RICHARD THOMAS STELTZER, Applicant-Appellant, vs. STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-014 / 07-0529
Filed February 13, 2008
RICHARD THOMAS STELTZER,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Warren County, Dale B. Hagen,
Judge.
Richard Steltzer appeals the district court decision denying his application
for postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
Paul Rosenberg of Rosenberg & Associates P.C., Des Moines, for
appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Robert P. Ewald, Assistant Attorney
General, Bryan Tingle, County Attorney, and Alyssa Kenville, Assistant County
Attorney, for appellee State.
Considered by Mahan, P.J., and Eisenhauer and Baker, JJ.
2
MAHAN, P.J.
Richard Steltzer appeals the district court decision denying his application
for postconviction relief. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings
On February 9, 1979, Steltzer was convicted of first-degree kidnapping
and second-degree sexual abuse. The Iowa Supreme Court summarized the
facts of the case in the following manner:
On the evening of October 21, 1978, passing motorists
found the female victim, Lillian, age 21, in a ditch near a country
road partially dressed with her hands tied. At trial she testified in
detail concerning her abduction by defendant, who was a casual
acquaintance. She stated that defendant took her, against her will,
in his truck to a cornfield and subjected her to various acts of
sexual abuse. He then took her to a nearby recreational area, tied
her to a tree and abandoned her there.
Defendant denied the incident and testified that on the
afternoon and evening in question he had driven to Lineville,
Missouri, looking for truck parts, but returned without talking to
anyone when he was unable to locate the man who was to sell him
the parts.
State v. Steltzer, 288 N.W.2d 557, 558 (Iowa 1980).
Both convictions were
affirmed on direct appeal. Id.
At some point after the criminal trial, the victim instituted child support
proceedings against Steltzer, claiming he was the father of her child that was
born approximately nine months after the sexual abuse.
In 1993 Steltzer filed an application for postconviction relief (hereinafter
“PCR application”) requesting that DNA testing be performed on the victim, her
child, her boyfriend, and himself, in order to determine the paternity of the child.
The State moved to dismiss the application as untimely. The court granted the
State’s motion to dismiss, stating
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The development of the DNA testing procedure and its general
acceptance does not constitute new evidence; it is merely a new
way to evaluate the existing evidence. In the absence of new
evidence the 3 year statute is applicable. Petitioner’s Motion for
DNA Testing at State Expense and alternatively at his own expense
is accordingly also denied.
See Iowa Code § 822.3 (1993) (“All other applications must be filed within three
years from the date the conviction or decision is final or, in the event of an
appeal, from the date the writ of procedendo is issued.”).
Steltzer did not appeal this ruling.
Instead, he filed a second PCR
application requesting the same DNA testing.
Once again, the district court
denied his application. Our court affirmed this decision on appeal.
On August 2, 2006, Steltzer filed a third application for postconviction
relief. When filling out this pro se form application, Steltzer checked the box
indicating that the ground for relief was that there were material facts, not
previously presented or heard, that required vacation of his conviction in the
interest of justice. When asked to describe these facts, Steltzer referred to “DNA
results” that he wanted to receive through testing of the victim’s “rape kit,” the
victim’s child, the victim’s alleged boyfriend, and himself. Steltzer listed “section
81.10” as the authority for this DNA testing. See Iowa Code § 81.10 (2007)
(describing a procedure whereby individuals can request DNA profiling for
previous convictions).
The State responded to this PCR application with a motion to dismiss
claiming the application was “without merit absent a motion and subsequent
order pursuant to § 81.10 of the Iowa Code establishing the existence of newly
discovered evidence in the form of DNA evidence.” Steltzer’s court-appointed
4
counsel responded to the motion to dismiss with a motion asking the court to
order DNA testing of Steltzer, the victim, and the victim’s child pursuant to
section 81.10.
After a brief hearing, the district court entered a ruling on the State’s
motion to dismiss. The court noted that Steltzer had presented no evidence in
support of his PCR application; instead, he had “jumped the gun” and filed the
PCR application before there had even been a DNA test. Rather than dismiss
the PCR application outright, the district court entered a ruling withholding
judgment on the PCR application until such time as the section 81.10 motion was
resolved. In the meantime, the court directed the State to respond to the section
81.10 motion and specify whether any biological or blood evidence had been
collected in this case.
The State filed a resistance to the section 81.10 motion indicating that it
knew of no blood testing, biological testing, or other DNA collection performed
during the 1978 investigation. The State also indicated that all the exhibits and
records for this twenty-seven-year-old trial had been destroyed.
The district court denied the section 81.10 motion. Nine days later, the
court issued a separate ruling denying the PCR application because there was
“no evidence” upon which it could grant the requested relief.
Steltzer raises two issues on appeal:
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN SUMMARILY
DISMISSING RICHARD STELTZER’S PCR ON THE NARROW
GROUND THAT DNA TESTING WAS UNAVAILABLE UNDER §
81.10.
II. RICHARD STELTZER’S PCR COUNSEL WAS
INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO PROPERLY RESIST THE STATE’S
DISMISSAL MOTION.
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II. Standard of Review
We typically review postconviction relief proceedings on error. Osborn v.
