STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. MICHAEL DAVID PAPESH, Defendant-Appellee.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 7-753 / 06-1909
Filed October 24, 2007
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
MICHAEL DAVID PAPESH,
Defendant-Appellee.
______________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, George L. Stigler,
Judge.
The State appeals from the district court’s grant of Michael Papesh’s motion to
suppress. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jean Pettinger and Mary Tabor, Assistant
Attorneys General, Thomas J. Ferguson, County Attorney, and Brad Walz, Assistant
County Attorney, for appellant State.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Shellie Knipfer, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Baker, JJ.
2
VAITHESWARAN, J.
A Black Hawk County deputy sheriff stopped a vehicle driven by Michael Papesh.
He subsequently searched the vehicle and found illegal drugs.
The State charged Papesh with possession of a controlled substance
(methamphetamine) with intent to deliver; three counts of possession of precursors with
intent to manufacture a controlled substance; and failure to affix a drug tax stamp. Iowa
Code §§ 124.401(1)(b) (2005), 124.401(4), and 453B.12. Papesh pled not guilty to the
charges and filed a motion to suppress the evidence garnered during the search.
Following a hearing, the district court granted Papesh’s motion.
The State sought
discretionary review. The Iowa Supreme Court granted the State’s request and the
case was transferred to our court for resolution.
“[I]n justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those
facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868,
1880, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 906 (1968). The following factors are the “most persuasive” in
determining the reasonableness of a stop: (1) whether the officer was investigating a
specific crime, (2) whether the officer had been given a description of the assailant and
the vehicle, and (3) whether “the perpetration of the crime was reasonably close in time
and distance to the investigatory stop under the circumstances.” State v. Scott, 405
N.W.2d 829, 832 (Iowa 1987) (quoting State v. Lamp, 322 N.W.2d 48, 51 (Iowa 1982),
abrogated on other grounds by State v. Heminover, 619 N.W.2d 353 (Iowa 2000)).
Strict compliance with the Lamp test, though, is not required. In re S.A.W., 499
N.W.2d 739, 741 (Iowa 1993).
Finally, while an officer may not rely solely on
3
circumstances that describe a broad category of innocent persons, when combined with
other factors, seemingly innocent activities may give an experienced law enforcement
officer reason to expect wrongdoing. State v. Rosenstiel, 473 N.W.2d 59, 62 (Iowa
1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277 (Iowa 2000).
Our de novo review reveals the following facts. Deputy Reese worked the day
shift. During the morning briefing he was advised of a report received by the officers on
the previous evening’s shift. The report indicated that a 1995 Polaris brand all terrain
vehicle (ATV) had been stolen. Shortly before noon, the deputy was patrolling the
eastern part of rural Black Hawk County when he noticed a vehicle pulling a flatbed
trailer with an ATV. The vehicle was approximately two-and-a-half miles west and three
miles north of the road from which the ATV was reportedly stolen. The vehicle was
driving away from that location.
After spotting the ATV, Deputy Reese turned around and pulled the vehicle over.
He testified the ATV was consistent with a 1995 Polaris. He also testified that ATVs are
difficult to identify because they are “so generic.” Finally, he stated that hauling ATVs
by trailer or truck was a common way of transporting them if one was not able to drive
them away.
We conclude the information Deputy Reese received during the briefing, together
with the knowledge he had about ATV identification and transport, satisfied the Terry
standard for a stop and the Lamp criteria.
In reaching this conclusion, we recognize that information Deputy Reese
acquired after the stop led him to conclude this particular ATV was not the stolen ATV.
However, the focus of a Terry stop is on the investigation of possible criminal behavior.
4
Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S. Ct. at 1880, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 906-07. We are persuaded that
Deputy Reese had sufficient facts at his disposal before the stop to investigate further,
even though a subsequent investigation proved him incorrect. Id. at 23, 88 S. Ct. at
1881, 20 L. Ed 2d at 907 (“It would have been poor police work indeed for an officer of
thirty years' experience in the detection of thievery from stores in this same
neighborhood to have failed to investigate this behavior further.”).
We also recognize that there was a lapse of up to twenty hours between the time
the stolen ATV was reported and the time Papesh’s vehicle was stopped. However, the
deputy was acting on a report of stolen property received just one shift earlier.
Additionally, he was canvassing a small rural segment of the county near the location of
the reported theft. In our view, the mere lapse of time between the report and the stop
does not override these factors.
We reverse the district court’s ruling on Papesh’s motion to suppress and
remand for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.