AZIZ HAFFAR, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. SIMPSON COLLEGE, Defendant-Appellee.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 7-760 / 07-0271
Filed December 28, 2007
AZIZ HAFFAR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
SIMPSON COLLEGE,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Warren County, Peter A. Keller,
Judge.
Appeal from the district court’s grant of summary judgment. REVERSED
AND REMANDED.
Steven DeVolder of the DeVolder Law Firm, Norwalk, for appellant.
Thomas Cunningham and Anna Wholey of Nyemaster, Goode, West,
Hansell & O’Brien, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Baker, JJ.
2
SACKETT, C.J.
Plaintiff-appellant, Aziz Haffar, appeals from the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee, Simpson College, in plaintiff’s
suit for breach of employment contract and breach of Iowa Wage Payment
Collection Law. 1 He contends the court erred in granting defendant’s motion for
summary judgment and in denying his cross-motion for summary judgment. We
reverse and remand.
I. Background
Plaintiff was employed by defendant in 1995 as the head soccer coach.
His employment was governed by a succession of annual written employment
contracts that issued around March 1 of each year for the succeeding academic
year. The administrative contract at issue was dated March 1, 2004, and offered
employment “for the 2004-05 fiscal year ending May 31, 2005.”
It was
“[c]ontingent upon plaintiff’s agreement to coach soccer exclusively for Simpson
College.” At the time, plaintiff also was head soccer coach at Valley High School
in West Des Moines. The contract further provided:
Should either the college or the administrator wish to terminate the
employment relationship at the end of the fiscal year, written notice
should be provided by March 1, 2005. The college reserves the
right to terminate the contract at any time according to the policies
and procedures defined in the administrative section of the
Employee Handbook. Notice of termination will be given in writing
30 days prior to the last day of employment under such
circumstances, or payment in lieu of notice may be given, in which
case termination shall be effective immediately.
The employee handbook contained a section on “contractual policies for exempt
positions” such as plaintiff’s position. In relevant part, it provides:
1
Iowa Code chapter 91A (2003).
3
Contracts are considered to be instruments of good faith. Under
normal conditions, each party is expected to honor an agreement
extended over a period of time. There may be exceptions to this
rule.
An employee may be offered unusual professional
advancement that necessitates breach of contract. In such a
circumstance, a thirty-day notice to the College is considered to be
minimal. The College likewise reserves the right to terminate a
contract with a thirty-day notice.
The employee handbook also contained provisions for dismissal for cause. The
parties dispute whether the dismissal-for-cause provisions are relevant to this
case. The handbook defined the contractual year for all exempt employees,
such as plaintiff, as beginning on June 1 and ending on May 31. The salary year
was set as beginning September 1 and ending on August 31.
Haffar did not terminate his employment as head soccer coach at Valley
High School. In a letter dated March 1, 2005, the college provided “written notice
of termination.”
This written notice of termination is given pursuant to the
terms of your 2004-2005 administrative contract dated March 1,
2004, as amended 2 by a letter to you dated September 15, 2004.
Pursuant to the terms of your contract, you are hereby notified that
your employment with Simpson College is terminated effective
immediately. Thirty days’ pay is enclosed herewith in lieu of a 30day notice of termination.
We regret we were unable to arrive at a mutually acceptable
resolution with respect to your departure.
Plaintiff made unsuccessful demand on defendant for payment of what he
claimed was due him under the contract in salary and benefits. On September
30, 2005, plaintiff filed suit against defendant alleging (1) breach of an
employment contract, and (2) breach of the wage payment collection law.
2
The amendment specified the salary for 2004-05, (effective September 1, 2004), which
was set at $46,848, an increase from the 2003-04 salary of $41,600. It did not amend
any other provisions of the March 1, 2004 administrative employment contract.
4
Defendant answered and counterclaimed for breach of contract. Defendant later
dismissed its counterclaim.
II. Scope of Review
We review rulings on motions for summary judgment for correction of
errors at law. Stevens v. Iowa Newspapers, Inc., 728 N.W.2d 823, 827 (Iowa
2007). Summary judgment is proper only when the entire record reveals no
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Carr v. Bankers Trust Co., 546 N.W.2d 901, 903 (Iowa 1996).
