STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. RICK ANTHONY BRANDES, Defendant-Appellant.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 7-816 / 06-0576
Filed December 28, 2007
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RICK ANTHONY BRANDES,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Chickasaw County, James C.
Bauch, Judge.
Defendant
appeals
his
conviction
and
sentence
for
first-degree
kidnapping. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Patricia Reynolds, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Bridget Chambers, Assistant Attorney
General, W. Patrick Wegman, County Attorney, and Scott Brown, Assistant
County Attorney, for appellee.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Baker, JJ.
2
BAKER, J.
In this appeal, we are asked to decide whether the State met its burden of
proving requisite specific intent where an expert psychiatric witness testified that
the defendant lacked the capacity to form such intent, and the State presented
other evidence, but no testimony from a psychiatric expert, that the defendant
was capable of forming the requisite specific intent. Having reviewed the issues
raised on appeal, we affirm the defendant’s conviction and sentence for firstdegree kidnapping.
I. Background and Facts
On May 26, 2005, the victim was working as a bartender at McShanney’s
Bar in New Hampton. Rick Brandes and Travis Alve were at the bar, drinking
and playing pool. They repeatedly invited the victim to an after-hours party at
Brandes’s apartment.
She initially refused, but eventually agreed to go with
them. She testified that she accepted the invitation because she had recently
moved to New Hampton and wanted to meet people. Her husband was in jail at
the time.
After the victim closed the bar at 2:00 a.m., Brandes and Alve stayed while
she locked up. The three walked the block to Brandes’s apartment. When they
arrived, Brandes locked the front door, and then offered the victim a beer, which
she declined. The three sat at the kitchen table and smoked cigarettes. When
nobody else showed up after about ten minutes, the victim began to feel
uncomfortable and told the men she needed to go home to let her dog out.
Brandes told the victim he had something for her, took her to the nearby
bedroom, and gave her a Seroquel, a prescription medication used to treat
3
bipolar disorder. The victim did not take the pill, but kept it and later hid it in her
sock. When she tried walking toward the door of the bedroom, Alve grabbed her
from behind. She was unable to remove Alve’s hands from her waist. She
pulled out a knife. Brandes told Alve about the knife. When the victim started to
scream, Alve started to strangle her and told her they would slit her throat if she
screamed. She stopped screaming. While Brandes was trying to get the knife
from the victim’s hand, his hand was cut.
During the struggle, Alve got his
forearm around the victim’s throat and leaned her back into the bed so her feet
did not touch the floor. She lost consciousness. When she came to, she was
face-down on the floor, her nose was bleeding, and she was lying in a pool of
blood. Brandes and Alve were standing over her, telling her they were going to
teach her a lesson for pulling a knife on them. Brandes was holding her knife
and told her they were going to use the knife on her.
Alve began removing most of the victim’s clothing. Alve then repeatedly
anally raped her. She testified that, while Alve was raping her, Brandes was in
the living room much of the time, but would come into the bedroom “every so
often.” Brandes would ask her if she wanted him to touch her, and she replied
no, she just wanted to go home. Brandes also held the knife to her throat and
told her he was going to slit her throat and watch her bleed and laugh at her. At
some point during the night, Brandes used the knife to cut off her shirt. On two
occasions, Brandes held a knife to her throat and forced her to perform oral sex
on him. Brandes also performed oral sex on her several times.
Brandes and Alve held the victim in Brandes’s apartment for over four
hours. Two or three times the men allowed her to get dressed and told her they
4
were going to let her leave, but then prevented her from leaving. Brandes kept
her from leaving by dragging her around by her hair, arms, and legs. The victim
testified that Brandes and Alve continually threatened to kill her and told her that,
if she went to law enforcement authorities, “they would have the Sons of Silence
and the Hells Angels come after [her] and they would do worse.”
She also
testified that Brandes told her it wouldn’t matter if she went to the authorities
because “everyone knows that he’s crazy and that he would get away with it” and
that he would come in the bar and make sure she did not tell anyone.
Alve eventually fell asleep on the couch. The victim testified that Brandes
kept saying he was going to keep her hostage, but Alve said she could go.
Brandes told her to wake Alve up to see if she could go. She did and initially
Alve said something about killing her. Brandes then came toward her with a
knife. She ducked in a corner and started screaming. Alve then woke up and
told Brandes that the victim needed to leave before she woke up Alve’s mother
and girlfriend, who were in an upstairs apartment with his two-week-old son. The
men told the victim she had five minutes to leave, or she would not be leaving at
all. She left and walked to her home.
At home, the victim threw her shirt in the garbage and her other clothes in
the laundry and took a shower.
