.
Defendant appeals his convictions for criminal trespass and assault.
AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Stephan J. Japuntich,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Robert P. Ewald and Patricia
Houlihan, Assistant Attorneys General, and Paul L. Martin, County Attorney, for
appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Vaitheswaran, J., and Beeghly, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2007).
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BEEGHLY, S.J.
I.
Background Facts & Proceedings
Daniel Mason, a police officer, was acquainted with Marcia, who was the
former wife of a fellow police officer. Marcia was a cosmetologist and she cut
Mason’s hair. The two would engage in flirtatious conversations in the hair salon.
Marcia stated she felt this was a safe situation and she joked back. After Marcia
was divorced Mason asked her out, but she was already dating another man,
Craig.
Mason and Marcia exchanged telephone calls and text messages.
Mason also started calling Marcia in the middle of the night and coming over to
her house, asking her to let him in. Marcia testified she did not respond to
Mason’s night-time calls or let him in the house.
On July 28, 2004, Marcia had a migraine headache and she accidentally
left her back door unlocked. At about 3:00 a.m. she woke up and heard Mason
walking into her bedroom. Mason asked her to have sex. He tried to take off her
shirt and touched her clothing over the breast area.
Marcia went into the
bathroom and threw up. When she came out Mason was lying on her bed, and
she told him he needed to go home. She then went back into the bathroom and
threw up again. Eventually Marcia talked Mason into leaving the house. She
told him Craig was due to stop by the house soon. Marcia testified Mason’s
appearance at her house made her feel, “[v]ery scared, very intimidated, very
vulnerable.”
Mason was charged with burglary in the second degree and assault with
intent to commit sexual abuse. At the trial, Marcia testified as outlined above.
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Mason testified he engaged in a sporadic sexual relationship with Marcia
between February and July 2004. He stated that when they had an appointment
to meet, Marcia would leave the back door unlocked for him and he would walk
in.
Mason testified that he attempted to call Marcia several times in the early
morning hours of July 28, but she did not answer her telephone, and he believed
she was sleeping. He went over to her house anyway. He stated he tried the
back door, and because it was unlocked he walked in. He asked Marcia if she
left the door open for him, and she said she forgot to lock it. He stated Marcia
was wearing about five shirts, and he grabbed the top one and asked why she
was wearing so many shirts. Marcia replied she was ill and felt chilled. Mason
tried to give her a kiss and she backed away, saying she had just thrown up.
Mason stated he asked if he could stay the night with her, and she said he
should go home, so he left. Mason quit calling Marcia after July 28.
The jury returned a verdict finding Mason guilty of the lesser included
offenses of criminal trespass, in violation of Iowa Code sections 716.7 (2003) and
716.8(1), and assault, in violation of sections 708.1 and 708.2(6) (Supp. 2003).
The district court denied Mason’s motion for a new trial. Mason was sentenced
to thirty days in jail on each count, to be served concurrently. He was ordered to
have no contact with Marcia for a period of five years. Mason now appeals his
convictions.
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II.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Mason contends there is insufficient evidence in the record to support his
convictions. He claims there is no evidence that an assault occurred, or that he
had the intent to commit an assault.
He asserts there was no evidence he
displayed anger or force, and he states Marcia asked him to leave merely
because she was not feeling well that evening.
He also claims there is
insufficient evidence to show he had an intent to commit an assault, which is an
element of criminal trespass. He states he had been in Marcia’s home many
times while they had an affair, and he believes he entered the home with her
permission.
We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence for the correction
of errors at law. State v. Schmidt, 480 N.W.2d 886, 887 (Iowa 1992). A guilty
verdict is binding on appeal, unless there is not substantial evidence in the record
to support it, or the verdict is clearly against the weight of the evidence. State v.
Shortridge, 589 N.W.2d 76, 80 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998).
Substantial evidence
means evidence that could convince a rational fact-finder that the defendant is
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
A.
The jury was instructed that Mason engaged in “assault” if he
committed an act: (1) which was intended to cause pain or injury; or (2) which
was intended to result in physical contact which would be insulting or offensive;
or (3) which was intended to place another person in fear of immediate physical
contact which would be painful, injurious, insulting or offensive to another person,
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when coupled with the apparent ability to do the act. See Iowa Code § 708.1(1),
(2) (2003).
We find there is substantial evidence in the record to support the jury’s
verdict that Mason’s conduct constituted an assault under section 708.1. Marcia
testified Mason tried to take off her top, and he touched her breasts over her
clothing. Mason also admitted that he grabbed her shirt. The jury could have
found this physical contact was insulting or offensive to Marcia.
Furthermore, the jury could have found that Mason’s actions of coming
into Marcia’s home in the middle of the night, uninvited and unannounced, and
asking her for sex were actions which were “intended to place another in fear of
immediate physical contact which will be painful, injurious, insulting, or offensive.”
See Iowa Code § 708.1(2). Marcia testified Mason’s actions caused her to be
“[v]ery scared, very intimidated, very vulnerable.”
We also consider that the
telephone records which showed Mason often called Marcia prior to July 28, and
then did not call her at all after July 28, could show a consciousness of guilt by
Mason. See State v. Cox, 500 N.W.2d 23, 25 (Iowa 1993) (noting a defendant’s
activities following an offense may provide a legitimate basis for inferring
consciousness of guilt).
We conclude there is sufficient evidence in the record to find Mason
committed the crime of assault.
B.
For the crime of criminal trespass, the jury was instructed it needed
to find: (1) defendant entered Marcia’s residence; (2) he did not have Marcia’s
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express permission; and (3) when he entered he had the specific intent to
commit an assault. See Iowa Code § 716.7(2)(a).
We have already found there is sufficient evidence in the record to show
Mason had the specific intent to commit an assault. Mason has also claimed
there was insufficient evidence he did not have Marcia’s express permission to
enter her home. Mason’s argument is based on his testimony that he had an
ongoing sexual relationship with Marcia.
Marcia denied having a sexual
relationship with Mason, and denied giving Mason permission to enter her home.
On cross-examination Mason revealed relatively little knowledge about the layout
of Marcia’s home, or about Marcia personally.
Weighing the evidence and
assessing the credibility of witnesses are matters left to the jury.
State v.
Hutchison, 721 N.W.2d 776, 780 (Iowa 2006). The jury could have decided not
to believe Mason’s testimony that he had a previous sexual relationship with
Marcia.
We conclude there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the jury’s
verdict finding Mason guilty of criminal trespass.
We affirm Mason’s convictions.
AFFIRMED.
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SACKETT, C.J. (concurs specially)
I concur specially. I agree with the result reached by the majority. In
doing so I do not adopt the following language of the majority:
We also consider that the telephone records which showed Mason
often called Marcia prior to July 28, and then did not call her at all
after July 28, could show a consciousness of guilt by Mason. See
State v. Cox, 500 N.W.2d 23, 25 (Iowa 1993) (noting a defendant’s
activities following an offense may provide a legitimate basis for
inferring consciousness of guilt).
Our supreme court held that: “Admissions may be implied by the conduct
of the defendant subsequent to a crime, including fabrication, when such conduct
indicates a consciousness of guilt.”
State v. Cox, 500 N.W.2d 23, 25 (Iowa
1993). I am unwilling to determine that Mason’s failure to call Marcia following
the event is such conduct as can be implied an admission of guilt.
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