KRISTEN NEINER, f/k/a KRISTEN GUILFORD, Plaintiff-Appell ant/Cross-Appellee, vs. TIMOTHY E. GARDNER and GARDNER CROP INSURANCE, INC., Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 7-939 / 06-1878
Filed March 14, 2008
KRISTEN NEINER, f/k/a
KRISTEN GUILFORD,
Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
vs.
TIMOTHY E. GARDNER and
GARDNER CROP INSURANCE, INC.,
Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Monroe County, James Q.
Blomgren (trial, motion for new trial) and Daniel P. Wilson (motion to reconsider),
Judges.
Plaintiff appeals a district court ruling granting defendants’ motion for new
trial. REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
Verle W. Norris, Corydon, for appellant.
John A. Pabst of Pabst Law Firm, Albia, for appellee.
Heard by Huitink, P.J., and Zimmer and Miller, JJ.
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HUITINK, P.J.
I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings
On April 14, 2005, the plaintiff, Kristen Neiner, f/k/a Kristen Guilford, filed a
petition at law claiming Timothy Gardner and Gardner Crop Insurance, Inc., owed
her commissions for her role in the sale of federal crop insurance. The matter
proceeded to a bench trial in March 2006. A key part of the plaintiff’s case was
that the defendants acknowledged the existence of some of these commissions
because they had received a notice of assignment of her commissions to a bank
and agreed to remit her commissions directly to that bank.
At the close of
evidence, the defendants made a motion for directed verdict arguing, among
other things, that the plaintiff was not the real party in interest because she had
assigned her interest in the disputed commissions.
In an off-the-record
discussion, the court indicated it would be interested in receiving written
argument and authorities on the parties’ position on the issue of whether the
plaintiff was the real party in interest.
Weeks later, the plaintiff filed a motion to reopen the record to allow
additional evidence regarding payment of the indebtedness that led to the
assignment. 1 Sometime after the motion was filed, a member of the court’s staff
inadvertently faxed counsel an unsigned ruling granting judgment to the plaintiff
for $45,063.44.
This unsigned ruling contained the following language
dismissing the defendants’ argument that the plaintiff was not the real party in
interest:
1
The motion also erroneously stated that an exhibit confirming payment of the debt was
attached to the motion. No such exhibit was attached to the motion.
3
Defendant further asserts plaintiff is not the real party in
interest with regard to at least $28,430 of the commissions claimed
because she had assigned payment to the bank in Missouri and
therefore was not the real party in interest. After the initial trial, the
court reopened the record in this matter and plaintiff demonstrated
the debt had been paid, and the bank no longer was interested in
the assignment of the commissions. The real import of the
acknowledgment of assignment in any event by the defendant was
his understanding that the debt was owed.
(Emphasis added.)
Once the judge discovered the proposed ruling had been sent, he spoke
with counsel for both parties and then filed an order setting a hearing on the
motion to reopen the record. The defendants filed a resistance to the motion to
reopen, contending the plaintiff had sufficient notice of this issue prior to trial and
ample opportunity to present evidence that the assignment was no longer
applicable. The defendants also claimed the judge had acted as an advocate for
the plaintiff when he suggested that plaintiff’s counsel provide authority
addressing the real-party-in-interest issue.
After the contested hearing, the judge entered an order granting plaintiff’s
request to reopen the record and arranged a separate hearing to receive the new
evidence. The judge also addressed the defendants’ “advocacy” argument and
concluded he would not disqualify himself from the proceeding.
The judge
eventually entered judgment for the plaintiff for $45,063.44.
On September 5, 2006, the defendants filed a combined motion for new
trial/motion to enlarge and amend. The motion set forth numerous arguments as
to why a new trial was necessary in this case. It stated that the judge’s actions
constituted an irregularity that prevented the defendants from receiving a fair trial.
The motion also accused the judge of acting as an advocate for the plaintiff. The
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accompanying brief pointed to the draft ruling and claimed that the judge had
“prejudged” the real-party-in-interest issue before he had even received evidence
to support his ruling on the subject. The motion also claimed that the judge had
asked counsel to act unethically when he personally told them not to tell their
clients about the earlier draft decision. Finally, the motion claimed the decision to
grant judgment for the plaintiffs was contrary to law.
On October 20, 2006, the judge entered a brief ruling granting the
defendants’ motion for a new trial and recusing himself from further participation
in the case. In so ruling, the court stated
The Court is prohibited by its rules from becoming a witness in this
matter despite the inaccurate and incomplete assertions of the
[defendants’] motion.
Nonetheless, the unfortunate distribution of the preliminary
draft presents the appearance of an unfair trial for the defendants.
Under these circumstances, Defendant’s Motion for New Trial must
be sustained.
The plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration. Because the original judge had
recused himself from the case, a different district court judge, Judge Daniel P.
Wilson, ruled on the motion. Judge Wilson denied the motion for reconsideration
based on the prior judge’s conclusion that the trial appeared unfair for the
defendants.