Later that day, she visited her mother and
husband, who told her to go to the police. Later that afternoon, she went to the
sheriff’s office in New Hampton and reported the incident. New Hampton Police
Officer Jeff Jackson interviewed the victim and sent her to the hospital for an
examination.
5
The doctor who examined the victim found tenderness in her neck area,
hemorrhages in her posterior left scalp, where her hair had been forcibly
removed, tearing and swollenness around her nose, and a contusion on her
shoulder, consistent with a rug burn. The doctor also noted tenderness and
several tears around her rectal area, consistent with non-consensual sex. He
noted multiple hemorrhages in both eyes, consistent with the increased pressure
in the blood vessels that occurs when a person has been strangled or the neck
has been forcibly constricted.
That evening, Officer Jackson obtained a warrant to search Brandes’s
apartment. Jackson executed the warrant shortly after midnight. He discovered
bloodstains on the bedroom floor and several bloody towels. Testing confirmed it
was the victim’s blood on the carpet and towels.
While Jackson was drafting the application for the search warrant, the police
received a report of a man at Josie’s bar threatening patrons with a knife. Officer
Jeremy Copp responded to the call. The man with a knife was reportedly walking
south from the bar. Copp eventually found the man and turned his spotlight on
him. He recognized the man as Brandes. Copp got out of his squad car, drew
his weapon, and told Brandes to keep his hands up and get on the ground.
Brandes did not comply, but continued to walk away. Eventually, Copp tackled
Brandes. Foster’s knife was found in the grass approximately twenty feet from
where Copp first spotted Brandes.
After his arrest, Jackson observed and
photographed an injury to Brandes’s left hand.
A June 3, 2005 trial information charged Brandes with kidnapping in the first
degree, in violation of Iowa Code sections 710.1 and 710.2 (2005) and going
6
armed with intent in violation of section 708.8. On January 20, 2006, Brandes
filed a notice of his intent to rely on the defense of diminished responsibility. He
also waived his right to a jury trial. A bench trial commenced on February 15 and
concluded on February 23, 2006.
Brandes testified that when he was eighteen or nineteen, his car hit a train,
and after that he began to see psychiatrists and was diagnosed with mental
illness. He also testified that his mind races and that for a year he has been
hearing voices telling him to hurt himself. At the time of trial, he was not working
but was drawing social security disability. He admitted he took Seroquel, but
denied giving a pill to the victim. He testified that, on May 26, 2005, he started
drinking around 12:30 in the afternoon and had seven to nine beers before he
went to McShanney’s around 10:00 p.m.
At trial, Dr. Raja Akbar, a psychiatrist who had treated Brandes since 1998,
testified that Brandes had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder with psychosis.
He testified that for years Brandes had intermittently been paranoid and
delusional, and reported hearing voices. Akbar testified that Brandes’s “thinking
process was sufficiently impaired” that he could not form the intent needed to
understand that the victim was being confined against her will or that she was not
consenting to participation in sex acts. His opinion was primarily based upon the
combination of taking prescription medications and drinking alcoholic beverages,
which left Brandes without the capacity to understand the danger of the situation.
The trial court convicted Brandes of first-degree kidnapping and sentenced
him to a term of life in prison. The court granted the State’s motion to dismiss the
charge of going armed with intent.
7
II. Merits
Brandes appeals his conviction and sentence for first-degree kidnapping,
contending the record contains insufficient evidence to support his conviction, his
trial counsel was ineffective, and the trial court erred in refusing to allow him to
present evidence which was vital to his theory of defense.
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Brandes contends the record contains insufficient evidence to support his
conviction, based upon his incapacity to form the requisite specific intent. We
review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence for correction of errors at
law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4; State v. Bower, 725 N.W.2d 435, 440-41 (Iowa 2006).
The trial court’s findings of guilt are binding on appeal if supported by substantial
evidence. State v. Thomas, 561 N.W.2d 37, 39 (Iowa 1997).
Substantial evidence is evidence upon which a rational finder of
fact could find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We
review the facts in the light most favorable to the State.
Furthermore, we consider not only evidence which supports the
verdict, but all reasonable inferences which could be derived from
the evidence.
State v. Rohm, 609 N.W.2d 504, 509 (Iowa 2000) (internal citations and
quotations omitted). “[T]he State must prove every element of the crime charged
beyond a reasonable doubt. The State’s evidence must raise a fair inference of
guilt and do more than create speculation, suspicion, or conjecture.” State v.
Williams, 674 N.W.2d 69, 71 (Iowa 2004) (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
A person commits kidnapping when he confines another person, knowing
that he “has neither the authority nor the consent of the other to do so” and the
8
act is accompanied by “[t]he intent to inflict serious injury upon such person, or to
subject the person to a sexual abuse.” Iowa Code § 710.1. Brandes relies on
the defense of diminished responsibility. Where specific intent is an element of
the charged crime, the diminished responsibility defense allows a defendant to
present evidence of diminished mental capacity. State v. Jacobs, 607 N.W.2d
679, 684 (Iowa 2000). Brandes contends the State failed to meet its burden to
prove that he was capable of forming the requisite specific intent to sexually
abuse the victim.