The record on summary judgment includes the pleadings, depositions, affidavits,
and exhibits presented. Id. We review the evidence in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. Mason v. Vision Iowa Bd., 700 N.W.2d 349, 353 (Iowa
2005). The nonmoving party, however, may not rest upon the mere allegations
of his pleading but must set forth specific facts showing the existence of a
genuine issue for trial. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(5); Hlubek v. Pelecky, 701 N.W.2d
93, 95 (Iowa 2005). A fact question exists if reasonable minds could differ on
how an issue should be resolved. Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co. v. Jungling, 654
N.W.2d 530, 535 (Iowa 2002).
No fact question exists if the only conflict
concerns the legal consequences flowing from undisputed facts. Id.
III. Analysis
Breach of Contract.
Haffar contends the court erred in granting the
college’s motion for summary judgment and in denying his cross-motion for
summary judgment.
He first argues the written employment contract and
employee manual “unambiguously establish a one-year term employment
agreement.” The college argued, and the district court found the language in the
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contract and employee handbook, taken as a whole make it apparent “that the
College can terminate an exempt administrative employee at any time without
cause upon 30 days notice (or payment in lieu thereof).” The court did not find
Haffar’s arguments to the contrary persuasive.
“Employment relationships in Iowa are presumed to be at-will.” Phipps v.
IASD Health Servs. Corp., 558 N.W.2d 198, 202 (Iowa 1997). If an employment
contract “is for a definite time or to last until a definite day, the employer may not
discharge the employee before that time unless cause is shown or there is some
reason for discharge provided for in the contract.” Kabe's Rest., Ltd. v. Kintner,
538 N.W.2d 281, 283 (Iowa 1995). Haffar’s contract with the college was for the
fiscal year, but expressly reserved to the college the right to terminate the
contract upon thirty-day notice or immediately with payment in lieu of notice.
The employment contract expressly referred to the employee handbook.
In addition to the language quoted above that is specifically directed at exempt
employees, the handbook begins with this disclaimer:
THIS HANDBOOK IS NOT A CONTRACT NOR IS IT INTENDED
TO BE A CONTRACT. SIMPSON COLLEGE ADHERES TO THE
EMPLOYMENT AT WILL DOCTRINE.
THIS MEANS BOTH
SIMPSON COLLEGE AND AN EMPLOYEE CAN TERMINATE
THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP AT ANY TIME, WITH OR
WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE, FOR ANY REASON (NOT
OTHERWISE UNLAWFUL) OR FOR NO REASON ABSENT A
WRITTEN AGREEMENT TO THE CONTRARY. Nothing in this
handbook or in any other employment policies of Simpson College
is intended to create any promise or representation of continued
employment or other terms or conditions of employment.
(Emphasis in original.) This language unambiguously sets forth the intent that
both parties to any employment relationship have the ability to end that
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relationship at any time. The language specifically directed at exempt positions
expressly reserves the right to terminate a contract with notice:
An employee may be offered unusual professional advancement
that necessitates breach of contract. In such a circumstance, a
thirty-day notice to the College is considered to be minimal. The
College likewise reserves the right to terminate a contract with a
thirty-day notice.
Haffar argues the use of the word “breach” means an exempt employee who
chooses to terminate his employment prior to the end of the contract is subject to
legal action for breach of contract. He further argues the word “likewise” relates
back to “breach” so that the college is subject to legal action for breach of
contract if it terminates a contract pursuant to this language.
The district court, having reviewed the employment contract and the
employee handbook, determined:
It is clear from looking at the contract in its entirety that the
language referencing a breach of contract should not be construed
in the legal sense. This paragraph is simply addressing the
situation where either the employee or the employer wants to
terminate a contract prior to its expiration. Ideally, the employee
remains employed until the end of the fiscal year, but Simpson is
acknowledging what realistically occurs from time to time and that
conduct will not be actionable.
The district court did not find any ambiguity in the language of the written
employment contract or the language of the employee handbook and thus
decided there was no need to interpret the language. We disagree.
The parties had a contract; however, there remain disputed factual issues
as to the end date of the contract, the actual damages if any that plaintiff
suffered, and whether he is entitled to make a claim under Iowa Code chapter
91A. Summary judgment is inappropriate. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
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