State, 573 N.W.2d 917, 920 (Iowa 1998). However, when the applicant asserts
claims of a constitutional nature, our review is de novo. Id. Thus, we review
Steltzer’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim de novo. Id.
III. Merits
A. Summary Decision
Stelzer contends the court’s “very narrow and strict treatment” and
summary disposition of his PCR application was inappropriate. We disagree.
Iowa Code section 822.6 provides that the postconviction court may grant
a motion for summary disposition “when it appears from the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact,
together with any affidavits” that there is “no genuine issue of material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Summary
disposition of a postconviction relief application is not proper if a material issue of
fact exists. See Iowa Code § 822.6. A fact issue is generated if reasonable
minds can differ on how the issues should be resolved, but if the conflict in the
record consists only of the legal consequences flowing from undisputed facts,
entry of summary judgment is proper. See Davis v. State, 520 N.W.2d 319, 321
(Iowa Ct. App. 1994).
The only ground for postconviction relief listed in Steltzer’s application was
that there were “material facts, not previously presented and heard, that
require[d] vacation of [his] conviction or sentence in the interest of justice.”
Although his application does not cite a specific section of the Uniform
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Postconviction Procedure Act, his PCR claim clearly rests upon Iowa Code
section 822.2(1)(d), which holds that a defendant may seek postconviction relief
from his conviction if “[t]here exists evidence of material facts, not previously
presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the
interest of justice.”
Section 822.2(1)(d) requires the postconviction relief applicant to establish
four elements before a new trial will be granted. See Summage v. State, 579
N.W.2d 821, 822 (Iowa 1998). The applicant must show:
(1) the evidence was discovered after judgment; (2) the evidence
could not have been discovered earlier in the exercise of due
diligence; (3) it is material to the issue, not merely cumulative or
impeaching; and (4) it would probably change the result if a new
trial is granted.
Id.
Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Steltzer, see Davis, 520
N.W.2d at 321, we agree with the district court’s conclusion that Steltzer failed to
set forth any new facts or evidence showing that there was a genuine issue for
trial. Indeed, his PCR application only consisted of allegations that he was not
the father of the victim’s child. Even if he were able to prove that he was not the
father of this child, at most this evidence would merely impeach the victim’s
paternity claim, a claim that was apparently only made after Steltzer was
convicted of the crime. 1 Newly-discovered evidence which is merely cumulative
or impeaching does not entitle one to a new trial. Summage, 579 N.W.2d at 822.
1
Steltzer never claims she said he was the father of the child during his criminal
proceeding. All of his allegations relate to the claim she made in the subsequent civil
proceeding.
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We also find this alleged evidence would not change the result if he were
granted a new trial. The victim specifically identified the defendant, a person she
knew prior to the incident, as the person who kidnapped her, tied her hands
together, and repeatedly sexually abused her. Evidence that the twenty-oneyear-old victim had sexual intercourse with another man in the weeks before or
after the incident would have little impact on the ultimate issue of whether
Steltzer committed these crimes. Accordingly, we find the district court properly
denied Steltzer’s PCR application via summary disposition because he failed to
provide sufficient evidence to warrant a new trial and failed to generate a genuine
issue of material fact issue that would warrant further proceedings.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Postconviction Counsel
Steltzer also contends his postconviction counsel for his third PCR
application rendered ineffective assistance. To prevail on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, Steltzer must show that his attorney’s performance fell
outside the normal range of competency, and the deficient performance so
prejudiced his case as to give rise to a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s alleged errors, the outcome of the proceedings would have been
different. Dunbar v. State, 515 N.W.2d 12, 15 (Iowa 1994). There is a strong
presumption counsel performed competently, and Steltzer as claimant has the
burden to prove that counsel was ineffective. Id. An ineffective assistance of
counsel claim may be disposed of if the defendant fails to prove either prong.
State v. Cook, 565 N.W.2d 611, 614 (Iowa 1997).
Steltzer claims his PCR counsel was ineffective because he did not
attempt to amend the PCR application or supplement the record in order to
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properly resist the state’s dismissal motion. On appeal, Steltzer suggests that his
PCR counsel “could have put on evidence that only the rapist could have
fathered [the victim’s] child.” However, Steltzer does not identify any credible
evidence to prove this point and such an argument contradicts his claim that the
victim’s boyfriend is the father of the child. We find this argument meritless.
Steltzer also claims his PCR counsel should have explored the
circumstances surrounding the destruction of the rape kit. This argument hinges
on two assumptions: (1) the 1978 investigation produced a rape kit and (2) the
State destroyed that rape kit. As noted in the State’s resistance to the motion for
section 81.10 DNA testing, the State knew of no collected DNA evidence and
knew of no biological or blood testing in this case. Because there is no evidence
that there was ever a rape kit containing biological evidence, 2 we find a
competent attorney would not have explored this matter further.
IV. Conclusion
Having considered all arguments made on appeal, whether or not
specifically addressed in this opinion, we affirm the district court’s decision
denying Steltzer’s third application for postconviction relief. Id. We also find he
has failed to prove his ineffective assistance claim.
AFFIRMED.
2
Steltzer’s two previous postconviction requests for DNA profiling of the victim, her child,
her boyfriend, and himself never mentioned a rape kit.
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