The record contains sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that
Brandes had the capacity to form the requisite specific intent.
The physical
evidence supports the non-consensual nature of the victim’s confinement, the
forceful nature of the sex acts, and that sexual abuse occurred.
Brandes’s
actions in holding a knife to the victim’s throat, cutting her shirt from her body,
and in forcing her to perform oral sex and forcing her to submit to oral sex
demonstrate his specific intent to sexually abuse her. Brandes’s threats to kill
her and his warnings to her to not go to the police demonstrate that he had the
capacity to form the specific intent to sexually abuse her. See State v. Wheeler,
403 N.W.2d 58, 64 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987) (finding substantial evidence of specific
intent, despite expert’s testimony that defendant was unable to form such intent,
where defendant shot father at close range after hours of deliberation).
Additionally, there have been lengthy periods when Brandes’s mental illness has
been under control.
The evidence supports an inference that he was
experiencing one of those periods at the time of the kidnapping.
9
Dr. Akbar testified that Brandes did not have the capacity to form the
requisite specific intent. Iowa appellate courts have held that trial courts are “not
obligated to accept opinion evidence, even from experts, as conclusive.”
Jacobs, 607 N.W.2d at 685.
Such holdings, however, typically occur in the
context of conflicting testimony between experts. See, e.g., id; Wheeler, 403
N.W.2d at 64. It has also been said that “[t]he fact finder is not obliged to accept
expert testimony, even if it is uncontradicted, although testimony should not be
arbitrarily and capriciously rejected.” Waddell v. Peet’s Feeds, Inc., 266 N.W.2d
29, 32 (Iowa 1978).
We hold that the trial court was free to reject Akbar’s opinion that Brandes
lacked the capacity to form the requisite specific intent in spite of the State’s
failure to present expert mental health testimony to refute Akbar’s opinion. In
other jurisdictions, courts have come to similar conclusions. See, e.g., Nelson v.
State, 850 So. 2d 514, 530-31 (Fla. 2003) (holding the trial court was entitled to
reject uncontroverted opinion testimony of defense mental health expert that
defendant suffered from brain damage if court found there was competent,
substantial evidence refuting the claim that defendant lacked capacity to
appreciate the criminality of his acts); W.D.B. v. Com., ___ S.W.3d ___, ___ (Ky.
2007) (holding defense expert’s testimony, although uncontroverted by another
mental health expert, was refuted by other evidence and inconclusive on the
issue of defendant’s criminal capacity); State v. Dickerson, 543 N.E.2d 1250,
1255 (Ohio 1989) (upholding trial court’s finding that diminished capacity had not
been established in spite of expert testimony by psychiatrists that defendant
lacked capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct).
10
Important factors which convince us that the trial court was entitled to
reject Akbar’s opinion include the previously-noted other substantial evidence
supporting Brandes’s capacity to form the requisite specific intent, e.g., holding a
knife to the victim’s throat and warning her not go to the police, and Akbar’s
reliance on incomplete, insufficient, and/or inaccurate information. Akbar relied
on Brandes’s account of the events and information from Brandes’s attorney to
form his opinion. He was unaware of many of the facts of the case, including
evidence that on the day following the kidnapping, Brandes told Vivien Stenhard
about his actions with the victim and that he planned to take another woman
back to his apartment at knifepoint. The information relied upon by Akbar to form
his opinion was, therefore, incomplete at best. See Jacobs, 607 N.W.2d at 685
(affirming the trial court’s rejection of diminished responsibility defense where the
expert’s opinion “was undermined by the fact that the doctor was not fully aware
of the extent of the efforts the defendant had taken to conceal his illegal
activities”). The trial court was free to reject Akbar’s opinion because it was
inconsistent with other substantial evidence supporting Brandes’s capacity to
form the requisite specific intent and was based on incomplete information. We
find sufficient evidence supports the conviction and affirm on this issue.
B. Ineffective Assistance
Brandes next contends that, should this court refuse to consider the issue
of the sufficiency of the evidence due to his trial counsel’s failure to timely file
notice of the affirmative defense of diminished capacity, we should find his trial
counsel ineffective in order to reach the issue. Because we have considered
Brandes’s sufficiency argument, we need not consider this issue. Were we to
11
consider the issue, however, we would find that, although Brandes’s defense
counsel failed to file a timely notice of his intent to rely on the defense of
diminished responsibility, Brandes was not prejudiced by the failure as he was
permitted to present the defense. See State v. Simmons, 714 N.W.2d 264, 276
(Iowa 2006) (noting that to establish ineffective assistance, defendant must show
both that counsel failed to perform an essential duty and that prejudice resulted);
State v. Tejeda, 677 N.W.2d 744, 754 (Iowa 2004) (noting that, should a
defendant fail to prove prejudice, we need not consider whether his trial counsel
performed competently).
