MARK WAYNE BRUNS, Applicant-Appellant, vs. STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 7-644 / 06-1855
Filed September 19, 2007
MARK WAYNE BRUNS,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Bruce B.
Zager, Judge.
Defendant appeals the district court decision denying his petition for
postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
Christopher M. Soppe of Blair & Fitzsimmons, P.C., Dubuque, for
appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Elisabeth S. Reynoldson, Assistant
Attorney General, Thomas J. Ferguson, County Attorney, and Kimberly Griffith,
Assistant County Attorney, for appellee State.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Vogel and Baker, JJ.
2
HUITINK, P.J.
Mark Wayne Bruns appeals the district court decision denying his petition
for postconviction relief. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings
On August 16, 2001, Bruns was charged with two counts of seconddegree sexual abuse for allegedly sexually abusing two five-year-old boys.
Because of his indigency, the court appointed him an attorney from the public
defender’s office. On October 18, 2001, Bruns pled guilty to both counts and
agreed to be sentenced immediately. The court sentenced him to two concurrent
twenty-five-year prison sentences.
Bruns filed the current application for postconviction relief in July 2004,
and the court held a hearing on his application in September 2006.
The
postconviction proceeding was limited to the voluntariness of his plea. The court
considered testimony from Bruns and his trial counsel concerning Bruns’s state
of mind at the time of the plea.
Following the hearing, the district court entered an order denying his
application for postconviction relief. On appeal, Bruns claims his trial counsel
was ineffective because she did not have his mental health assessed by a
professional prior to the guilty plea.
II. Standard of Review
Normally, a trial court’s denial of an application for postconviction relief
proceedings is reviewed for correction of errors at law. Ledezma v. State, 626
N.W.2d 134, 141 (Iowa 2001). However, when an applicant raises constitutional
issues, our review is de novo. Id.
3
III. Merits
Our ultimate concern in claims of ineffective assistance is with the
“‘fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being challenged.’”
State v. Risdal, 404 N.W.2d 130, 131 (Iowa 1987) (quoting Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2069, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 699
(1984)). The burden is on the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that (1) counsel failed in an essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted.
Id. at 131-32.
“To prove the first prong, the defendant must overcome the
presumption that counsel was competent and show that counsel’s performance
was not within the range of normal competency.” State v. Buck, 510 N.W.2d
850, 853 (Iowa 1994). To prove the second prong, the defendant must show
“there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result would have been different.” State v. Artzer, 609 N.W.2d 526, 531 (Iowa
2000). If the defendant is unable to prove either prong, the ineffective-assistance
claim fails. Bear v. State, 417 N.W.2d 467, 472 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987).
Bruns contends that trial counsel knew he was bipolar, taking Paxil, and
was contemplating suicide while he was in jail. He claims his trial counsel failed
to perform an essential duty when she did not have his mental health assessed
by a professional prior to the guilty plea proceeding.
The State first points out that there was no expert testimony or medical
evidence to establish Bruns’s claim that his bipolar disorder made him
incompetent to waive his rights.
The only evidence of Bruns’s alleged
incompetency was his own testimony about how he had “a hard time
concentrating on things and knowing what’s really real or not.”
4
The State also contends there was ample evidence to prove trial counsel
did not breach an essential duty when she did not take efforts to have his mental
health assessed by a professional. 1
His trial counsel testified at the
postconviction hearing that she had a doctorate in counseling and human
development and was a ten-year veteran at the public defender’s office. She
indicated that she had “a lot” of experience working with people with mental
illness and some experience working with people who were suicidal.
When
asked how she viewed Bruns’s mental state at the time, she classified it as “very
clear” and went on to indicate she never had any concerns that he did not
understand what was going on. She testified that Bruns took an active role in his
defense and he was “orchestrating what was going to go on” throughout the
case.
The State also notes that the district court inquired into this issue at the
time of the plea and found no reason to doubt Bruns’s competency:
Q. The various medications that we have talked about you
taking, do any of those medications affect your ability to think and
to know what’s going on? A. No.
Q. Where are you right now, Mr. Bruns? A. Black Hawk
County Jail.
Q. And what are you doing right now? A. I’m being
sentenced for the crime of second degree sexual abuse, two
counts, two boys.
The court went on to determine a factual basis for the plea. Not only did Bruns
articulate a factual basis, but he also went further to correct the court with respect
to which sex acts were committed on which victim.
1
The State contends Bruns did not preserve error because he has not specifically
alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion in arrest of
judgment or allowing him to waive this right We will assume, arguendo, that Bruns
preserved error on this issue.
5
For a defendant to be adjudged legally incompetent during any stage of a
criminal proceeding, it must reasonably appear as though “the defendant is
suffering from a mental disorder which prevents the defendant from appreciating
the charge, understanding the proceedings, or assisting effectively in the
defense.” Iowa Code § 812.3 (2005). As a general rule, a competency hearing
is required if the “record contains information from which a reasonable person
would believe a substantial question of the defendant’s competency exists.”
State v. Kempf, 282 N.W.2d 704, 706 (Iowa 1979) (emphasis added).
Even though he was on Paxil and, at some point, on a suicide watch, we
find a reasonable attorney would not have doubted his competency and taken
steps to seek a mental health assessment. The record is void of any objective
manifestations of incompetence. Bruns’s conduct throughout the proceedings
was that of a cogent, sound-minded individual. His trial counsel met with him on
approximately twelve occasions, and she described how he was “orchestrating”
his own defense.
She had extensive criminal experience and experience
working with individuals with mental illness, yet at no point did she find any
reason to doubt his competency.
In addition, his conduct during the plea
colloquy gave the district court no reason to doubt his competency. In total, we
find there was no reason for trial counsel to take steps to procure a mental health
assessment in this case.
Bruns did not prove his trial counsel’s performance fell outside the normal
range of competence. Accordingly, we find he did not meet his burden to prove
that she failed to perform an essential duty. Without such proof, his ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claim fails.
See Bear, 417 N.W.2d at 472 (holding a
6
defendant must prove both prongs in order to succeed on an ineffectiveassistance claim).
AFFIRMED.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
