DANNY LEE BEASON, Applicant-Appellant, vs. STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 7-646 / 06-1997
Filed October 24, 2007
DANNY LEE BEASON,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Mahaska County, James Q.
Blomgren, Judge.
Defendant appeals from the district court order denying his application for
postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
Michael S. Fisher of the Fisher Law Office, Oskaloosa, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Darrel Mullins, Assistant Attorney
General, and Rose Anne Mefford, County Attorney, for appellee State.
Considered by Mahan, P.J., and Miller and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
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MAHAN, P.J.
Danny Lee Beason appeals from the district court order denying his
application for postconviction relief (PCR). We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings
On October 18, 2002, Beason was charged with one count of seconddegree sexual abuse. Beason’s first trial to the court resulted in a guilty verdict.
However, the court overruled its own findings of fact and ordered a new trial.
Beason’s second trial was to a jury. This trial ended when the jury was unable to
reach a verdict. In the third trial, the jury found him guilty of second-degree
sexual abuse. Beason was sentenced to a term of imprisonment not to exceed
twenty-five years. Pursuant to the statutory punishment for his offense, he was
required to serve a minimum of seventy percent of this sentence.
Beason obtained new counsel and appealed his conviction. The Iowa
Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, but preserved his ineffective assistance
of counsel claims for postconviction relief.
Beason filed a PCR application on October 31, 2005, citing numerous
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
The only witnesses at the PCR
hearing were Beason and his trial counsel. The district court denied his petition
for relief.
Beason appeals, claiming his trial counsel was ineffective because (1) he
did not inform Beason that the crime of second-degree sexual abuse carried a
mandatory minimum sentence, (2) he did not call additional witnesses during
trial, and (3) he did not adequately communicate with Beason.
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II. Merits
Iowa appellate courts typically review PCR proceedings on error.
Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 141 (Iowa 2001).
However, where the
applicant asserts claims of a constitutional nature, our review is de novo. Id.
To prove ineffective assistance, Beason must prove, by a preponderance
of the evidence, his counsel failed in an essential duty and prejudice resulted. Id.
at 142. To prove the first prong, Beason must overcome the presumption that
counsel was competent. Id. To prove the second prong, he must show “there is
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result
would have been different.” State v. Artzer, 609 N.W.2d 526, 531 (Iowa 2000).
We generally find that miscalculated trial strategies and mere mistakes in
judgment do not rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel. State v.
Johnson, 604 N.W.2d 669, 673 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999).
Mandatory Minimum Sentence. Beason claims he received ineffective
assistance because he did not know that if he was convicted of second-degree
sexual abuse, he would have to serve a mandatory seventy percent of the
sentence. He claims the first time he became aware of this mandatory minimum
was at sentencing.
Beason contends he was prejudiced by this lack of
information because, had he known, he would have accepted a plea offer that
only involved probation.
At the PCR hearing, Beason’s trial counsel stated that he did not
specifically recall telling Beason about the mandatory minimum sentence.
However, he testified that he did a lot of criminal trials and he was “sure” he told
Beason about the mandatory minimum because he routinely tells all clients about
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any mandatory minimum sentence and “what they are risking.” He also indicated
that there was never a potential plea agreement where Beason would avoid a
prison sentence. Trial counsel recollected that the best plea offer was a ten-year
prison sentence, but Beason refused to entertain any plea that involved a prison
sentence.
Upon our de novo review of the record, we find the more credible
evidence is that Beason was informed of the mandatory minimum sentence for
his charge. Therefore, we find Beason has failed to prove his attorney violated
an essential duty. Even if we assume, arguendo, that Beason was not informed
of the mandatory minimum sentence, we still find there is insufficient proof of
resulting prejudice. Beyond Beason’s vague assertion that he had the chance to
plead guilty to a lesser charge that would have only resulted in a term of
probation, there is no evidence to support such a claim. Instead, his trial attorney
adamantly denies that any such offer was ever on the table.
In light of the
serious nature of the crime involved, we find it unlikely Beason would have been
offered the chance to only serve probation, and even more unlikely that his trial
counsel would not have told him about the mandatory minimum punishment
when he presented Beason with this alleged plea offer.
Additional Witnesses. Beason claims his trial counsel was ineffective
“for not calling defense witnesses which . . . would have been important to his
defense.” Beason did not call any of these potential witnesses to testify at the
PCR hearing. Instead, he simply stated what he thought they would have said at
trial. His trial counsel listed strategic reasons for not calling these additional
witnesses.
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Because these witnesses did not testify at the PCR proceeding, any
testimony they may or may not have given is purely speculative and thus any
prejudice from the failure to call them as witnesses is equally speculative.
Without these witnesses, we find little assurance that such testimony would be as
favorable as Beason alleges. See State v. Douglas, 485 N.W.2d 619, 625 (Iowa
1992) (“A reviewing court cannot predicate error on speculation.”). Accordingly,
we find Beason has failed to prove that these witnesses would have had any
significant impact on his original trial, let alone prove that the result of his trial
would have been different.
Even if we assume these witnesses would have testified as Beason
claims, we still find he failed to prove ineffective assistance because his trial
counsel articulated a sound strategic reason for not calling some of these
witnesses, and the rest of the alleged testimony would have been, at best,
cumulative. See State v. Schrier, 347 N.W.2d 657, 664 (Iowa 1984) (noting that
the failure to produce cumulative testimony is not a sufficient showing of
prejudice on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim); Johnson, 604 N.W.2d at
673 (“Where counsel’s decisions are made pursuant to a reasonable trial
strategy, we will not find ineffective assistance of counsel.”).
We find no
ineffective assistance here.
We also find no merit to Beason’s claim that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to adequately communicate with him. Accordingly, we affirm
the district court’s decision denying Beason’s application for postconviction relief.
AFFIRMED.
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