C. Admission of Evidence
Brandes also contends the trial court erred in granting the State’s motion
and refusing to allow him to present scientific evidence which was vital to his
theory of defense. We review the trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Shortridge, 589 N.W.2d 76, 81 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998). To the
extent Brandes raises constitutional issues, our review is de novo.
State v.
Heuser, 661 N.W.2d 157, 162 (Iowa 2003).
Brandes argues the trial court erred in excluding evidence that sperm was
found on a vaginal smear taken during the victim’s sexual assault examination.
Brandes sought to admit evidence that DNA testing proved the sperm could not
have come from Alve or Brandes, and that, because a sperm fragment can
survive in the vagina for a maximum of seventy-two hours, the victim’s husband
could not have been the source of the sperm because he had been incarcerated
more than seventy-two hours prior to the examination.
12
It was Brandes’s theory that the source of the sperm was another man
with whom the victim had consensual sex, that she had consensual sex with Alve
and consented by gesture to Brandes performing oral sex on her, and that she
made up the story about being held against her will and raped because she
feared her jealous husband would be upset if he knew the truth. Brandes further
theorized that the source of her injuries was likely sex with the other man, whose
semen remained in her vagina, after her night at Brandes’s apartment. The trial
court excluded the evidence as inadmissible under the rape shield statute, not
relevant to any issue in the case, and not constitutionally required. We agree.
Evidence of the past sexual behavior of a sexual assault victim is
generally inadmissible. Iowa R. Evid. 5.412. Rape shield laws like Iowa’s “were
enacted to (1) protect the privacy of victims, (2) encourage reporting, and (3)
prevent time-consuming and distracting inquiry into collateral matters.” State v.
Mitchell, 568 N.W.2d 493, 497 (Iowa 1997); see also U.S. v. Morris, 47 M.J. 695,
704 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1997) (noting rape shield laws were “adopted in
response to the regular defense practice of eliciting the most intimate details
about a rape victim’s sexual history”). Pursuant to section 5.412(c)(3), however,
if the court determines that the “evidence which the accused seeks to offer is
relevant and that the probative value of such evidence outweighs the danger of
unfair prejudice, such evidence shall be admissible in the trial.”
“Evidence is relevant when it has ‘any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable
or less probable than it would be without the evidence.’” Mitchell, 568 N.W.2d at
498 (quoting Iowa R. Evid. 401). Brandes contends the evidence that the victim
13
had engaged in sexual liaisons was relevant to demonstrate her motive to
fabricate her claims she was held against her will and raped, and relevant to
show the source of her injuries was another man. We find such inferences to be
highly attenuated. There was no demonstrated relationship between a sperm
cell in the victim’s vagina and her anal injuries. Further, the evidence would have
little probative value on who imposed the injuries to the victim, as there was no
claim that Alve or Brandes engaged in vaginal sex with her.
Further, any
probative value of such evidence would be outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. See State v. Gettier, 438 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Iowa 1989) (finding evidence of
victim having sex with another person, and its insinuation that she is a bad
person, to be unduly prejudicial); Morris, 47 M.J. at 704 (“Other than when
certain exceptions apply, there is no purpose for eliciting such evidence other
than to impose an additional indignity on the victim.”).
We also reject Brandes’s claim that he was denied his constitutional right
to confrontation and due process due to the trial court’s refusal to allow discovery
and cross-examination on the subject of the victim’s other sexual activity in the
days before the sexual assault examination.
Evidence that is irrelevant is not constitutionally required to be
admitted. Further, the trial court has a duty to protect a witness
from questions which go beyond the bounds of proper crossexamination merely to harass, annoy, or humiliate. Even relevant
evidence is not constitutionally required to be admitted if the
prejudicial effect outweighs the probative value.
State v. Clarke, 343 N.W.2d 158, 161 (Iowa 1984) (internal citations omitted).
14
III. Conclusion
Because the trial court was free to reject Akbar’s opinion and because there
was other compelling evidence to support a conclusion that Brandes had the
capacity to form the requisite specific intent, we find sufficient evidence supports
Brandes’s conviction. Upon our de novo review, we find Brandes’s constitutional
rights were not impinged upon by the trial court’s exclusion of victim’s prior
sexual activity, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the
evidence as inadmissible under the rape shield statute and not relevant to any
issue in the case.
AFFIRMED.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