The plaintiff now appeals, arguing the district court applied the improper
legal standard and abused its discretion in granting the defendants’ motion for
new trial. She also claims the original district court judge should have ruled upon
her motion for reconsideration.
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The defendants contend the district court properly ordered the new trial,
but also argue on cross-appeal that judgment be entered in their favor as a
matter of law. 2
II. Scope and Standard of Review
The scope of review in this appeal is for correction of errors of law. Iowa
R. App. P. 6.4. We review a ruling on a motion for new trial for an abuse of
discretion. Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)(c); Kuta v. Newberg, 600 N.W.2d 280, 284
(Iowa 1999).
III. Merits
We need not address plaintiff’s specific arguments challenging the court’s
decision to grant a new trial because our supreme court’s decision in Taylor v.
State, 632 N.W.2d 891 (Iowa 2001), establishes that the original judge erred
when he simultaneously recused himself and granted the motion for new trial.
In Taylor, the petitioner had been sentenced to prison for willfully failing to
pay income taxes.
Taylor, 632 N.W.2d at 892.
He filed an application for
postconviction relief in district court, and the district court denied the application.
Id. at 892-93. Taylor filed a combined motion for reconsideration and new trial.
Id. at 893. One of the arguments in this motion was that the presiding judge
should recuse himself because he had developed an interest in the proceedings.
Id. The judge responded by issuing an order simultaneously recusing himself
2
Specifically, the defendants argue the district court erred in: (1) basing recovery on
both a written and an oral contract; (2) granting the motion to reopen the record; (3) not
finding that it was illegal to pay commissions to a non-licensed person; (4) finding the
prior oral agreement did not merge into the written agreement; (5) finding that the
plaintiff was the real party in interest; (6) accepting hearsay evidence at the hearing to
reopen the record; and (7) not granting the defendants’ motion for directed verdict.
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from the case and granting Taylor’s request for a new hearing on his
postconviction application. Id. The judge stated that he did not have an interest
in the proceedings, but felt it necessary to recuse himself “in order to avoid the
appearance of any impropriety.” Id. The judge went on to state
It is this Court’s opinion that such a ruling on a [rule 1.904(2)]
motion can only be made by the fact finder and/or the judge
presiding in that matter. Therefore, due to the fact that the Court
now recuses itself from this matter and cannot rule on the [rule
1.904(2)] motion, the Court grants motion for new trial . . . .
Id.
The State appealed, arguing that if the recusal was proper, the judge had
no authority to grant a new trial. Id. The Iowa Supreme Court agreed. Id. at
896. The court found the judge did not abuse his discretion when he recused
himself from the proceedings. Id. at 895. However, the court determined that
“[w]hen a judge recuses himself, he no longer has the ability to perform and,
thus, is disqualified” from that case. Id. at 896. “As such, it was error for the
recusing judge to grant the motion for new trial, rather than leaving that decision
to the new judge.” Id. (citing Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1802). The court reversed the
decision granting the new trial and remanded the case back to district court so
that a new judge could rule on the pending motion. Id.
The supreme court went on to instruct future courts facing similar
situations:
As a matter of public policy, we note that we would not be well
served if defendants could make accusations of impropriety, which
when accepted, would result in an automatic new trial. In future
cases, when a [1.904(2)] motion is pending, but the presiding judge
sees fit to recuse himself, it is the new judge who has the authority
to decide if a new trial is required. Otherwise, this new judge
should rule on the pending motion.
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Id. (emphasis added).
In the present case, the district court erred when it did not follow the
aforementioned procedure. The original judge issued an order both granting a
new trial and recusing himself from the case. The judge did not err when he
decided to recuse himself from the case; however he did err when he
simultaneously granted the defendants’ request for a new trial. His authority to
decide whether a new trial was appropriate expired once he determined he could
no longer proceed with the case. That decision should have fallen to the judge
assigned to replace him. Accordingly, we reverse the court’s decision to grant a
new trial and remand so that a new judge can address the defendants’ combined
motion for new trial/motion to enlarge and amend. 3
IV. Cross-Appeal
The defendants’ cross-appeal raises many arguments pertaining to
whether the district court’s original decision granting judgment for the plaintiff was
contrary to law. It would be improvident for this court to consider these issues
before the new judge has the opportunity to rule on the combined motion for new
trial/motion to enlarge and amend. Therefore, we deny the defendants’ crossappeal.
3
We also reject any argument that Judge Wilson’s denial of the motion to reconsider
satisfied the procedure set forth in Taylor. The tenor of that ruling suggests that Judge
Wilson did not consider the defendants’ September 5, 2006 motion anew, but merely
deferred to the prior judge’s reasoning for granting the new trial. We find this is not the
type of independent review our supreme court envisioned when it set forth the
aforementioned procedure.
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V. Conclusion
We reinstate this case to the status it held before the court granted the
motion for new trial. Judge Blomgren is recused from the case, and, on remand,
a different judge shall rule on the defendants’ September 5, 2006 motion for new
trial/motion to enlarge and amend.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
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