WILLIAM C. SCOTT, Applicant-Appellant, vs. STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 7-697 / 06-2084
Filed October 24, 2007
WILLIAM C. SCOTT,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Bruce B.
Zager, Judge.
Defendant appeals from the district court order denying his application for
postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
William C. Scott, Anamosa, pro se.
Jeremy B.A. Feitelson of Feitelson Law, L.L.C., West Des Moines, for
appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Thomas Tauber, Assistant Attorney
General, Thomas J. Ferguson, County Attorney, and Kimberly Griffith, Assistant
County Attorney, for appellee State.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Vogel and Baker, JJ.
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HUITINK, P.J.
William C. Scott appeals from the district court order denying his
application for postconviction relief (PCR). We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings
In 1991 a jury convicted Scott of first-degree murder.
The jury was
instructed on both first-degree murder and felony murder, but the general verdict
form did not specify the ultimate basis for the guilty verdict. We affirmed the
conviction on direct appeal and preserved his claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel for postconviction proceedings. See State v. Scott, No. 92-0064 (Iowa
Ct. App. Sept. 2, 1993). Scott filed a PCR application in 1996 asserting several
claims of ineffective assistance. After a hearing, the district court denied Scott’s
application. On appeal, we affirmed the district court’s decision denying his PCR
application. Scott v. State, No. 98-173 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 28, 1998).
In 2006 the Iowa Supreme Court issued its decision in the case of State v.
Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d 549 (Iowa 2006), and significantly altered the existing
felony-murder rule. The court made the new felony-murder rule applicable to all
prospective cases and all cases pending on direct appeal, but specifically chose
not to make the modification retroactive. Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d at 558.
Scott filed the current pro se PCR application on September 8, 2006. The
basis for this application, and the subsequent amendment to the application, was
the new felony-murder rule set forth in Heemstra.
Scott claimed the
postconviction court should reverse his conviction because the original trial
court’s jury instructions were now improper in light of the Heemstra decision. He
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also claimed the supreme court’s decision not to make Heemstra retroactive
violated his constitutional rights.
The State filed a motion to dismiss the PCR application, noting that the
Heemstra decision was not retroactive. The State also argued the application
should be dismissed because it was filed after the limitations period for PCR
actions.
Scott’s appointed counsel filed a brief resistance to this motion to
dismiss.
The district court held an unrecorded hearing on the State’s motion to
dismiss and entered an order dismissing Scott’s application for postconviction
relief on the grounds that the application was barred by the statute of limitations
set forth in Iowa Code section 822.3 (2005). The court also rejected Scott’s
claim that the retroactivity provision in Heemstra violated his constitutional rights.
On appeal, Scott claims (1) United States Supreme Court precedent
requires that the Heemstra felony-murder rule be applied retroactively to his own
case, (2) in light of Heemstra, the district court improperly instructed the jury
during his original trial, and (3) that his PCR counsel for his second application
for postconviction relief was ineffective.
II. Standard of Review
Iowa appellate courts typically review postconviction relief proceedings on
error. Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 141 (Iowa 2001). However, where
the applicant asserts claims of a constitutional nature, our review is de novo. Id.
III. Merits
Heemstra. Scott’s first two issues urged on appeal hinge on the Iowa
Supreme Court’s decision to give the rule set forth in Heemstra prospective,
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rather than retroactive, application. Scott contends the court’s decision to do so
was unconstitutional.
We disagree.
The United States Supreme Court holds that, “[w]hen
questions of state law are at issue, state courts generally have the authority to
determine the retroactivity of their own decisions.” American Trucking Ass’ns,
Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 177, 110 S. Ct. 2323, 2330, 110 L. Ed. 2d 148, 159
(1990). We find that our supreme court’s decision to alter the existing felony
murder rule falls within this general rule. Accordingly, we find no constitutional
violation here. See also State v. Eichler, 248 Iowa 1267, 1270, 83 N.W.2d 576,
578 (1957) (“If our previous holdings are to be overruled, we should ordinarily
prefer to do it ourselves.”).
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. Scott also claims his PCR counsel
for the current postconviction action was ineffective. In doing so, he claims PCR
counsel was ineffective because she did not: (1) raise any additional issues in
her resistance to the motion to dismiss, (2) raise any additional arguments that
the original trial counsel was ineffective, or (3) raise any additional arguments
that his appellate counsel was ineffective.
Finally, Scott claims she was
ineffective because she “neglected to make a record” of the hearing on the
motion to dismiss.
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant has
the burden to prove (1) counsel failed in an essential duty and (2) prejudice
resulted from counsel’s failure. State v. Buck, 510 N.W.2d 850, 853 (Iowa 1994).
“To prove the first prong, the defendant must overcome the presumption that
counsel was competent.” Id. To prove the second prong, the defendant must
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show “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result would have been different.” State v. Artzer, 609 N.W.2d 526,
531 (Iowa 2000). If the defendant is unable to prove either prong, the ineffectiveassistance claim fails. Ledezma, 626 N.W.2d at 142.
Scott mounted several attacks against his underlying conviction prior to
the current PCR proceeding. His direct appeal, initial petition for postconviction
relief, and appeal of the decision denying his petition for postconviction relief
were all unsuccessful. We find no merit to his claim that PCR counsel was
ineffective because she did not find more issues to challenge beyond those
raised in the current PCR petition.
Also, in light of our decision that his
constitutional rights were not violated by the retroactivity provision in the
Heemstra decision, we find no resulting prejudice from PCR counsel’s alleged
failure to raise additional arguments to resist the motion to dismiss and alleged
failure to insist that a record be made during the hearing on the State’s motion to
dismiss. We find no ineffective assistance here. 1
Waiver. Scott does not claim the court erred when it dismissed his PCR
application on statute of limitations grounds. Because the “[f]ailure . . . to state,
to argue or to cite authority in support of an issue may be deemed waiver of that
issue,” Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(1)(c), we also affirm the district court’s decision on
statute of limitations grounds.
AFFIRMED.
1
We also find it unnecessary to preserve these ineffective assistance claims for further
postconviction proceedings so that Scott may conduct further investigations to determine
whether he may have been prejudiced by his counsel’s alleged ineffective assistance.
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