IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF SHARON D. MOUW AND JEFFREY MOUW, Upon the Petition of SHARON D. MOUW, Petitioner-Appellant, And Concerning JEFFREY MOUW, Respondent-Appellee.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-032 / 07-1162
Filed February 13, 2008
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF SHARON D. MOUW AND JEFFREY MOUW,
Upon the Petition of
SHARON D. MOUW,
Petitioner-Appellant,
And Concerning
JEFFREY MOUW,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Sioux County, James D. Scott,
Judge.
Petitioner appeals from the economic provisions of the decree dissolving
the parties’ marriage. AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
Michael L. Zenor of Zenor, Houchins & Borth, Spencer, for appellant.
Lloyd W. Bierma of Oostra, Bierma & Van Engen, P.L.C., Sioux Center,
for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Vogel and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
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SACKETT, C.J.
Petitioner-appellant, Sharon Mouw, appeals from the economic provisions
of the decree dissolving her marriage to respondent-appellee, Jeffrey Mouw.
She contends the court erred in valuing certain assets and in not awarding her
traditional alimony. We affirm as modified.
I. Background
The parties married in 1980. They had two children who are now adults.
At the time of the dissolution in June of 2007, Sharon was fifty-one years old and
Jeffrey was fifty-seven. Sharon has a GED and one semester of college. She
works as a travel agent, cleans houses, and does other office work. The district
court found she had monthly income of $1550.
Jeffrey has a tenth-grade
education and is a long-haul truck driver. The district court found his monthly
income to be $3000.
The district court valued certain assets and based on these valuations
awarded Jeffrey the family home, an acreage, and assigned all the parties’ debt
to him. The district court determined this left Jeffrey with a negative net award of
$19,269. The court awarded Sharon assets of $8912 but did not order her to pay
any of the parties’ debts.
The court considered alimony together with the
property award and concluded alimony was not appropriate because of the
disparity in the property settlement, Sharon’s younger age, her better health, and
greater education.
II. Scope and Standards of Review
We review decrees of dissolution of marriage de novo. Iowa R. App. P.
6.4. We give weight to the findings of the district court, but are not bound by
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them. In re Marriage of Brown, 487 N.W.2d 331, 332 (Iowa 1992). Prior cases
have little precedential value, and we base our decision on the facts and
circumstances unique to the parties before us.
N.W.2d 324, 326 (Iowa 1991).
In re Marriage of Gaer, 476
“We consider alimony and property division
together in assessing their individual sufficiency. They are neither made nor
subject to evaluation in isolation from one another.”
In re Marriage of
McLaughlin, 526 N.W.2d 342, 345 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994). An award of alimony
depends on the circumstances of each particular case. In re Marriage of Dieger,
584 N.W.2d 567, 570 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998).
When determining the
appropriateness of alimony, the court must consider the statutory factors
enumerated in Iowa Code section 598.21A (Supp. 2005).
The court also
considers each party’s earning capacity, as well as the parties’ present standards
of living and ability to pay, balanced against the relative needs of the other. In re
Marriage of Hettinga, 574 N.W.2d 920, 922 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). Although our
review of the district court's alimony award is de novo, we afford that court
considerable latitude in making the determination. In re Marriage of Anliker, 694
N.W.2d 535, 540 (Iowa 2005). We will disturb that determination only when there
has been a failure to do equity. Id.
III. Property Division
Sharon contends the district court undervalued certain of the assets
awarded Jeffrey and erred in considering as debt to Jeffrey an oral obligation to
Jeffrey’s father, which the court determined to be in the amount of $75,000.
Sharon contends the home and acreage that went to Jeffrey should have been
valued at $250,000 rather than the $185,000 value placed on it by the district
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court. She also challenges the valuation placed on a Peterbilt tractor and reefer
trailer. Although our review is de novo, we will defer to the trial court when
valuations are accompanied with supporting credibility findings or corroborating
evidence. We find the values assigned by the court are within the permissible
range of the evidence and we will not disturb them on appeal.
See In re
Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 703 (Iowa 2007); In re Marriage of Vieth,
591 N.W.2d 639, 640 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999).
We consider the valuations established by the district court in assessing
the economic provisions of the decree.
Sharon also challenges the district court crediting to Jeffrey a $75,000 oral
debt he claimed was owed to his father.
In 1993 Jeffrey’s father sold and
transferred to Jeffrey and Sharon the home and part of the acreage allocated to
Jeffrey. The district court found there was an oral agreement between Jeffrey
and his father for a sale price of $75,000 with payment of interest only at $400 a
month and principal payments at Jeffrey and Sharon’s discretion.
The court
further found “Jeffrey’s father has never asked for principal and the court does
not believe he intends to do so.”
Sharon argues if the $75,000 is not going to be repaid then it should not
excuse Jeffrey from paying alimony.
We give some consideration to Sharon’s argument on this issue in
assessing her claim for alimony. The forebearance of principal payments is in
the nature of a gift to Jeffrey. Sharon testified the $400 was paid to Jeffrey’s
father nearly every month and it was her understanding the $400 went to
principal and no interest was being charged. She also testified this was his way
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of giving the couple an inheritance without having to pay taxes. Inherited and
gifted property can be considered in determining alimony.
See, e.g., In re
Marriage of Moffatt, 279 N.W.2d 15, 20 (Iowa 1979); In re Marriage of Weiss, 496
N.W.2d 785, 788 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992); In re Marriage of Voss, 396 N.W.2d 801,
804 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986).
IV. Alimony
We address Sharon’s contention the court erred in not awarding her
traditional alimony. This was a nearly thirty-year marriage. Jeffrey’s income is
greater than Sharon’s. Sharon spent several years out of the workforce caring
for the couple’s children. She worked for a number of years as a travel agent, an
occupation for which there no longer is a demand. We modify the decree to
provide that Jeffrey shall pay Saron alimony of $200 a month until he reaches his
sixty-second birthday. The alimony shall terminate at the death of either party if it
occurs before Jeffrey’s sixty-second birthday.
V. Attorney Fees
Sharon requests appellate attorney fees. In considering such a request,
we look to the needs of the party making the request, the ability of the other party
to pay, and whether the party making the request was obligated to defend the
trial court’s decision on appeal. In re Marriage of Wood, 567 N.W.2d 680, 684
(Iowa Ct. App. 1997).
Jeffrey is ordered to pay $250 of Sharon’s appellate
attorney fees. Costs on appeal are taxed one-half to each party.
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
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